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THE NEW ROAD TO SERFDOM: THE CURSE OF BIGNESS
AND THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST
Carl T. Bogus*
This Article argues for a paradigm shift in modern antitrust policy. Rather than
being concerned exclusively with consumer welfare, antitrust law should also be
concerned with consolidated corporate power. Regulators and courts should con-
sider the social and political, as well as the economic, consequences of corporate
mergers. The vision that antitrust must be a key tool for limiting consolidated cor-
porate power has a venerable legacy, extending back to the origins of antitrust law
in early seventeenth century England, running throughout American history, and
influencing the enactment of U.S. antitrust laws. However, the Chicago School’s
view that antitrust law should be exclusively concerned with consumer welfare—
that is, total industry output and consumer prices—has now become the consensus
view. The result has impoverished communities, decreased innovation, increased
corporate cronyism, and diminished the freedom of American citizens. This is too
important a topic to be left up to antitrust specialists alone. As it was during the
presidential election of 1912, antitrust must again be a subject of wide public
debate.
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INTRODUCTION
We are living in an era of behemoth corporations, consolidated
industries, and enormous wealth flowing into the hands of a few
people. This Article argues that our times demand a radical change
in antitrust policy: Rather than focusing exclusively on consumer
welfare, antitrust law should be concerned with the consequences
of consolidated power. Moreover, antitrust needs to become a cen-
tral topic of public debate. Just as Georges Clemenceau once
declared that war is much too serious to be left to the generals,1 I
shall argue that antitrust is too important to be left exclusively to
the economists. Antitrust issues are fundamental to American de-
mocracy and society, and they need to be a matter of general public
concern.
There was a time when antitrust was, in fact, a subject of wide-
spread public discussion. A century ago, Louis D. Brandeis warned
the nation about the dangers of giant corporations and heavily con-
centrated industries. Brandeis was concerned not merely with the
economic effects of behemoth entities—that is, not only with
whether they had the ability to gouge consumers through monop-
oly prices—but also with the political and sociological effects of
having fewer, larger companies rather than more, smaller ones.
Among other things, Brandeis believed that big business weakened
the spirit, verve, and e´lan of the nation.2 As he saw it, every time an
independent firm was swallowed by a conglomerate, someone who
was previously a chief executive officer and captain of his or her
ship became a mere member of the crew in a corporate bureau-
cracy. He was not persuaded by corporate chieftains who claimed
1. See GEOFFREY O’BRIEN & JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 348 n.5
(18th ed. 2012) (attributing the statement to Georges Clemenceau, among others). There
are various versions and attributions for the quotation; the version in the main body, attrib-
uted to Clemenceau, is the best known due to its use by the character General Jack Ripper in
Stanley Kubrick’s great film, Dr. Strangelove (1964).
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUB-
LIC PHILOSOPHY 235–36 (1996) (placing Brandeis in the tradition of those who believed that
independent entrepreneurs were vital to the moral and civic life of the nation).
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that mergers made their businesses more efficient; he was con-
vinced that many businesses were, in fact, too big to manage. And
he was concerned that big businesses were too politically powerful.
Brandeis sounded his tocsin in a series of magazines articles, a
book, and congressional testimony. His views received widespread
attention, and made him a trusted adviser of Woodrow Wilson.
Brandeis’ theories about “the curse of bigness” inspired one of the
main debates in the 1912 election, which historians consider “one
of the greatest presidential campaigns in history.”3
All four candidates in that contest—William Howard Taft, the
incumbent president and Republican candidate;4 Theodore
Roosevelt, the former president and Progressive Party candidate;5
Woodrow Wilson, then governor of New Jersey and the Democratic
candidate;6 and labor leader Eugene Debs, the candidate of the So-
cialist Party7—spoke about big business and what to do about it. As
improbable as it may seem looking back from our vantage point,
antitrust became a major campaign issue.
The clash was particularly pronounced between the two leading
candidates and their programs, that is, between Wilson and what he
called “The New Freedom,” and Roosevelt and his “New National-
ism.” Each made his approach to antitrust and the control of big
business a fundamental part of his platform. Echoing Brandeis’
thinking, Wilson complained that big business was turning rugged
individualists into serfs.8 “You know what happens when you are the
servant of a corporation,” Wilson declared; “Your individuality is
3. JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 159 (2009).
4. Taft argued that he was doing more to break up the trusts than Roosevelt had when
had been president. He observed that his administration had brought more antitrust actions
in one term than Roosevelt’s administration filed in two terms. H.W. BRANDS, TR: THE LAST
ROMANTIC 707 (1997). Taft boasted that his administration was suing to break up United
States Steel Corporation, which was then the largest company in the country and controlled
by the most powerful of all corporate magnates, J.P. Morgan. Taft’s attorney attacked
Roosevelt by arguing that U.S. Steel had become an illegal monopoly when it purchased
Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, which had been done with the express approval of then-
President Teddy Roosevelt. JAMES CHACE, 1912: WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TAFT & DEBS—THE
ELECTION THAT CHANGED THE COUNTRY 95–98 (2004). Taft believed the antitrust laws out-
lawed corporate conduct, not size, and promised to continue to vigorously enforce those laws
“no matter whether we be damned or not.” Id. at 95.
5. See infra at notes 8, 15–18, 20–22, 303–32 and accompanying text.
6. See infra at notes 8–14, 18–19, 23–25, 334–41 and accompanying text.
7. Debs was a democratic socialist who wanted to overthrow capitalism lock-stock-and-
barrel at the ballot box. CHACE, supra note 4, at 67–68, 81, 85. Debs denounced Roosevelt as a
“servile functionary of the trusts.” Id. at 223. In 1894, Debs had been convicted and jailed for
organizing the American Railway Union as a combination in restraint of trade, in violation of
the Sherman Act, and he wanted to exempt labor unions from the antitrust laws. COOPER,
supra note 3, at 230.
8. James Chace writes that in a three-hour meeting at Wilson’s home, Sea Girt, on
August 28, 1912, Brandeis persuaded Wilson to make monopolies the principal issue of his
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swallowed up in the individuality and purpose of a great corpora-
tion.”9 Wilson drew a distinction between enterprises that had
grown big through the “natural process” of outperforming rivals in
honest competition and those that had grown “artificially” through
mergers and combinations.10 The latter were the real problem ac-
cording to Wilson. “[T]hey are constantly buying up new
competitors in order to narrow the field,” he said.11
Speaking in antitrust terms, Wilson might have noted that giant
companies expanded vertically and horizontally through mergers
in order to occupy every nook and cranny of an industry, thereby
denying smaller firms profitable niches. When a pigmy found a
foothold by developing a new product, the savviest response was not
trying to outcompete the pigmy by creating an even more attractive
product, or even trying to destroy the pigmy through predatory
practices, but simply to buy the pigmy. During Wilson’s time for
example, the United States Steel Corporation combined with or ac-
quired no less than 228 separate companies.12 Those companies
had previously been located in 127 cities and towns.13 They had
been important not only to the local economies but also to the so-
cial and cultural fabric of their communities. Their top executives
may have been trustees and benefactors of local hospitals, schools,
colleges, religious organizations, museums, orchestras, and chari-
ties. They understood that the prosperity of their companies was
tied to the well-being of their communities, and they often acted as
city fathers urging elected officials to do the right thing. When local
firms were ripped from their roots and headquartered somewhere
campaign, and to argue to the American people that monopolies could not be effectively
controlled by government but had to be destroyed. CHACE, supra note 4, at 192.
9. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF A PEOPLE
12 (Gray Rabbit Publications 2011) (1913). This book consists of twelve of Wilson’s major
campaign speeches, which he collected and published after the election. Wilson’s views
about big business and antitrust are peppered throughout many of the chapters, but two
chapters— Chapter VIII “Monopoly or Opportunity?” and Chapter IX “Benevolence, or Jus-
tice?”—are devoted exclusively to these topics.
10. Id. at 71. Wilson thought that the nation need not be concerned about companies
growing big naturally because their size would become a competitive disadvantage. “[Y]ou
pass the limit of efficiency and get into the region of clumsiness and unwieldiness,” he ex-
plained. Id. at 72. Eventually, the “pigmies” will come out and “be so much more athletic, so
much more astute, so much more active, than the giants, that it will be a case of Jack the
giant-killer,” he said. Id. at 73.
11. Id.
12. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 153
(Martino Publishing 2009) (1914).
13. Id.
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else, communities were impoverished—a process we today call
“delocalization.”14
Like Wilson, Teddy Roosevelt was also influenced by a progres-
sive intellectual. In Roosevelt’s case, it was Herbert Croly, a founder
of the New Republic magazine and author of a book titled The Promise
of American Life.15 Roosevelt agreed with Wilson about the dangers
that gigantic corporations and the enormous wealth they generated
for the men who controlled them. In a series of magazine articles
published the previous year, Roosevelt condemned “dishonest men
of swollen riches” and the politicians who did their bidding
through “class favoritism.”16 “We are warring against bossism,
against privilege social and industrial,” he declared on the cam-
paign trail.17
Although Wilson and Roosevelt agreed on the disease, they pre-
scribed different medicine.18 Both men tried to draw a distinction
between good trusts and bad trusts—between big businesses that
should be broken up and those that should be left alone. But Wil-
son’s rhetoric always had the flavor of Brandeis’ belief in the “curse
of bigness,” that is, that giant corporations were inherently undesir-
able.19 Wilson was suggesting that they should be dissipated,
whether through the natural forces of a competitive marketplace,
where they would be done in by the disadvantages of their own
bloated size, or through governmental action.
In contrast, Roosevelt argued that giant companies were inevita-
ble in the industrial age. Moreover, in many instances big
14. “Practically every trust created has destroyed the financial independence of some
communities,” wrote Brandeis. Id. at 152. For an extensive modern analysis of how communi-
ties are diminished through delocalization , see Richard M. Brunell, Social Costs of Mergers:
Restoring Local Control as a Factor in Merger Policy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 149 (2006–07).
15. Roosevelt was very taken with Croley’s book, perhaps more because Croley agreed
with so many of Roosevelt’s ideas than the other way around. See BRANDS, supra note 4, at
684–85 (suggesting that Roosevelt’s raving about Croly’s “had much to do with the fact that
Croly agreed with him on the need for energetic government activities to retain the over-
weening power of corporations.”); see also CHACE, supra note 4, at 58 (regarding Croly’s
influence on Roosevelt).
16. BRANDS, supra note 4, at 684.
17. Id. at 715.
18. Not everyone agrees. For example, John Milton Cooper, Jr. writes: “On the two ques-
tions that did loom large, the trusts and the size and strength of government, it was hard to
see where [Wilson and Roosevelt] differed. Wilson talked about ‘big business’ and ‘trusts’;
Roosevelt talked about ‘good trusts’ and ‘bad trusts.’ Both would leave the former alone and
break up the latter.” COOPER, supra note 3, at 174.
19. “A Curse of Bigness” was the title of an article Brandeis wrote for HARPER’S WEEKLY
and later included as a chapter in his book OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 12. For a
description of the evolution of Brandeis’s thinking on the topic, see especially chapter thir-
teen (“The Curse of Bigness”) and pages 161 and 342–51 in MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS: A LIFE (2009).
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companies were desirable because only big companies could do big
things. The medicine Roosevelt prescribed was not breaking up big
businesses but regulating them, and thereby ensuring that their
power was not misused. Roosevelt wanted a national government
that was strong enough to keep big businesses on a leash. He criti-
cized Wilson for naively wanting to return to a preindustrial age,
and for being afraid of power—corporate or governmental.20
Roosevelt proposed establishing a “national industrial commission”
and giving it “the complete power to regulate all the great indus-
trial concerns engaged in interstate commerce—which practically
means all of them in the country.”21 Roosevelt argued that the pre-
cedent for this new commission was the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which had the power to set railroad fares, but he
wanted to give the new commission far more extensive authority. It
would not only regulate big business’ relationships with its suppliers
and customers but also its relationships with its employees. To en-
sure that corporations did not take unfair advantage of its
employees, it would be empowered to regulate wages, hours of em-
ployment, and workplace conditions.22
Wilson and Brandeis believed that seeking to control giant cor-
porations through regulation was doomed to failure. Big business
was so large and powerful, and had such a strong interest in re-
sisting regulation, that it would control the government. Wilson
suggested that business control of government was, in fact, the real
object of Roosevelt’s proposal; he said that Roosevelt’s industrial
commission idea had originally been proposed by the United States
Steel Corporation.23 Roosevelt’s proposal of controlling big busi-
ness through government regulation was a pipedream, argued
Wilson, because big companies would collaborate to control the
government instead. “We call upon all intelligent men to bear wit-
ness that if [Roosevelt’s] plan were consummated, the great
employers and capitalists of the country would be under a more
20. BRANDS, supra note 4, at 720.
21. See CHACE, supra note 4, at 167 (quoting Roosevelt). Roosevelt tried to begin to im-
plement his vision in his first term by persuading Congress to establish the Department of
Commerce and Labor and, within it, the Bureau of Corporations. However, Roosevelt had
not persuaded Congress to create a Bureau of Corporations with regulatory teeth; it had
been established merely as a research and reporting agency. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, THE
BULLY PULPIT: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF JOUR-
NALISM 370, 404–05, 432–36, 523–25 (2013).
22. CHACE, supra note 4, at 99.
23. WILSON, supra note 9, at 87.
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overpowering temptation than ever to take control of the govern-
ment and keep it subservient to their purpose,” declared Wilson.24
And the corporations would be successful. Wilson argued:
If the government is to tell big business men how to run their
business, then don’t you see that big business men have to get
closer to the government even than they are now? Don’t you
see that they must capture the government, in order not to be
restrained too much by it?25
The parallels between the Gilded Age—when the nation was
greatly concerned about the power amassed by Andrew Carnegie,
J.P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, Sanford Dole, Cornelius Vander-
bilt, and their “trusts”26—and our present era are striking. For
example, John D. Rockefeller started the Standard Oil trust
through a “buying spree” of oil refineries.27 He followed that
through an aggressive program of vertical integration, acquiring oil
producers (“buy all we can get,” he instructed his agents), and even
companies that built railroad tanker cars or pipelines that were
used for transporting oil.28 Other trusts of the era were formed in
much the same way.29
Consider the parallels with today. During the past decade, the
chemical company Monsanto purchased more than thirty compa-
nies, the computer giant Oracle acquired more than eighty
companies, and Google purchased more than 120 companies.30 Be-
tween 1994 and 2000, more than eighty aerospace-defense firms
merged into four dominant firms.31 Until relatively recently, there
were a rich diversity of major book publishers in the United States.
24. Id. at 89.
25. Id. at 85. In fact, Wilson argued that big business already controlled the government.
Id.
26. See infra at notes 218–73 and accompanying text.
27. See H.W. BRANDS, AMERICAN COLOSSUS: THE TRIUMPH OF CAPITALISM 1865–1900, at 88
(2010).
28. Id. at 91.
29. See, e.g., id. at 598–603 for a description of the formation of the United States Steel
Corporation.
30. Barry C. Lynn, Estates of Mind, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2013, at 28, 29.
31. Northrop Grumman boasts on its website that it has “integrat[ed]” nearly twenty
firms. Our Heritage, NORTHROP GRUMMAN, http://www.northropgrumman.com/AboutUs/
OurHeritage/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). General Dynamics says that
since the mid-1990s it has “acquired and integrated more than 65 businesses.” Corporate Over-
view, GEN. DYNAMICS, http://www.generaldynamics.com/about/corporate-overview/index
.cfm (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). Lockheed Martin formed in 1994 when the Lockheed and
Martin Marietta companies merged. The modern Boeing Corporation results from the merg-
ers with Rockwell aerospace and defense units in 1997, McDonnell Douglas in 1997, the
space and communications divisions of Hughes Electronics Inc. and Jeppersen Sanderson
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Now five conglomerates publish roughly two-thirds of all books in
the country.32 The largest, Penguin Random House, absorbed doz-
ens of previously-independent publishers, including such eminent
firms as Anchor, Doubleday, Dutton, Fawcett, Grosset & Dunlap,
Knopf, Pantheon, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, and Viking.33 Authors and
their agents say that these publishing houses used to separately re-
view and bid for manuscripts; now there is less of that. 34 And when
previously-independent publishers whose imprints once stood for
literary quality are absorbed by cookie-cutter conglomerates, quality
editing and individualized marketing may be sacrificed at the altar
of efficiency.35 By the time you read this, there may be only four, or
fewer, publishers. Harper-Collins and Simon & Schuster are report-
edly considering merging.36 If they decide to do so, they will
undoubtedly tell the antitrust regulators that they need to merge in
order to compete with Penguin Random House—just as Penguin
Random House told regulators it needed to merge to achieve some
level of parity with Amazon, which sells more than forty percent of
all books in the United States.37 Gigantism breeds more gigantism.
One difference between the Gilded Age and our New Gilded Age
is this: industry consolidation today often occurs on a global level.
The British advertising company WPP, for example, has today be-
come an international conglomerate by merging with or acquiring
more than three hundred previously independent ad agencies, in-
cluding such famous American firms as J. Walter Thompson, Young
& Rubicam, Ogilvy & Mather, and Hill & Knowlton.38 Today—as
Inc. in 2000. See DAVID ROTHKOPF, SUPERCLASS: THE GLOBAL POWER ELITE AND THE WORLD
THEY ARE MAKING 205 (2008).
32. Boris Kachka, Book Publishing’s Big Gamble, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/book-publishings-big-gamble.html.
33. Id.
34. Erick Pfanner & Amy Choznick, Random House and Penguin Merger Creates Global Gi-
ant, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/business/global/
random-house-and-penguin-to-be-combined.html?_r=0. One author opined that “it’s usually
true that an author benefits when there are as many big players as possible bidding against
each other.” Id. Some publishers discourage or even forbid their subsidiary imprints—which
previously had been independent rivals—from competing against each other for manu-
scripts. Kachka, supra note 32.
35. See Kachka, supra note 32 (asking “whether literary culture is best served by the
ceaseless centralization of publishing”).
36. Id.
37. Franklin Foer, Amazon Must be Stopped, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 9, 2014, http://www.new
republic.com/article/119769/amazons-monopoly-must-be-broken-radical-plan-tech-giant.
38. Barry C. Lynn, Killing the Competition: How the New Monopolies are Destorying Open Mar-
kets, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 2012, at 27, 32; Young & Rubicam Group, WPP, http://www.wpp.
com/wpp/companies/young-rubicam-group/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). WPP describes it-
self as “the world’s largest communications services group, employing 179,000 people
working in 3,000 offices in 111 countries.” Who We Are, WPP, http://www.wpp.com/wpp/
about/whoweare/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
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had been the case in the original Gilded Age—big fish are swal-
lowed by bigger fish, and then they in turn are swallowed by still
bigger fish. Many of the agencies that WPP acquired, such as the
Young & Rubicam Group,39 had themselves become large by de-
vouring other agencies. Meanwhile, delocalization has gone
international. Penguin Random House, which describes itself as
“the world’s first truly global trade book publishing company,” is
owned by Europeans.40
Consumers are often unaware of increasing industry consolida-
tion because it is camouflaged at the retail level. When a consumer
goes to the local supermarket or liquor store to purchase beer, for
example, he is greeted by what looks like a wide assortment of
brands. And, in fact, there are presently two thousand beer compa-
nies in the United States. Yet only two companies—Anheiser-Bush
InBev (AB InBev) and South African Breweries (SAB)—control
eighty percent of the domestic market.41 SAB acquired both of the
previously-independent Miller and Coors companies in 2007, and
the Belgium company InBev acquired Anheuser-Busch in 2008.42
AB InBev sells two hundred brands of beer in the United States
today, under such labels as Budweiser, Beck’s, Bass, Michelob,
Busch, Rolling Rock, St. Pauli Girl, Corona, Stella Artois, Lo¨wen-
bra¨u, Jinling, and many more.43 The SAB line-up is equally wide,
including not only a wide range of Miller and Coors beers but such
brands as Foster’s, Molson, Red Dog, Steele Reserve, Icehouse, and
Blue Moon, among others.44 It may be true that the consumer can
enjoy a wide variety of different types and tastes in beer, and maybe
even do so at reasonable prices, but people are not merely consum-
ers. What are the ramifications of consolidated corporate power for
people in their roles as citizens in a democracy, residents of local
communities, and workers?
Every time an independent firm is swallowed by a corporate be-
hemoth, top executives—the chief executive, operating, and
39. Young & Rubicam Group, WPP, supra note 38.
40. Kachka, supra note 32.
41. Tim Heffernan, Last Call, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov./Dec. 2012, http://www.washington
monthly.com/magazine/november_december_2012/features/last_call041131.php?page=all.
42. BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF
DESTRUCTION 38 (2010).
43. Brand Portfolio, AB INBEV, http://www.ab-inbev.com/brands/brand-portfolio.html
(last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
44. Brand Portfolio, MILLERCOORS, at http://www.millercoors.com/Our-Beers/Great-
Beers.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). Moreover, the two giants continue to try to acquire
other companies and expand their global market shares. See David Gelles & Stephanie Strom,
SABMiller’s Bid for Heineken Opens the Door to Possible Beer Industry Mergers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15,
2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/15/sabmiller-bid-for-heineken-opens-door-
to-possible-beer-industry-mergers/.
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financial officers; the general counsel; division and department
heads; and so on—suffer demotions in authority and self-image.
Moreover, workers at all levels face a reduction in potential employ-
ers. In an industry with many employers, a worker looking for a job
has a variety of prospects. If one employer is a bad fit, a worker
might find a better spot somewhere else. Someone who feels unap-
preciated can look elsewhere. This kind of diversity is a meaningful
component of freedom in modern society. When industries be-
come consolidated, individual freedom is diminished. An executive
at the advertising behemoth WPP remarked: “Every place I wanted
to work was already owned by WPP. And I realized that to move, I’d
need the approval of some grand poobah.”45
Today the nation has long been suffering from chronic problems
in employment and wages notwithstanding high corporate profits
and a surging stock market. It took a bafflingly long time for unem-
ployment to fall from a high of ten percent in the wake of the Great
Recession to 5.6% by the end of 2014.46 Meanwhile, experts tell us
standard unemployment figures have become misleading, perhaps
because of shadow unemployment—people who were unemployed
for so long that they have left the work force and are no longer
counted as unemployed. There is wide agreement we are still far
from the natural employment rate.47 Meanwhile, wages are stag-
nant.48 The typical American family earns less today than it did
fifteen years ago.49 There is much debate about whether these recal-
citrant problems are due to now-permanent structural problems.We
know that most jobs are created by small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs), and that SMEs are also more innovative than big
corporations.50 For this and other reasons, some believe that
45. LYNN, supra note 42, at 38 (quoting his interview of an anonymous WPP executive).
46. Robert J. Samuelson, More Jobs, But Wages Still Stagnant, SPOKESMAN-REV., Jan. 20,
2015, available at 2015 WLNR 1825637; see also Paul Krugman, Robots and Robber Barons, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/opinion/krugman-robots-and-
robber-barons.html?_r=0 (describing an increase in corporate profits at the expense of la-
bor’s wages).
47. Samuelson, supra note 46.




50. See Barry C. Lynn & Phillip Longman, Who Broke America’s Jobs Machine? Why Creeping
Consolidation is Crushing American Livelihoods, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.
washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1003.lynn-longman.html (“It is now widely ac-
cepted among scholars that small businesses are responsible for most of the net job creation
in the United States. It is also widely agreed that small businesses tend to be more inventive,
producing more patents per employee, for example, than do larger firms.”); see also JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, FREE FALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 6,
228 (2010) (stating that SMEs are the basis for job creation in any economy).
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increasing consolidation is exacerbating national employment
problems.51
As was also the case during the Gilded Age, we are living during a
time when enormous wealth flows into very few hands. During the
period from 1990 to 2004, for example, average real income in-
creased two percent for the bottom ninety percent of American
households but eighty-five percent for the top .01%.52
One of the most powerful contributors to this dynamic is the
enormous increase in compensation for CEOs and other top execu-
tives at the nation’s largest corporations. When I wrote about this
topic twenty years ago, CEOs at large U.S. companies were making
130 times as much as the average worker.53 CEOs at large firms now
make almost three hundred times as much as their average
worker.54 This is unprecedented. Even during the Gilded Age, J.P.
Morgan opined that top executives should not be paid more than
twenty times the average company worker.55
Executive compensation is correlated with something else that
Brandeis worried about: the interconnection of boards of directors.
Typically in very large corporations, many members of a company’s
board are executives and directors of other large companies. Often
outside executives are placed on the board’s executive compensa-
tion committee, creating a scratch-my-back-and-I’ll-scratch-yours
dynamic that drives up executive compensation everywhere.56 The
widening gap between the extremely rich and everyone else sup-
presses social mobility57 and exacerbates a pernicious pessimism in
national life.
Americans used to believe their children would be financially
better off than they were. This is no longer the case. Americans now
51. Lynn and Longman argue that there is growing evidence that “the radical, wide-
ranging consolidation of recent years has reduced creation at both big and small firms simul-
taneously.” Lynn & Longman, supra note 50. They believe that large dominant firms have less
incentive to create jobs themselves, but they also occupy such broad swaths of the market that
SMEs have fewer niches to exploit.
52. ROTHKOPF, supra note 31, at 69 (citing a N.Y. TIMES report).
53. Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41
BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 10 (1993).
54. See Glenn Kessler, Clinton’s Claim that CEOs make 300 Times More than American Work-
ers, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2015), available at 2015 WLNR 11036859(stating that this is the
result of a study by the Economic Policy Institute, and discussing how different studies and
methodologies lead to different results); see also ROTHKOPF, supra note 31, at 72.
55. ROTHKOPF, supra note 31, at 75.
56. See id. at 73–74 (citing a 2006 study by Amir Barnea and Ilan Guedj of the University
of Texas).
57. See id. at 71 (citing a study by Tom Hertz of American University that showed that an
American born to parents in the bottom sixty percent of all income has less than a two
percent chance of ending up in the top five percent).
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generally believe their children will likely be worse off than their
parents.58 The growing gap between the very rich and everyone else
may have many causes, but increasingly exorbitant executive com-
pensation is one of them.59
Further, executive compensation is closely tied to company size.60
Indeed, company size and top executive compensation are not
merely correlated; compensation may be precisely the point of cor-
porate growth. Some companies become larger—especially
through mergers and acquisitions—because size provides a ratio-
nale for increased compensation of the top executives.61
Perhaps the greatest problem resulting from gigantic corporate
size and high industry concentration is the political power of corpo-
rations. Bigger is more powerful, pure and simple. If we need a way
to confirm that self-evidential proposition, one is readily available.
How does business use whatever political power it can muster? First
and foremost, it seeks to have government provide it with special
benefits at the expense of the public-at-large. Economists call this
“rent-seeking.”62 In political discourse, liberals call the same thing
“corporate welfare”63 while conservatives prefer the term “crony
58. Andrew Kohut, What Will Become of America’s Kids? PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 12,
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/12/what-will-become-of-americas-
kids.
59. In 2014, the average annual compensation for CEOs at the nation’s largest 350 pub-
licly owned companies was $16.3 million. See Study: Average CEO Pay $16.3M, CHICAGO TRIB.
(June 23, 2015), available at 2015 WLNR 18410490 (describing the large gap between CEO
compensation compared to the average worker).
60. According to a series of studies by Graef Crystal of the University of California at
Berkeley, there is a close association between company size and CEO compensation. A ten-
percent increase in company size translates into a two-percent increase in CEO compensa-
tion. CEO Salaries in 1991, 41 ASS’N MGMT. 34 (1991), available at 1991 WLNR 4676994; see also
James J. Cordeiro, Beyond Pay for Performance: A Panel Study of the Determinants of CEO Compensa-
tion, 21 AM. BUS. REV. 56 (2003), available at 2003 WLNR 6794171 (reporting that the link
between company size and CEO compensation has been extensively studied); ROTHKOPF,
supra note 31, at 72–75 (suggesting that the highest paid CEOs are at very large firms).
61. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
62. “Rent seeking” has been defined as “the pursuit of governmentally-conferred bene-
fits by private interest groups.” Michael E. DeBow, The Ethics of Rent-Seeking? A New Perspective
on Corporate Social Responsibility, 12 J.L. & COM. 1, 2 (1992–93). Public policy experts some-
times use the narrower term “price supports.” See Isaac Chotiner, What Part of Poliltico Do You
Not Understand?, NEW REPUBLIC (July 1, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
113489/john-f-harris-jim-vandehei-interview-talking-politicos-editors (calling price supports
“a wonky Washington term” preferred by the Washington political class and defining it as a
“subsidy or market intervention meant to keep the price of a good inflated”).
63. “Corporate welfare” has been defined as “any action by local, state or federal govern-
ment that gives a corporation or an entire industry a benefit not offered to others.” Donald
L. Bartlett & James B. Steel, Corporate Welfare, TIME (Nov. 9, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/
ALLPOLITICS/time/1998/11/02/corp.welfare.html.
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capitalism.”64 I will use all three terms interchangeably.
One of the most extensive studies of corporate welfare was un-
dertaken by an award-winning team of investigative journalists and
published in a four-part series by Time magazine in 1998.65 Accord-
ing to that report, the annual cost of corporate welfare in the
United States is equal to the total salaries earned in a two-week pe-
riod by every worker in the country.66 Most of those benefits flowed
to the five hundred largest companies.67 A more recent academic
study confirms that larger companies are significantly more likely to
receive corporate welfare.68 Even within the cohort of very large
companies, the larger the company, the more corporate welfare it is
likely to obtain.69
When Brandeis and Wilson debated big business and antitrust
law with Croly and Roosevelt, their debate was considered to be so
important that it became the principal issue in a presidential elec-
tion.70 The problem of consolidated corporate power was then new
enough that the country had not yet accepted the status quo. Com-
placency had not settled in. Americans still believed these problems
could be solved, or at least significantly controlled. One of the main
tools for doing so was antitrust law, especially the Sherman Act,
which had been enacted two decades earlier. Historian Richard
Hofstadter says that the antitrust movement represented “the politi-
cal judgment of a nation whose leaders had always shown a keen
awareness of the economic foundations of politics. In this respect,
the Sherman Act was simply another manifestation of an enduring
American suspicion of concentrated power.”71
64. RALPH NADER, UNSTOPPABLE: THE EMERGING LEFT-RIGHT ALLIANCE TO DISMANTLE THE
CORPORATE STATE 46–47 (2014); see also HUNTER LEWIS, CRONY CAPITALISM IN AMERICA
2008–12 (2013); Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa G. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A
History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983 (2013).
65. Bartlett & Steel, supra note 63, at 36; Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steel, Corporate
Welfare: Fantasy Islands, TIME (Nov. 16, 1998), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/arti-
cle/0,9171,989572,00.html ; Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steel, Paying a Price for Polluters,
TIME (Nov. 23, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1998/11/16/polluters
.html; Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steel, The Empire of the Pigs, TIME (Nov. 30, 1998), http:/
/www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1998/11/23/pigs.html.
66. Bartlett & Steel, Corporate Welfare, supra note 63.
67. See id. (stating that Fortune 500 companies “are the biggest beneficiaries of corpo-
rate welfare”).
68. Cedric E. Dawkins, Corporate Welfare, Corporate Citizenship, and the Question of Accounta-
bility, 41 BUS. & SOC’Y 269, 282–83 (2002).
69. Id. at 284.
70. Brandeis persuaded Wilson to make monopolies the main issue of his campaign.
CHACE, supra note 4, at 192.
71. SANDEL, supra note 2, at 232 (quoting Rirchard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Anti-
trust Movement, in THE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT (Earl F. Cheit ed., 1964)).
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The antitrust specialists—the lawyers and economists specializing
in antitrust who work in the regulatory agencies, law firms and cor-
porate counsel offices, think tanks, law schools, and congressional
committees—are no longer concerned with questions about how
big business affects the political and social fabric of the nation. As
the specialists see it, those issues may be important; they are just not
appropriate considerations for antitrust law. They are messy, ideo-
logically-charged questions not susceptible to objective analysis.
Trying to take them into account leads to unpredictability, making
it impossible for corporations to know how to conduct their busi-
nesses. Courts used to take such things into account, but that led to
judges mandating their own political and social preferences.
Brandeisian lawyer-statesmen who thought that antitrust is properly
concerned with matters fundamental to the health of the Republic
have been displaced by economists with computer programs that
purport to divine whether, if companies merge, the price of prod-
ucts will rise and production fall. (It is an iron law of economic
theory that, all other things remaining constant, when prices rise,
production falls, and vice versa.) Economists might disagree about
the answers, but at least the debates appear to be scientific. To the
extent the antitrust laws take other things into account, they involve
other matters of consumer welfare such as innovation, product di-
versity, and product quality. That, in short, is what today’s antitrust
fraternity believes. Yet, as we shall see, antitrust policy traditionally
was concerned not only with consumer prices but also with the po-
litical and social consequences of consolidated power.
Here is how I shall proceed. Part I will describe how antitrust
changed. In a nutshell, it is because the Chicago School—and espe-
cially Robert H. Bork—persuaded the antitrust fraternity that its
field should be exclusively concerned with consumer welfare. This
Part of the Article will, therefore, describe and critique Judge
Bork’s argument. Part II will show that, contrary to Judge Bork’s
claims, antitrust traditionally had two strands. One strand was about
direct economic issues—about whether, for example, a merger
drove up prices or otherwise adversely affected consumers. But
there was traditionally another strand as well. That strand was about
the political and social effects of consolidated power.
Part III will bring concerns about consolidated power down to
earth by examining them within the context of specific industries. I
shall focus first on banking and the financial industry as a whole
because that was the area that Brandeis focused on. Within this in-
dustry, Brandeis’ original concerns have played out in the last ten
years: if corporations become too large, they will become, not
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merely too big to fail but too powerful to regulate. This Part will
also use the poultry industry to illustrate what industry consolida-
tion can mean for workers and for independent businesses that
deal with behemoth enterprises. Lastly, I will discuss the political
consequences of unrestrained corporate size. The Conclusion will
restate the consequences of corporate giantism, and propose that
we need a new antitrust paradigm that takes into account the conse-
quences of consolidated corporate power.
I. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL’S DEADWEIGHT VISION
A. Robert H. Bork and the Chicago School’s Central Premise
It would be an exaggeration to say that Robert H. Bork72 single-
handedly changed antitrust law. There were other influential advo-
cates of the Chicago School’s vision of antitrust, most notably
Richard A. Posner and Frank H. Easterbrook, both Chicago Law
School professors whom President Ronald Reagan nominated to
federal courts of appeals.73 Nevertheless, Bork’s influence on anti-
trust law was so enormous that is reasonable to focus on him
exclusively.
A little background is in order. In 1978, Bork, then a fifty-one-
year-old professor at Yale Law School, published The Antitrust Para-
dox: A Policy at War with Itself. Bork’s book was sophisticated yet
clearly written, fascinating, and brilliantly-argued. It is no surprise
72. Bork may be best known to history as the man whom President Ronald Reagan nom-
inated to the Supreme Court in 1987 and the Senate declined to confirm following a bloody
political battle. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, A Conservative Whose Supreme Court Bid Set the Senate
Afire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://nyti.ms/1C1WKU2. Bork earned another footnote
in history in October 1973, when he was solicitor general. In what has become known as the
“Saturday Night Massacre,” President Nixon fired both the attorney general and the deputy
attorney general for refusing to fire special prosecutor Archibald Cox, who was investigating
the president’s role in the Watergate scandal. When Nixon fired his two superiors, Bork
became acting head of the Department of Justice, and he complied with Nixon’s order to fire
Cox. Id.
Bork was originally a New Deal Democrat. His worldview was transformed when, as a
student at Chicago Law School, he took classes with economist Aaron Director. STEVEN M.
TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 93–96 (2008); Douglas Martin,
Aaron Director, Economist, Dies at 102, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2004), http://nyti.ms/1PVMcPA.
73. Their early articles include: Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law? 60
TEX. L. REV. 705 (1982). Posner says that developments in psychology have caused him to
qualify his views about the rational maximizer model, and that since the 2008 economic crisis
he has become “less trustful of purely economic analysis.” Joel Cohen, An Interview with Judge
Richard A. Posner, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
an_interview_with_judge_richard_a._posner/.
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that the book was influential.74 In a new introduction to the book
fifteen years later, Bork was able to express his satisfaction that “an-
titrust law has moved a long way in the direction urged by this
book.”75 When he wrote those words, Bork was being uncharacteris-
tically modest, since within the relatively short span of fifteen years,
The Antitrust Paradox had made an enormous impact.
Before I describe the gist of his argument, it is worth noting
something Robert Bork observed on the very first page of the origi-
nal edition: “Antitrust is a subset of ideology.”76 I entirely agree with
him on that point. It may be argued that all fields of law are subsets
of ideology; yet antitrust may be especially ideological. Ideology is
about values, and the law should reflect the values the nation de-
cides to adopt. Moreover, antitrust law does not merely involve
technical issues about how to protect competition and consumer
welfare. It is about what kind of society we want.
With this in mind, we might begin by asking what values Bork
wanted antitrust law to promote. “The only legitimate goal of Amer-
ican antitrust law,” he wrote, “is the maximization of consumer
welfare.”77 That is, of course, a simple and highly-reductionist state-
ment. Bork was not saying that antitrust has a number of goals but
one is more important than others. He claimed that antitrust legiti-
mately has a single goal. Any other goal—even if advocated by
legislators or courts—is somehow illegitimate. What makes other
goals illegitimate? I shall return to that question shortly.
First let’s ask: what constitutes consumer welfare? Bork said that
consumers decide that question in the marketplace; that is, con-
sumer welfare comprises the wants that consumers seek to satisfy
through their purchases.78 “Antitrust thus has a built-in preference
for material prosperity,” he declared.79 It is on this assumption that
the entirety of Bork’s theory rests. And that is what it is—an as-
sumption and nothing more—for Bork supported his claim that
74. It is difficult to overstate the influence of Bork’s book. One of the most acute observ-
ers of the field writes: “Bork’s ANTITRUST PARADOX defined the agenda for antitrust discourse
in its time.” William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transforma-
tion of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1416 (1990).
75. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
76. Id. at 3. When she first encounters that statement, the reader may not have been
entirely sure whether Bork was decrying that state of affairs. He was not, as he made clear
later in his book by writing: “To claim, as I have, that antitrust is a subcategory of ideology is
necessarily to assert that it connects with the central political and social concerns of our
time.” Id. at 408.
77. Id. at 51.
78. “Consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely another term for the wealth of the na-
tion,” he wrote. Id. at 90. This comes close to equating consumer welfare and the gross
national product.
79. Id.
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antitrust’s only legitimate goal is consumer welfare merely through
ipse dixit.80
Bork went on to argue that role of antitrust “lies at that stage of
the economic process in which production and distribution of
goods and services are organized in accordance with the scale of
values that consumers choose by their relative willingness to
purchase.”81 Citing Frank Knight, one of the original Chicago
School economists, Bork said that, properly conceived, antitrust law
promotes allocative efficiency without unduly impairing productive
efficiency.82 Allocative efficiency involves the allocation of resources
in the general economy while productive efficiency involves the ef-
fective use of resources by individual firms.83 Allocative efficiency
occurs when the economy produces a particular product at a price
that reflects the marginal cost of producing that product. Under
those conditions, consumers who are willing to pay the price of pro-
duction, plus a reasonable profit, can obtain that product.
Concomitantly, resources will flow toward the production of that
product in accord with what consumers are willing to pay. Where
there are greater demands, more resources will flow to meet that
demand.
By contrast, productive efficiency concerns how much it costs to
produce the product. Productive efficiency increases if a firm finds
a way to produce the same product at a lower marginal cost.
Bork argued that antitrust law should focus on allocative effi-
ciency. Because a monopolist has no competition, he is able to
demand a price higher than the marginal cost of producing the
product. This means that some consumers who would have pur-
chased the product at a lower, competitive price will not do so.
That, in turn, means fewer of those products will be produced. As
Bork saw it, the problem with monopoly pricing is not that consum-
ers must pay too much.84 He argued that the price may rise to the
same level that a monopolist might demand if, for example, the
cost of raw materials used in production increased. He also ob-
served that consumers pay monopoly prices in situations that the
law condones, such as when a seller has a patent on the product.85
Moreover, no wealth is destroyed when a monopolist obtains an in-
flated price. Wealth is merely transferred from one party to
another. That is an income distribution effect, said Bork, and such
80. Id.
81. Id. at 91.
82. Id.
83. See id. (especially the asterisked note).
84. Id. at 101.
85. Id. at 113.
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effects “should be completely excluded from the determination of
the antitrust legality of the activity.”86
But why should that consideration be excluded? Bork argued
that any decision “that requires a choice between two groups of
consumers” should be the exclusive province of the legislature and
thus is not a proper concern for a court.87 That is a strange proposi-
tion. Suppose A holds up B at gunpoint and robs him of $100. No
wealth was destroyed in that transaction either. A is $100 richer, B is
$100 poorer, and total societal wealth remains the same. Is that
transaction not a proper concern for a court? Perhaps Bork would
have laughed at this analogy. I imagine him noting that, “I said that
‘income distribution effects of economic activity’ are not a proper
concern for courts. I did not say courts should not enforce criminal
statutes.”88
If legislatures may properly consider morality and income distri-
bution effects when deciding to outlaw robbery, why should not
courts take those same matters into account when deciding whether
particular conduct should be deemed to violate the Sherman Act?
After all, Congress intended the Sherman Act to be a common law
statute to be interpreted flexibly by the courts.89 Gouged customers
surely would have no trouble with this analogy. The principal differ-
ence is that the robber’s instrument of coercion is the gun, while
the monopolist’s instrument is market power.90
Bork’s central problem with monopoly prices was that “the mo-
nopolist has made his monopoly profit creating an imbalance
between cost and desire.”91 There are some consumers who would
purchase the product at a competitive price but who will not
purchase it at the higher monopoly price. They may not be able to
afford the product at the inflated price, or even if they can afford it,
they may choose to make do with a less expensive but also less desir-
able substitute. Either way, this is a loss of value to those consumers
(as the consumers themselves perceive it)—a loss that is not coun-
terbalanced by someone else’s gain. Economists call this a
86. Id. at 110–11.
87. Id. at 111.
88. It is “the income distribution effects of economic activity” that Bork said “should be
completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust legality of the activity.” Id.
89. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 61–65 (4th ed. 2011).
90. A similar example has been used before, with the added edge of making the robbery
victim a Chicago School economist. John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental
Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 200
(2008).
91. BORK, supra note 75, at 101.
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“deadweight loss,” and Bork argued that this loss should be the pri-
mary concern of antitrust law.
The deadweight loss is a matter of allocative efficiency, and thus,
according to Bork, the kind of consumer welfare with which the
antitrust law should be concerned. He wrote:
We must appraise any questioned practice—say, a merger or a
requirements contract—in order to determine whether it con-
tains any likelihood of creating output restriction. If it does,
and if it also contains the possibility of efficiency, we have a
mixed case. . . . If a practice does not raise a question of out-
put restriction, however, we must assume that its purpose and
therefore its effect are either the creation of efficiency or some
neutral goal. In that case the practice should be held lawful.92
Our main interest is how antitrust should evaluate mergers, and
therefore we need to focus a little more on how Bork viewed corpo-
rate mergers. As the preceding discussion makes clear, Bork
effectively recognized only three categories of mergers.93 (1) Some
mergers are calculated to produce the ability to obtain monopoly
prices with the concomitant effect of reducing total industry output
and creating deadweight losses, which was Bork’s real concern. The
law, he believed, should look unfavorably on such mergers.94 (2)
Some mergers are calculated to create productive efficiency, which
would produce greater wealth for the producer, consumers, or
both. This is a reason to favor such mergers.95 (3) Some mergers
are calculated to achieve other goals.96 Bork declared that the law
should be disinterested in these other goals.97
Bork also suggested that when a company grows through merger,
we should consider that it could have chosen internal growth in-
stead. Antitrust law has traditionally been reluctant to condemn
internal growth on the theory that the law should not restrict firms
92. Id. at 122.
93. “A business firm may seek to increase profits by achieving new efficiency (benefi-
cial), by gaining monopoly power and restricting output (detrimental), or by some device
not related to either productive or allocative efficiency . . . (neutral).” Id. at 122.
94. See supra notes 91–92, infra note 101 and accompanying text.
95. BORK, supra note 75, at 125 (“There can be no rational antitrust policy that does not
recognize and give weight to productive efficiency.”).
96. Bork maintained that “when a practice does not have the capacity to restrict output,
we should assume that its purpose (and therefore its effect) is either the creation of effi-
ciency or some neutral result.” Id. at 123.
97. “The law should interfere only where merger would create a market share that raises
the likelihood of a significant restriction of output.” Id. at 207.
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from growing—and even achieving a monopoly position—by sim-
ply outperforming rivals.98
There has always been a distinction between monopolies pro-
duced by superior skill and effort, and those achieved through
mergers or predatory practices.99 The distinction has two somewhat
related justifications. The first is that it conflicts with American
principles to punish a company for doing what we expect good
companies to do, namely, grow by doing business well. The second
is that internal growth demonstrates that a firm is producing social
value by offering more attractive products or services. By contrast,
some mergers occur for exactly the opposite reason, namely, a com-
pany recognized that it was unable to grow naturally. Internal
growth serves the public interest in ways all mergers may not.
Bork seemed to accept this second rationale.100 He said nothing
about placing a ceiling on internal expansion. On the one hand,
that is entirely understandable as the antitrust laws have always
been interpreted as not placing a limit on internal expansion, as
long as it has not been assisted by unfair practices.
On the other hand, though, under Bork’s core theory—that the
antitrust laws are designed to prevent firms from achieving such
dominant market positions that they have the ability to restrict total
industry output—it should not matter how that dominance was
achieved.101 That would not have been an unprecedented view.
Over the years, some courts, scholars, and members of Congress
have argued that a monopoly position should be prohibited regard-
less of how acquired.102 Moreover, the language of the Sherman Act
is, on its face, consistent with that position.103 But that was not
Bork’s conclusion. He did not explain why; he simply ignored that
98. Id. at 206–07.
99. HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 296.
100. BORK, supra note 75, at 199 (“[S]ize by internal growth demonstrates superior effi-
ciency, but merger that creates real market control will certainly have the effect of restricting
output and may or may not create new efficiencies.”).
101. Id. at 206 (“Growth is preferable to merger in only one type of case: where merger
would create a market share so large that the result would be restriction to output. There is
no other general reason to prefer internal expansion to merger.”). Bork intended this as a
defense of growth by merger; he was arguing that growth through merger is generally just as
fine as growth through internal expansion. Yet he failed to explain why—when a firm is on
the threshold of achieving dominance sufficient to reduce output—he draws a distinction
between growth through merger and internal growth. I draw a distinction between growth by
merger and internal growth myself, but I do so on the basis of American tradition, not eco-
nomic policy. See infra at notes 689–90 and accompanying text.
102. HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 290–97.
103. Section 2 states that “Every person who shall monopolize . . . any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor.” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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option. His bottom line was: “The law should interfere only where
merger would create a market share that raises the likelihood of a
significant restriction of output.”104
In addition, Bork argued that the law should entirely ignore ver-
tical mergers and acquisitions by conglomerates because he
believed that only horizontal mergers are designed to increase a
firm’s market share.105 Vertical mergers, he believed, are always de-
signed to increase efficiency.106 As Bork colorfully put it: “The law
against vertical mergers is merely a law against the creation of effi-
ciency.”107 Conglomerate mergers are just as simple. Because only
horizontal mergers increase market share, and conglomerate merg-
ers are, by definition, not horizontal mergers between competitors,
they should not be a concern of antitrust law.108 “The legality of
such mergers under the antitrust laws should in no way depend
upon a showing that any particular merger will create new efficien-
cies or that conglomerates as a class create efficiencies. It is enough
that they do not create the power to restrict output,” Bork wrote.109
B. Are All Mergers Rational Corporate Decisions?
The fundamental Chicago School assumption—that people and
businesses are rational maximizers—subtly leads to a vision of the
world that is cartoonish in its simplicity. Bork believed that busi-
nesses merge either to increase market share or efficiency.
Although he acknowledged in passing that there might be other
motives driving mergers, he never explored what they might be,
and he was, in fact, probably skeptical that other motives really ex-
ist. “When the likelihood of output restriction is not present,” he
wrote, “we must assume that the firm makes the choice between
104. BORK, supra note 75, at 207.
105. “Horizontal mergers increase market share, but vertical mergers do not.” Id. at 231.
Horizontal mergers are those between firms at the same link on the production and distribu-
tion chain, such as a merger between two manufacturers or between two retailers. Vertical
mergers are those between firms at different links on the chain, such as a merger between a
supplier and its customer. ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & STEPHEN CAUKINS, ANTI-
TRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 409 (5th ed. 2004).
106. “Antitrust’s concern with vertical mergers is mistaken,” he argued. BORK, supra note
75, at 226. “Vertical mergers are means of creating efficiency, not of injuring competition.”
Id.
107. Id. at 237.
108. “A conglomerate merger is usually defined as any merger that is not horizontal or
vertical.” Id. at 246.
109. Id. at 248.
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internal expansion and merger on the basis of the relative costs of
two routes to larger size.”110
But, in fact, people are motivated by far more than rationality.
Human beings are driven by desires, hopes, and fears—some con-
scious, some unconscious—that often cause them to depart from
the course of action that would be chosen by an entirely rational
being. Corporations are, of course, nothing but collections of peo-
ple, and they too are capable of engaging in irrational behavior.
Sociologists have shown that large corporations, with presumably
well-trained managers and multiple levels of review, are capable of
breathtakingly irrational behavior.111 Corporate managers may
make decisions that are good for them personally but bad for their
company. Thus, merger decisions may be driven by many reasons
that are not rational from the firm’s point of view.
Bork was also wrong in arguing that when a company choses to
expand through a merger, we should assume that it could have cho-
sen to expand internally. Companies may decide to acquire small
innovative competitors because they were unable to themselves in-
novate. Even though Apple acquired many smaller companies
under his leadership, Steve Jobs, for example, believed that mergers
were signs of defeat because they represented failures to innovate
internally.112 Firms that are capable of innovating may find it
110. Id.
111. For example, B.F. Goodrich Co. designed, manufactured, and delivered a brake as-
sembly for a U.S. Air Force plane despite knowing that its new brake failed fourteen
consecutive internal tests and was certain to fail when tested by the general contractor and
Air Force, endangering plane and pilot. The company persisted in this course of conduct
even though it was all but certain that its malfeasance would be discovered, the company
would not profit, and its relationships with important customers would be damaged. Kent
Vandivier, Why Should My Conscience Bother Me? Hiding Aircraft Brake Hazards, in CORPORATE
AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY ch. 6 (M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundman eds.) (5th ed. 1996). Other stories of
less-than-rational actions by large companies include the GM ignition switch and the Ford
Pinto. See Bill Vlasic, G.M. Inquiry Cites Years of Neglect Over Fatal Defect, N.Y. TIMES (June 5,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/business/gm-ignition-switch-internal-recall-in-
vestigation-report.html (describing how GM employees sat through meetings about a
dangerous safety issue without making decisions or taking action, disabled by a culture of
avoiding “responsibility with a ‘G.M. salute’—arms crossed and pointing fingers at others—
and the ‘G.M. nod,’” described by G.M.’s current CEO as “an empty gesture”); CARL T. BO-
GUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: BIG BUSINESS, DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, AND THE
COMMON LAW 190–92 (2001) (describing how Ford produced a car in which it knew occu-
pants would burn to death while rejecting inexpensive safety modifications suggested by its
own engineers).
112. Sarah Cohen, Apple’s Acquisitions Aspirations: Think Again, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2013/04/25/apples-acquisition-aspirations-
think-again; see also Tom Peters, Dumb Rules Businesses Often Follow, SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, Oct. 24, 1994, at B3 (opining that most mergers are “lame excuses for the failure to
create genuinely new products, services or markets”).
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cheaper to purchase smaller firms that invent new products or
processes than to invest more heavily in research and development
themselves. When, for example, a large pharmaceutical company
buys a small firm that invented a potentially profitable new drug,
should the law care that there will be one less firm in the industry?
Should the law care that so often the dream of innovative entrepre-
neurs appears to be not to build companies that will flourish and
grow over time, but to get rich quicker by building companies that
will be bought out by a corporate behemoth?113 Judge Bork would
answer no to the first question, and presumably to the second as
well.114 Bork was also insensitive to the possibility of a corporate
agenda being driven by the personal interests of its top executives.
Suppose the real motivation behind a company purchasing three
other firms was because the company’s top executives believed that
increasing their company’s size would produce increases in their
compensation.115 In a slightly different twist, suppose the com-
pany’s top executives are motivated more by ego than money.
Suppose, for example, that they want the prestige that goes with
running a larger company. Of course, the executives would not re-
veal their real motives. They would argue that the mergers would
produce synergies or otherwise enhance efficiency. Moreover, cog-
nitive dissonance being what it is, they may even persuade
themselves that their proffered rationalizations are true. Should the
law care about the real motives behind a merger? Bork would surely
say that it is not the job of antitrust regulators and courts to psycho-
analyze or second guess a company’s executives; that’s the job of
the board of directors. Besides, he would argue, the actual mo-
tives—good or bad, laudable or not—should not matter to the law
as long they do not involve restricting output.116
Bork and the Chicago School became blind to the complexity of
the world by relying too heavily on theory. The central premise of
Chicago School theory is that people and firms are rational
113. See infra at notes 692–93 and accompanying text.
114. BORK, supra note 75, at 206.
115. Companies often justify executive compensation on the basis of their size. For exam-
ple, when four New York hospitals were asked why they were paying their chief executive
officer more than four million dollars per year, “All of the hospitals said the pay was justified
by the size of their systems.” Anemona Hartocollis, At New York-Presbyterian Hospital, Its Ex-
C.E.O. Finds Lucrative Work, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/
16/nyregion/at-newyork-presbyterian-hospital-its-ex-ceo-finds-lucrative-work-.html.
116. BORK, supra note 75, at 123 (“Antitrust must content itself with the identification of
attempts to restrict output and let all other decisions, right or wrong, be made by the millions
of private decision centers in the American economy.”).
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maximizers.117 But, in fact, people are often driven by emotions.
They don’t always act rationally to maximize their self-interest; and
because corporations are managed by human beings, they too often
fail to follow the rational-maximizer model. Bork accepts at face
value that corporate mergers are driven by honest analyses of
profitability.
There is evidence, however, that most mergers between large
companies destroy rather than increase shareholder wealth. Ac-
cording to one study, when large companies acquire other firms of
some significant relative size, shareholder wealth is destroyed far
more often than it is created.118 Surely executives of large compa-
nies know this. Perhaps some of them believe that they are smarter
and savvier than their counterparts at other companies, and will
succeed where others have failed.
Another example of Bork relying too heavily on theory involves
cartels. He argues that few cartels exist because it is difficult to
maintain cartels over any period of time.119 The theory—long pro-
moted by many economists—is that each member of the cartel has
a strong incentive to cheat and sell more than the established
quota, and it is difficult for other members of the cartel to detect
and punish cheating. Thus, cartels quickly disintegrate. That is the
theory. But we have learned that, in fact, many cartels are successful
over extended periods of time.120
Similarly, Bork also argued that predatory pricing—that is, at-
tempting to drive a rival out of business by selling products below
cost—seldom occurs, and even in those rare instances when it does
117. Throughout this paper, I use the term “rational maximizers” to mean rational profit
maximizers. Chicago School and other rational choice theorists will argue that they use the
term more broadly to mean that people rationally seek to maximize all that is personally
useful to them, including not only material wealth but also status, sexual satisfaction, love,
pleasure, knowledge, vengeance, enlightenment, and so on. There are two problems with
that claim. First, after having made it, rational choice theorists generally focus on material
wealth and ignore everything else. Second, when one broadens what is being maximized to
include everything, it is no longer analytically useful to say that people are rational maximiz-
ers. You might as well say that people are motived by human desires.
118. The study focused on acquisitions worth $500 million or more and only on deals
when the buyer offered a price more than fifteen percent of its own market capitalization.
David Henry, Mergers: Why Most Big Deals Don’t Pay Off, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 14, 2002, at 60, 63.
It found that sixty-one percent of deals destroyed rather than created shareholder wealth of
the buyer company, measured one year after acquisition. Id. The results remained about the
same two years post-merger. Id. An earlier study produced similar results. Id.
119. Bork, in fact, carries this idea even further. Not only does he believe that cartels
seldom exist, he is “highly skeptical of the entire theory of oligopolistic interdependence.”
BORK, supra note 75, at 191.
120. WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD 13 (2002).
We have learned that cartels can be profitable and difficult to detect. Avishalom Tor, Under-
standing Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573, 644–45 (2014).
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occur, it does not have a deleterious effect on allocative effi-
ciency.121 According to Chicago School theory, predatory pricing
was irrational because to make its scheme effective the predator
would have to increase output. Meanwhile, the firm it was trying to
hurt had the option of reducing output. This would result in the
predator bleeding losses at a greater rate than the victim.122 Even if
a predator succeeded in driving a competitor out of the market, it
would be unlikely to recoup its losses because should it start reap-
ing the rewards of monopoly pricing, new competitors will enter
the market, forcing prices down to competitive levels.123
Besides, predatory pricing benefits consumers. “The theoretical
argument presented here suggests that predatory pricing is most
unlikely to exist and that attempts to outlaw it are likely to harm
consumers more than would abandoning the effort,” concluded
Bork.124 The theory was elegant and seemed to make intuitive
sense. But theories can be dangerous. Albert Einstein warned:
“Pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empiri-
cal world; all knowledge of reality starts from experience and ends
in it.”125 We know from real-world experience that predatory
pricing does occur and is often successful.126 Amazon, for example,
has repeatedly and successfully engaged in predatory pricing, often
to force a recalcitrant rival to sell its business to Amazon.127
121. BORK, supra note 75, at 148–60.
122. Id. at 149.
123. Bork put a finer point on it. Theory suggested that “ease of entry will be symmetrical
with ease of exit.” Id. at 153. That is, the easier it would be to drive a rival out of the market
through predatory pricing, the easier it would be for new rivals to enter to the market. Con-
versely, the higher the barriers to entry, the more difficult it would be to drive a rival from
the market. “This symmetry of entry and exit means that predation by price cutting is a poor
investment even if the predator has the reserves to bear the disproportional losses required,”
concluded Bork. Id. And if this were not enough, said Bork, losses were immediate while any
monopoly profits were in the future. Thus, even assuming they were not pie in the sky, future
monopoly profits had to be discounted by the interest rate, thus making the recouping of
losses still more difficult. Id. at 154.
124. Id. at 155.
125. ALBERT EINSTEIN, IDEAS AND OPINIONS 271 (1954). Einstein was not saying that logic
and reason have no place; he was emphasizing the danger of relying on pure reason and not
grounding theory in experience. Id.
126. Behavioral research also suggests that firms may engage in predatory pricing and
other predatory conduct even when that conduct is theoretically irrational. Tor, supra note
120, at 660–61; Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 767–68 (2004).
127. For example, Amazon wanted to purchase the internet shoe retailer Zappos, but
Zappos wasn’t interested. BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF
AMAZON 269–70 (2013). Amazon spent a great deal of money launching a competing busi-
ness, offering services and pricing that “ensured Amazon would lose money on each sale.” Id.
Contrary to Chicago School theory, when Zappos tried to match Amazon, the victim’s losses
exceeded those of the predator because Zappos’ volume was greater. (While Amazon was the
bigger and financially-stronger company, Zappos had a much larger share of the shoe mar-
ket.) Amazon tightened the noose more by giving customers a five-dollar bonus to free
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Bork and the Chicago School presented an ideological worldview
and a set of values camouflaged as immutable economic laws. I do
not dispute that when prices rise above competitive levels consum-
ers who can no longer afford the product suffer deadweight losses.
Nor do I dispute that monopoly prices and deadweight losses are
proper concerns of antitrust law. But it is an ideological choice to
make consumer welfare and deadweight losses the only concern. It
is too easy to confuse what we value with what we measure.128 Ironi-
cally, Bork himself observes: “Economists, like other people, will
measure what is susceptible of measurement and will tend to forget
what is not, though what is forgotten may be far more important
than what is measured.”129 Yet that is precisely what Bork and the
Chicago School have done by throwing out all considerations other
than one that economists claim to be able to measure, namely,
whether a merger produces sufficient concentration to result in
monopoly pricing and deadweight losses.
C. The Influence of Chicago School Theory on the Law
Ten years after publication of The Antitrust Paradox, Richard Pos-
ner declared, “Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust
overnight shipping. “In other words,” explains Stone, “a customer was given five dollars just
to buy something on the site.” Id. Eventually, Zappos surrendered and sold itself to Amazon.
See id. at 250–56.
A second example is Amazon’s acquisition of Quidsi, an online retailer of diapers and
other baby supplies. After Quidsi’s fiercely-independent cofounders rebuffed Amazon’s invi-
tation to buy their company, Amazon entered their market, pricing diapers so low that
Quidsi estimated that Amazon would incur losses of $100 million over just a three-month
period. Id. at 277. Quidsi was not strong enough to wage a sustained war however. It capitu-
lated and was acquired by Amazon. The FTC approved the deal because other firms sold
diapers online and in physical stores, and therefore the acquisition did not result in a mo-
nopoly. This is, incidentally, an example of antitrust law’s single-minded focus on consumer
welfare. See id. at 274–79.
Amazon also engaged in somewhat different predatory practices to force another unwill-
ing firm, Lovefilm, to sell itself to Amazon. See id. at 286–90.
Amazon’s use of predatory pricing of e-books and other predatory practices is an ongoing
story. See id. at 237–42, 260–66, 311; see also David Streitfeld, Feed the Beast (or Else), N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2014, at BU1; David Streitfeld, Amazon Angles to Attract Hachett’s Authors to Its Side, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2014, at B3; Jonathan Mahler, Toe-to-Toe With a Giant, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2014,
at B1.
128. Two centuries ago, Edmund Burke had the same complaint about certain members
of parliament. “They think there is nothing worth pursuit, but that which they can handle;
which they can measure with a two-foot rule; which they can tell upon ten figures,” he la-
mented. JESSE NORMAN, EDMUND BURKE: THE FIRST CONSERVATIVE 161 (2013) (quoting
Burke).
129. BORK, supra note 75, at 127.
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today—whether as a litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or in-
formed observer . . . agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws
should be to promote economic welfare.”130 This was not just wish-
ful thinking by a prominent Chicago School member. Although
everyone may not have been fully persuaded of the wisdom of its
vision, just about everyone was persuaded that the Chicago School
was now the consensus view. Thirty-five years after its publication,
The Antitrust Paradox has been cited in over 200 court opinions and
nearly 2,500 law review articles.131 Contributors to a 2014 sympo-
sium on Bork and antitrust published by the Antitrust Law Journal
said Bork’s influence on antitrust law is “unequaled,”132 declared his
book to be “undeniably the most influential work in modern anti-
trust,”133 and observed that it is “difficult to overstate Robert Bork’s
impact on law and politics in the second half of the 20th cen-
tury.”134 Bork is hardly just of historical importance. The
contributors agreed that his influence has been “deep and dura-
ble”135 and “enduring.”136 Bork remains the single most influential
voice in antitrust law.
The Chicago School worldview has so saturated the collective
mind of the antitrust fraternity that most of those who try resisting
wind up debating details while conceding first principles.137 Per-
haps the greatest challenge to the Chicago School is coming from a
130. Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 563 (2012) (cit-
ing Posner’s treatise on antitrust law).
131. According to Westlaw searches conducted in the “all cases” data base on October 9,
2015.
132. William E. Kovacic, Out of Control? Robert Bork’s Portrayal of the U.S. Antitrust System in
the 1970s, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 855 (2014).
133. Barak Orbach, Was the Crisis in Antitrust a Trojan Horse?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 881,
881–82 (2014).
134. Adam J. Di Vincenzo, Editor’s Note: Robert Bork, Originalism, and Bounded Antitrust, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 821, 821 (2014).
135. Kovacic, Out of Control?, supra note 132, at 855.
136. Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and The Goals of Antitrust Policy,
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 847 (2014).
137. One commentator observed that in the early years of the debate, Chicago School
theorists would argue that an entire field of law was one hundred percent wrong, “[a]nd then
the replies would be, ‘No, we were only 80 percent wrong.’” TELES, supra note 72, at 99
(quoting Douglas Baird). Critics generally still argue that the Chicago School’s error is a
matter of degree. E.g., JONATHAN B. BAKER ET AL., HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE
MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky
ed., 2008). Another prominent example is Herbert Hovenkamp, who believes Chicago
School doctrine is oversimplified and who welcomes a post-Chicago School antitrust that
recognizes greater complexity. See generally, Hebert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Re-
view and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257 (2001). Nevertheless, Hovenkamp accepts
first principles when he states: “Antitrust is a defensible enterprise only if it can make markets
more competitive—that is, if antitrust intervention tends to produce higher prices, larger
outputs, or improved product quality. Id. at 269.
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burgeoning behavioral antitrust movement, which seeks to apply
the findings of behavioral economics to antitrust policy.138 Behav-
ioral economics holds that individual rationality is often
compromised by psychological biases and failures of willpower, and
it argues that the Chicago School exaggerates the degree to which
individual choices are driven by rational judgments. 139 Behavioral
economics challenges many of Chicago School theory-based dog-
mas with empirical research, and it is extremely useful.
Nevertheless, in the main behavioral economists are not challeng-
ing the central values and objectives of the Chicago School. “There
is nothing left of the old pre-Chicago, social/political, big business
is bad, small business is good, rationale for antitrust,” write two
commentators.140
To get a feel for how Chicago School theory has influenced anti-
trust jurisprudence, let’s consider a couple of cases that—although
having little to do with our central concern of mergers—are none-
theless useful in showing how Chicago School theory has affected
fundamental values.
In 1984, the Supreme Court heard a dispute between the NCAA
and two of its member colleges.141 The NCAA had entered into
four-year television contracts with the ABC and CBS television net-
works, giving each network the right to broadcast a certain number
of football games played by its member schools per year. In the
1980–1981 football season, for example, one network telecast
twelve national games and forty-six regional games.142
In theory the colleges were free to negotiate fees with the net-
works for the right to broadcast their games; but in practice
everyone adhered to a NCAA recommended fee schedule that set
rates depending upon whether a game was televised nationally or
regionally, and whether a team was in Division I, II, or III.143 Within
those classifications, all colleges received the same fees. Over every
two-year period no school could have its games broadcast more
than six times, and each network had to telecast games of least
138. See Tor, supra note 120, at 576 n.7 (citing much of the literature that attempts to
apply behavioral economics to antitrust issues).
139. See generally Amanda R. Reeves & Maurice Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J.
1527 (2011).
140. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 90, at 191.
141. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
142. Id. at 93 n.10. The NCAA entered into a separate contract with Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. (TBS), giving TBS the exclusive right to cablecast NCAA football games. Id. at 92
n.9. TBS was permitted to cablecast nineteen games per season that were not broadcast by
either ABC or CBS. Id. at 124. At the time, the cable audience was relatively small. Id. at 95.
143. Nearly ninety percent of total revenue went to Division I teams. Id. at 93 n.10.
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eighty-two different schools.144 NCAA rules also prohibited Division
I colleges from having any other football games televised.145
Unhappy with limits being placed on their ability to sell televi-
sion rights for their games, two football powers—the University of
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia—sued the NCAA, alleging
that the TV contracts and its rules unreasonably restrained trade.146
They argued that the NCAA was acting like a cartel, restricting out-
put, that is, the total number of televised college football games.
The NCAA argued that it was attempting to protect attendance at
its members’ football stadiums, competitive balance among its
members, and amateur athletics.147
The Court decided that the NCAA plan was unlawful. “Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription,’ ”
declared the Court.148 Its authority for that proposition was The An-
titrust Paradox.149 As the Court saw it, in this case the consumers
were television viewers.150 Thus, the welfare of those viewers was go-
ing to be paramount. The Court defined consumer welfare in terms
144. Id. at 94. There were 187 NCAA member colleges that played Division I football. Id.
at 89. Thus, the TV contracts required that the networks telecast games by about forty-four
percent of those schools. Not all telecasts were equal, however. Syndicated stations might
elect not to carry a particular telecast. The Court noted that on a particular weekend in 1981,
ABC telecast a football game between the University of Oklahoma and USC that was carried
by more than two hundred stations, and a football game between Appalachia State and The
Citadel that was carried by only four stations. Id. at 107 n.33.
145. Id. at 94.
146. More precisely, five major conferences formed a separate association, the College
Football Association (CFA), to represent their interests as their member colleges, which were
all major football schools and NCAA members. The CFA negotiated a contract with NBC to
broadcast additional games. The NCAA announced that it would impose sanctions on any
member that allowed its football games to be broadcast by NBC. Under the threat of sanc-
tions, colleges balked, and the CFA-NBC contract was cancelled. Id. at 89, 95.
147. The case is generally considered significant because the Court decided that the
NCAA plan had to be analyzed under a rule of reason analysis rather than decided on a per
se basis. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984). That is, rather
than condemning the TV arrangement merely because it constituted a horizontal restriction
that reduced output, the Court held that it was necessary to consider whether the plan’s
anticompetitive effects outweighed any procompetitive benefits. See generally id. However, the
Court stressed that it was not mandating the more extensive rule of reason inquiry because
the NCAA was a non-profit organization or because the NCAA sought to protect intercollegi-
ate amateur athletics. Id. at 100–01. Rather, the Court said that rule of reason analysis was
necessary because no sports league can exist without horizontal agreements, and it cited THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX for that noncontroversial proposition. Id.
148. Id. at 107.
149. While the Court did not cite THE ANTITRUST PARADOX directly in support of this
proposition, it quoted from one of its earlier decisions, which cited Judge Bork’s book. Id. at
107 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)).
150. The Court clearly drew a distinction between broadcasters and consumers. Id. at 99.
It also cited with approval the trial court’s statement that consumers were as “the viewers of
college football television.” Id. at 107 n.34.
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of prices and output.151 Television viewers were harmed because the
number of college football games being telecast was artificially lim-
ited.152 In fact, the Court used the word output no less than forty-
seven times in its decision.
However, the laws of economics that govern the manufacture
and sale of widgets are not as readily transferable to this arena as
the Court seemed to assume. The Court never paused to consider
that, in this situation, price and output were not the two sides of the
same coin. As a general principle, when output decreases, price in-
creases, and vice versa. But although the NCAA television plan may
have artificially reduced the number of college football games avail-
able for television viewers, it did not inflate prices for those
consumers. Regardless of whether viewers were receiving network
broadcasts free over the airwaves or via cable, there is no evidence
that they were paying higher prices in any form, whether in money
or time spent suffering through commercials. Maybe this should
make a difference; maybe it should not. Viewers may have been dis-
advantaged because of decreased output—that is, fewer TV college
football games—but reduced output was not driving up consumer
prices.153
The television networks were, of course, affected. They paid
more to broadcast particular games than they would have paid for
the same games if there were no limits on the number of games
that could be televised. Scarcity increases prices in this situation
too. But the networks were not complaining because what they paid
colleges and what it charged advertisers were both dependent upon
the size of the television audience. Scarcity increased the fees they
had to pay colleges for individual games, but it also increased their
advertising rates. For the same reason, advertisers were not being
151. The Court spoke of prices and output as intertwined vis-a`-vis consumers. It wrote, for
example:
A restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer preference in
setting price and output is not consistent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law.
Restrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade
that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.
Id. at 107–08.
152. Id. at 99.
153. The court of appeals seemed to have a better understanding of this. It noted that
many of the alleged injuries did not involve “the allocative efficiency/deadweight loss classi-
cally attributed to cartelization.” Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147,
1151 (10th Cir. 1983). When it mentioned reduced output, it did not automatically associate
it with increased consumer prices. Id. at 1156 (stating that the TV plan “suppresses product
diversity and restricts output.”).
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harmed. They pay higher rates to reach larger audiences with desir-
able demographics for all programming.154
In simple terms, the case comes down to a cost-benefit analysis,
comparing the plan’s anticompetitive effects against whatever legiti-
mate benefits it produces. The plan was anticompetitive in that it
restricted the number of games for which Oklahoma and Georgia
could sell television rights. The NCAA argued that its plan had an
important procompetitive effect because it protected ticket sales at
its members’ football stadiums. In response to that argument, the
Court wrote: “At bottom the NCAA’s position is that ticket sales for
most college games are unable to compete in a free market. The
television plan protects ticket sales by limiting output—just as any
monopolist increases revenues by reducing output.”155
Is it appropriate to consider noneconomic benefits when evaluat-
ing an alleged antitrust violation? Or should anticompetitive
economic harms be weighted only against procompetitive, eco-
nomic benefits? The Court’s opinion elided this controversial
issue.156 “Today we hold only that . . . by curtailing output and
blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to consumer
preference, the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the
place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life,” it declared.157
It was a 7-2 decision, and the justices did not divide ideologically.
The two dissenters, Justices Byron White and William Rehnquist,
thought it proper to consider noneconomic factors. “When these
values are factored into the balance,” they wrote, “the NCAA’s tele-
vision plan seems eminently reasonable. Most fundamentally, the
plan fosters amateurism by spreading revenues among various
154. Advertisers pay premium rates for NCAA football games because those broadcasts
draw viewers with college degrees and higher incomes. Id. at 1158.
155. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984), at 116–17. The
dominance of television is having its effect; student attendance at college stadiums is declin-
ing. Darren Rovell, Will Next Generation of Fans Show Up?, ESPN (Feb. 17, 2004), http://
espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10458047/next-generation-ticket-holder-concern-
students-show-college-football-games.
156. Based on its reading of previous Supreme Court precedent, the court of appeals had
held, “Noneconomic considerations, however worthy, cannot be used to justify restraints that
adversely affect competition.” 707 F.2d 1147, at 1154. Its conclusion was based on language in
an earlier Supreme Court case that stated: “[W]e may assume that competition is not entirely
conducive to ethical behavior, but that is not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act,
for doing away with competition.” Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
687–96 (1978). In his dissenting opinion in Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., Justice
White said that language should not be interpreted to mean that courts should not consider
noneconomic effects. 468 U.S. 85, at 133–34.
157. 468 U.S. 85, at 120.
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schools and reducing the financial incentives toward
professionalism.”158
The most articulate expression of that view was offered by Judge
James E. Barrett in his dissenting opinion at the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge Barrett argued that the primary
purpose of the NCAA’s television plan was not anticompetitive but
in furtherance of the association’s mission of maintaining “intercol-
legiate football as an amateur sport and an adjunct of the academic
endeavors of the institution.”159 He stressed that many NCAA rules
were designed to insure that college athletes were “genuine stu-
dents,” and he thought the TV plan supported that fundamental
objective.160 It was a mistake, he said, to view “intercollegiate foot-
ball competition not only as a business, but as a ‘pot of gold’
business” for football power schools such as Oklahoma and Geor-
gia.161 But of the thirteen jurists who ruled in the case—the trial
judge, the three judges on the panel of the Court of Appeals, and
the nine justices of the Supreme Court—ten of them brushed aside
the NCAA’s arguments that important noncommercial interests
were at stake.162
Focusing nearly exclusively on output has the virtue of providing
an objective method for deciding the case. One of the principal
virtues of the doctrine is that it is administrable. Attempting to
weigh intangibles such as amateurism and academic integrity is a
messier and more subjective endeavor.163 In addition, it may have
struck judges as naı¨ve to swallow claims about protecting amateur-
ism, academic values, and culture when big money was at stake.164
Courts had become skeptical of professional associations arguing
158. Id. at 135.
159. 707 F.2d 1147, at 1163.
160. Id. at 1164.
161. Id. at 1165.
162. The district-court judge also ruled in plaintiff’s favor. He wrote:
NCAA submits that if it is not allowed to control football, the “power elite” will system-
atically rout their opposition on the field, thereby alienating viewers, and ultimately
destroying the marketability of college football. This argument borders on frivolous.
What NCAA argues, in essence, is that competition will destroy the market. . . . If
NCAA is correct about the “power elite,” and if viewers lose interest in one-sided
games, the free market should and will resolve the problem. The networks will re-
spond to poor ratings by showing more competitive games. That is how the market
should operate, and that is what the Sherman Act demands.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1310–11 (W. D. Okla.
1982).
163. The NCAA argued that it was attempting to protect amateurism. 468 U.S. 85. The
language about protecting a culture consistent with academic integrity and values is mine.
164. The trial judge did not find the NCAA witnesses who testified that the controls were
essential to the NCAA’s overall regulatory mission to be credible. 546 F. Supp. 1276, at 1309.
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that rules that restricted competition were designed to protect pro-
fessionalism or the public rather than their members’ incomes.165
Yet culture is important. Just as courts should guard against being
too naı¨ve, they should also guard against becoming too cynical.166
In retrospect, it has become clear that NCAA v. University of
Oklahoma was a watershed event in college football. Sports historian
Andrew Zimbalist writes:
By applying normal standards of free enterprise, the majority
of the Court was giving freer reign to further commercialism
of college sports. The resulting potential for heightened reve-
nue, in turn, has led universities to devote even greater
resources to seeking athletic success and to the increasing
prominence of sports in U.S. culture.”167
We are now witnessing how the extreme commercialization of
college football is degrading academic values and threatening ama-
teurism. Not only have the number of televised games increased,
but the number of college football and basketball games that teams
play per season has steadily increased. So too have the number of
hours that college athletes devote to those sports. At Division I col-
leges, football and basketball players spend as much as sixty hours
per week training, practicing, traveling, and playing their sports.168
Do they have time to attend classes, study, and absorb material? It is
no wonder that scandals about athletes attending fake courses
erupt at even well-regarded universities. Indeed, we have recently
learned that between 1990 and 2013 3,100 students at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina—most of them athletes, including those in
the football and men’s basketball programs—took sham courses
165. The landmark case in this area is Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
Courts also confronted other schemes in which professional associations used market power
for their own benefit. See, e.g., Bogus v. Am. Speech & Hearing Ass’n, 582 F.2d 277 (3d. Cir.
1978) (involving the tying of association membership to professional certification).
166. The Supreme Court understands the need to protect intangibles that affect its own
work and image. For example, although it now makes audio recordings of oral arguments
available at the end of the week in which they occur, it continues to resist arguments from
many quarters that it should allow its proceedings to be televised. Editorial, Time for TV in the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1R6IneU. The Court understands
that live television would change the character of its proceedings. Lawyers and justices alike
would be principally performing for a live audience rather than attending to the substance of
the arguments.
167. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG
TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 100 (1999).
168. Id. at 37.
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designed to keep the athletes eligible to play.169 It was difficult not
to conclude that an Ohio State football player was merely telling an
unacknowledged truth when he tweeted: “Why should we have to
go to class if we came here to play FOOTBALL, we ain’t come to
play SCHOOL, classes are POINTLESS.”170
Successful coaches at major programs receive salaries in the mil-
lions of dollars, far more than university presidents or
NobelLaureates on the faculty.171 It is television that has driven
coaches’ salaries to their present levels. UCLA basketball coach
John Wooden—who retired in 1975, and was arguably the greatest
college coach of all time—was never paid more $32,500.172 Moreo-
ver, before 1984, college athletic conferences were largely regional.
Now Rutgers and Nebraska are in the same conference. So are Syra-
cuse and Florida State, Connecticut and SMU, East Carolina and
Tulsa. These otherwise wacky realignments are driven by confer-
ence desires to extend their media markets and increase the value
of television contracts.173 We have reached a point where serious
people contend that amateurism in college sports is a sham—a
mere pretense for exploiting athletes on whose backs universities
make a great deal of money.174
It is not fair to lay all of these developments at the feet of the
Supreme Court.175 Nevertheless, how the Court decides cases can
169. See generally JAY M. SMITH & MARY WILLINGHAM, CHEATED: THE UNC SCANDAL, THE
EDUCATION OF ATHLETES, AND THE FAILURE OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS (2015); Paul M. Bar-
rett, University of North Carolina Apologizes for Fake Classes, Promises Real Change, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-27/university-
of-north-carolina-apologizes-for-fake-classes-promises-real-change.
170. Marc Tracy and Tim Rohan, What Made College Ball More Like Pros? $7.3 Billion, for a
Start, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1tz9vZ3.
171. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 167, at 80–83. In 2013, the head football coach at the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin made $5.4 million, about eight times as much as the University
president. Allie Grasgreen, Coaches Make More than You, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/11/07/football-coach-salaries-10-percent-over-
last-year-and-top-5-million#sthash.cDBIJvz7.dpbs. In forty states, the highest paid state em-
ployee was either a college football or basketball coach. In nine states, the highest paid state
employee was a university president or dean. Nevada was the outlier; its highest paid state
employee was a medical school plastic surgeon. Reuben Fischer-Baum, Inforgraphic: Is Your
State’s Highest-Paid Employee a Coach? (Probably), DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013), http://deadspin
.com/infographic-is-your-states-highest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228.
172. ZIMBALIST, supra note 167, at 80.
173. Id. at 93–97 (describing the value of television contracts).
174. E.g., John Feinstein, In O’Bannon Trial NCAA Officials Give Amateur-Hour Performance,
WASH. POST (June 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/in-obannon-
trial-ncaa-officials-give-amateur-hour-performance/2014/06/23/8e579048-fb06-11e3-b1f4-
8e77c632c07b_story.html; Joe Nocera, Amateurism and the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES (June 20,
2014), http://nyti.ms/TfUCJV.
175. Zimbalist notes that if the Supreme Court held in favor of the NCAA in 1984, it’s
possible that the University of Oklahoma and other football powers would have seceded from
the NCAA to pursue more lucrative television contracts. He adds, however: “While this would
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have an impact on public attitudes. Let us return briefly to the envi-
ronment in which the courts handed down their decisions in 1984.
The NCAA was a large and diverse organization. Some of its mem-
bers wanted to rid themselves of restrictions so that they could
maximize television revenue. Others wanted rules that might pro-
vide them with at least a smidgeon of television exposure and
revenue. Still others were primarily interested in ensuring that col-
lege athletes were genuine students and preserving academic
values. In this struggle for the soul of college athletics, the Court
might have found a way of supporting those who believed academic
values should be of paramount importance. Instead, it effectively
prohibited all efforts to restrict or spread television exposure in col-
lege sports, sounding a starting gun for an unbridled race for
money and air time that would ultimately overwhelm other efforts
to protect amateurism and academic values. Perhaps even more im-
portantly, it implicitly adopted the worldview that sees everyone as
self-interested rational maximizers, and that values consumer wel-
fare—defined as high output and low prices—above all else.176
This thinking reached the point of reductio absurdium in a 1999
Supreme Court decision involving the Code of Ethics of the Califor-
nia Dental Association.177 The association’s code prohibited false or
misleading advertising. The FTC challenged the association’s prac-
tice of interpreting that rule as precluding advertisements that
promised special offers or across-the-board discounts, such as dis-
counts to senior citizens or new patients; precluding advertisements
that characterized fees as “low, reasonable, or affordable”; and pre-
cluding advertising that made quality claims, such as “gentle
dentistry in a caring environment.”178
This case, too, is generally considered significant for the Court’s
decision regarding the level of review.179 The Court held that the
have created a hyper-commercialized sector within college sports, it might have reduced the
commercialization tendencies within the rest of the NCAA.” ZIMBALIST, supra note 167, at
116.
176. Of course, the Court did not say such things in so many words. It paid lip service to
amateurism by stating:
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateur-
ism in college sports. There can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to play
that role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds
richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the
goals of the Sherman Act.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
177. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
178. Id. at 783–84.
179. The Court wrote: “The truth is our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are
less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them
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court of appeals review had been too quick, and it sent the case
back for scrutiny of its assumption that the association’s interpreta-
tions had anticompetitive tendencies.180 Although the Court did
not decide the case, it defined the key question in the case as
“whether the limitation on advertisements obviously tends to limit
the total delivery of dental services.”181
Should that really be the key question? Dental services are not
like widgets. In the main, customers will not purchase more widgets
than they need, and even if they do the public-at-large will not be
harmed. That is not the case with dental or medical services how-
ever. Because doctors and hospitals are generally paid on a fee-for-
service basis, the system incentivizes providers to recommend ser-
vices regardless of whether patients truly need them.182 And
patients may too easily be persuaded to undergo unnecessary proce-
dures. That is bad not only for the patients but, to the extent those
services are paid for by insurance, for society-at-large. I am not argu-
ing that all of rule interpretations at issue were targeting
unnecessary dental services; nor am I arguing that, after careful
analysis, the association’s practices should have been found unlaw-
ful.183 However, antitrust has become an unsophisticated, kneejerk
discipline if it cannot recognize that more output is not always a
good thing. This was a case in which the word output should not
have appeared at all. In fact, it appeared in the Supreme Court’s
majority and dissenting opinions twenty-two times. Moreover, the
NCAA and California Dental Association cases are merely two of many
examples in which Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence reflects
Chicago School dogma.184
The law both reflects and reinforces societal values. The Chicago
School and modern antitrust doctrine do not stand alone; they are
appear. . . . What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circum-
stances, details, and logic of a restraint.” Id.at 779, 781.
180. Id. at 781.
181. Id. at 776. The Court added: “[I]t is of course the producers’ supply of a good in
relation to demand that is normally relevant in determining whether a producer-imposed
limitation has the anticompetitive effect of artificially raising prices.” Id. at 777.
182. STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM DEALS, AND THE
FIGHT TO FIX OUR BROKEN HEATHCARE SYSTEM 58, 237–38 (2015).
183. The Court noted that it was “plausible . . . that restricting difficult-to-verify claims
about quality or patient comfort would have a procompetitive effect by preventing mislead-
ing or false claims that distort the market.” 526 U.S. 756, at 778. That was closer to a sensible
way of analyzing the case; nevertheless, the Court was suggesting that anticompetitive effects
may only be counterbalanced by procompetitive effects. The Court should acknowledge that
anticompetitive effects can be justified by legitimate goals, regardless of whether those goals
can be classified as procompetitive.
184. See Tor, supra note 120, at 583–88; Dibadj, supra note 126, at 762 (listing Supreme
Court antitrust cases influenced by Chicago School doctrine).
FALL 2015] The New Road to Serfdom 37
part and parcel of the larger problem of valuing only what econo-
mists can measure. This problem affects not merely the law or the
United States but western society as a whole. Speaking broadly
about the effect of neoclassical economics on modern thinking,
British Member of Parliament Jesse Norman writes:
[M]odern economists have themselves now become highly in-
fluential institutions in their own right, embedded in
universities, business schools and corporations around the
world. Since their basic tenet is often that humans are purely
economic agents, seeking gain and shunning loss, the danger
is that this creates further feedback loops, inculcating succes-
sive generations into an orthodoxy of self-interest and thereby
making them more selfish. What starts with an economist’s as-
sumption ends up as a deep cultural pathology.185
French economist Thomas Piketty agrees. “For far too long,
economists have sought to define themselves in terms of their sup-
posedly scientific methods,” he writes.186 “In fact, those methods
rely on an immoderate use of mathematical models, which are fre-
quently no more than an excuse for occupying the terrain and
masking the vacuity of the content.”187 No area of American law has
succumbed to this problem more than antitrust. It is time for anti-
trust to throw off the narrow blinders of Chicago School thinking
and acknowledge that there are other values at stake beyond pro-
duction, consumption, and efficiencies. But is antitrust an
appropriate place to take these other values into consideration, or
is antitrust properly limited to economic considerations? That is the
question to which I shall now turn.
II. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL TRADITION OF ANTITRUST
David Million said: “Only one scholar, then Professor Robert
Bork, has argued that Congress had the Chicago School’s approach
in mind when it passed the Sherman Act.”188 It is a wonderfully wry
comment. Of course, Bork hadn’t really argued that members of
the fifty-first Congress were devotees of twentieth-century Chicago
School economics. Nevertheless, Bork presented Chicago School
185. NORMAN, EDMUND BURKE, supra note 128, at 247.
186. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 574 (2014).
187. Id.
188. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1222
(1988).
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principles as eternal truths, and he went so far as to argue that Sen-
ator John Sherman and his colleagues had much the same
fundamental vision as did the Chicago School a century later. For
example, Bork wrote: “The legislative history of the Sherman Act,
the oldest and most basic of the antitrust statutes, displays the clear
and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer welfare.”189
The problem with that claim is the word exclusive. In this Part of the
Article, I shall show that except for the very recent post-Chicago
School past, antitrust law has never been exclusively concerned with
consumer welfare. Traditionally antitrust law was also concerned
with other social and political values.
The antitrust tradition historically has been comprised of two
broad and overlapping strands: (1) to promote consumer welfare,
and (2) to check the adverse sociological and political conse-
quences that can flow from concentrations of economic power.
Because the consumer welfare strand is not in dispute, I shall focus
only on the second strand. This will be a very short and incomplete
thumbnail history—just enough to demonstrate that the socio-polit-
ical strand has a venerable pedigree, and thereby show that I am
advocating the revival and modernization of a deeply-rooted
tradition.190
The Sherman Act was not meant to create new law, but to pro-
vide a federal statutory basis for courts, especially federal courts, to
enforce the common law of antitrust.191 Senator John Sherman and
the Fifteenth Congress were not writing on a blank slate. They
already had a well-formed understanding about the purposes of an-
titrust law. It is important, therefore, to start at the beginning.
A. Antitrust Origins
Antitrust law extends at least as far back as the famous Case of
Monopolies, decided by the King’s Bench in 1603.192 In that case,
189. BORK, supra note 75, at 61.
190. What I call the “socio-political” vision has sometimes been called the “civic” tradition
of antitrust. I prefer the term “socio-political” for two reasons. First, I want to stress that we
need to modernize rather than to merely adopt the older civic views of Brandeis and the
progressives. Second, the term “socio-political” suggests that insights provided by the socio-
economic school of thought can be useful in reforming antitrust law. See, e.g., Robert Ash-
ford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 TUL .
L. REV. 1187 (2002) (describing the socio-economic approach).
191. HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 61–65.
192. The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 11Co. Rep. 84b (1603). This published
decision is not an opinion by the court. The judges never publicly stated their reasons for
finding for the defendant. It is instead a report by Edward Coke published in 1615. Coke was
not a disinterested observer; he himself had argued the case for Darcy in his capacity as
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Edward Darcy, a groom of Queen Elizabeth’s Privy Chamber,
brought an action against Thomas Allein, a haberdasher in
London, for infringing upon his exclusive right, granted to him by
Queen Elizabeth, to manufacturer and import playing cards for sale
in England.193 The Crown granted monopolies of these kinds to
raise revenue, especially when Parliament declined to financially
support the royal household to the extent requested. The possessor
of the monopoly paid the Crown an annual rent or “farm” on the
grant.194 In this case of Darcy versus Allein, the court held that the
monopoly was invalid because it contravened both statutes and
common law. The court believed that the monopoly violated com-
mon law for four reasons.195 One reason involved consumer
welfare, specifically that goods produced by a monopolist are not
“so good or merchantable” as they had previously been.196 But an-
other reason had to do with the welfare of workers who “had
maintained themselves and their families” by practicing card mak-
ing and were thrown out of work.197 A third reason rested on the
constitutional argument that only Parliament had the authority to
grant monopolies involving recreational items such as playing
cards, dice, and hawks’ hoods, and thus the Crown granting exclu-
sive license to manufacture or import playing cards was “utterly
against law.”198 The fourth reason was that the Queen was “deceived
in her grant” because she intended it to be for the benefit of the
public when, in fact, it only benefitted the monopolist.199 This may
have been merely a way of ruling against the sovereign while mak-
ing the pro forma suggestion that the malefactor was not the
Queen but the party who deceived her. The rationale involving
worker welfare appears no less important than the one involving
consumer welfare. The case report says that the monopoly violated
a subject’s liberty. “The ‘liberty’ at issue,” writes Thomas B.
attorney general. Historians debate the accuracy of Coke’s report. Nevertheless, it has been
cited by both English and American courts. See Jacob I. Corre´, The Argument, Decision, and
Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261 (1996). For our purposes, the legacy of the
decision matters more than what the judges themselves thought when they decided the case.
193. Some authorities spell the defendant’s name “Allen.” Morris D. Forkasch, The Doc-
trine of Criminal Conspiracy and its Modern Application to Labor, 40 TEX. L. REV. 303, 315 n.55
(1962).
194. Corre´, supra note 192, at 1322.
195. See 77 Eng. Rep. 1260.
196. Id. at 1261.
197. Id. at 1263.
198. Id. at 1265.
199. Id. at 1264.
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Nachbar, “was not the freedom to consume; it was the freedom to
practice a trade.”200
Despite the decision, the Crown continued to aggressively raise
revenue by granting monopolies.201 In 1624, Parliament enacted
the Statute of Monopolies, which voided all monopolies granted by
the Crown, either previously or in the future, although it preserved
monopolies granted by Parliament.202 The statute also provided a
right of action—and treble damages—for anyone aggrieved by mo-
nopolies. This did not settle the matter either. The Crown
continued to grant monopolies, and the Star Chamber and other
conciliar courts that did the Crown’s bidding enforced them. Parlia-
ment railed against the practice, and insisted that monopoly cases
be heard instead by common law courts, which were not controlled
by the Crown. The issue, along with others involving the division of
powers between Crown and Parliament, was finally settled in the
Glorious Revolution of 1689.203 Henceforth, monopolies had to be
granted by Parliament.
One of the monopolies granted by Queen Elizabeth I was to the
East India Company, which was established by royal charter in
1600.204 The monopoly was to all trade beyond the Atlantic Ocean,
most importantly to the East Indies and especially India. By the
mid-eighteenth century, the East India Company controlled
281,412 square miles of the Indian subcontinent, employing an
army of 60,000 for that purpose.205 Following the Glorious Revolu-
tion the company was reorganized. Parliament granted the
company a new charter and refashioned it into a modern-styled
stock corporation.206
200. Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1313, 1336 (2005).
201. Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 64, at 994–98.
202. English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3. Thomas Nachbar writes:
“While the Statute of Monopolies does represent a strong and important tradition, it is not
one of free trade; it is one of political action.” Nachbar, supra note 200, at 1354.
203. Id. Section 2 of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 reads: “That the pretended power
of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed
and exercised of late, is illegal.” English Bill of Rights. This provision, among others, effec-
tively ended the practice of granting monopolies because the Crown had previously claimed
it was dispensing with laws prohibiting monopolies when it granted them. For a brief history
of the Glorious Revolution and the drafting of the English Declaration of Rights (which
became the Bill of Rights when enacted), see Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second
Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309, 379–86 (1998).
204. For a brief history of the East India Company, see Carl T. Bogus, Rescuing Burke, 72
MO. L. REV. 387, 435–51 (2007).
205. Id. at 435–36.
206. Id. at 437.
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The history of the East India Company is revealing because it
demonstrates the old adage that the more things change, the more
they remain the same. Where great riches are to be made, corpora-
tions will find creative means of taming regulators. Techniques may
change; human nature does not. The small clique of East India
stockholders remained people with close ties to the Crown, and the
Company worked assiduously at fending off parliamentary regula-
tion by granting favors to members of Parliament and allying them
with the company and its interests. Although the company formally
existed for the benefit of the stockholders, managers were more
concerned with their own interests and concentrated on enriching
themselves. They did this by extorting money from the natives
through many different rackets for themselves personally as well as
their benefactors and protectors.207 While the East India Company
itself seldom turned a profit, many of its employees and allies
amassed personal fortunes.208 Both of these things—compromising
regulators, and personal enrichment, even at corporate and social
expense—are facilitated by a lack of competition.209
Powerful companies do not merely work to immunize themselves
from government regulation; they seek corporate welfare in as wide
a variety of forms as imagination allows. And if a company is too big
to fail without devastating the national economy, government is all
but forced to save it. This too was the case with Britain and the East
India Company, and that history had a marked effect on American
attitudes toward monopolies.
In 1773, when the East India Company was on the verge of bank-
ruptcy, Parliament came to its aid. It loaned the company one-
million pounds.210 It also granted the company a monopoly on sell-
ing tea in America, which had a large appetite for the beverage.211
However, even with a monopoly, the East India Company faced stiff
competition from American smugglers. Parliament helped there as
207. For example, the East India Company forced Indian Nabobs to borrow money from
private parties at usurious rates, and cut members of Parliament in on the scheme by includ-
ing them among the private lenders. Id. at 446.
208. Id. at 437.
209. A champion of the abused and exploited Indians finally arose within the English
government, Edmund Burke, who argued that Parliament needed to regulate the East India
Company. In rebutting arguments that the company was immune from governmental regula-
tion because it was a private company or because Parliament had granted it a charter, Burke
contrasted the company’s charter with the Great Charter—that is, the Magna Carta or Magna
Charta—by stating: “Magna Charta is a charter to restrain power and to destroy monopoly.”
Id. at 444.
210. JOHN FERLING, INDEPENDENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO SET AMERICA FREE 34–41 (2011).
211. Id.
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well by lowering the duty imposed on tea so that the East India
Company could undersell smugglers.
Though it may have seemed like a good idea at the time, it did
not work out so well. During the cold night of December 16th,
American colonists disguised as Indians boarded three East India
ships and dumped 90,000 pounds of tea into the waters of Boston
Harbor.212 The colonists protested Parliament’s taxing them indi-
rectly by imposing duties on imports and the East India Company’s
monopoly, both of which were inextricably intertwined.213
This was not the first distaste Americans had for monopolies.
Massachusetts and Connecticut had prohibitions on monopolies
dating back one hundred years earlier.214 England had long ran-
kled Americans by granting English firms monopolies on importing
many goods besides tea to the Americas.215
It is not surprising, therefore, that in the minds of many Ameri-
cans the concept of liberty included the right to be free from
monopolies. Six states formally proposed including a prohibition
against monopolies in the United States Constitution.216
B. Sherman Act
The Magna Carta of American antitrust law is the Sherman Act,
enacted in 1890. The legislation resulted from the public’s alarm
about the growth of the enormous “trusts,”217 that is, the behemoth
212. Id. at 41.
213. Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 64, at 1008.
214. Id. at 1004.
215. Id. at 1007.
216. Id. at 1013.
217. Trusts are, of course, instruments for separating legal and beneficial ownership. For
example, testators bequest money to trustees for the benefit of children who cannot respon-
sibly handle their own affairs. In 1882, Rockefeller employed this device to establish the
Standard Oil trust. Under his arrangement, nine trustees—who basically composed a board
of directors—held stock in a collection of oil companies. He employed this device as a means
of getting around state laws that forbade one corporation from owning stock or assets of
another corporation, or forbade a company from conducting business in other states. Rocke-
feller knew that public sentiment would not look favorably upon evading the spirit, if not the
letter, of these state laws, or upon the consolidation of so much corporate power, so he used
the trust as a device to avoid the state prohibitions and to conceal the existence of what was,
in effect, a large holding company. He publicly denied that the companies had been com-
bined until a congressional committee exposed the truth. In 1882, following an adverse
antitrust ruling from an Ohio state court, Rockefeller reorganized Standard Oil. Thereafter,
the stock of subsidiary companies were held by a holding company named Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey. By this time, however, the term “trust” had come to mean any giant
corporation. BRANDS, supra note 27, at 98–99; 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES, 10 (Earl W. Kintner ed. 1978)[hereinafter Kintner,
Vol. 1].
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companies that controlled railroads,218 oil,219 steel,220 whiskey,221
sugar,222 copper,223 and many other industries. There were con-
cerns that the titans who controlled these industries—J.P. Morgan,
John D. Rockefeller, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and others—could
gouge consumers; but there was even greater concern about their
exploiting workers.
Where monopolists controlled industries, not only did consum-
ers lack a choice of sellers but workers lacked a choice of
employers. This meant that companies faced little competition for
employees and could get away with offering low pay, long hours,
and undesirable—and often dangerous—working conditions. H.W.
Brands writes: “From a worker’s perspective, the salient characteris-
tic of the modern age was consolidation.”224
There were a variety of ways to try to address this. One was with
countervailing power through labor unions. That effort was under-
way—this was the dawn of the labor movement—but success was, at
best, limited, and the price of attempting to organize was high. For
the most part, government sided with the powerful, that is, with the
moguls and big business. Not only were workers seeking to organize
or strike often forced to combat private police and vigilantes em-
ployed by big companies, but they often faced state militias and
federal troops as well.225
The courts also sided with big business and its titans—not just in
the field of labor law, but across the entire legal spectrum.226 Rail-
roads were the first giant industry. For them, labor was cheaper
than equipment.227 Rather than invest in automatic air brakes, for
example, railroads used manual braking systems that required
brakemen to turn wheels on the roofs of speeding railroad cars.
They had to dash from roof to roof across as many as six cars, some-
times in driving rain or snow. Many fell to their deaths. In the
course of one twelve-month period—from June 1888 to June
1889—1,972 railway men were killed and 20,028 were injured on
218. BRANDS, supra note 27, at 25–29.
219. Id. at 84–92.
220. Id. at 92–94.
221. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2459 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. BRANDS, supra note 27, at 118.
225. Id. at 95–120.
226. Most of this paragraph is adapted from BOGUS, supra note 111. For a fuller discus-
sion of how courts shielded business from lawsuits seeking compensation for injured and
killed workers, see id. at 127–37. See also BRANDS, supra note 27, at 5.
227. BOGUS, supra note 111, at 128.
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the job.228 The total dead and injured in that single year repre-
sented more than three percent of the railroad industry’s
workforce. This is but one example of how the railroads sacrificed
safety to economic efficiency.
State legislatures were unequal to the task of regulating the rail-
roads with respect to worker safety. The railroads were generally
successful at lobbying against legislation. When, on occasion, legis-
latures enacted laws they did not like, they often simply ignored
them. The courts shielded railroads—as well as factories, mines,
and other big businesses—from lawsuits by injured workers and
families of workers who had been killed on the job.229
Big business found many ways to purchase political influence.
One way was to provide inside information to politicians or political
parties that allowed them to profit by purchasing stock or property
that would soon increase in value. A Tammany Hall official de-
fended such arrangements by calling them “honest graft.” 230 It was
a time, says H.W. Brands, when “capitalism threatened to eclipse
democracy.”231 And, of course, it was a time of rapidly growing ine-
quality of wealth.232 Books about business moguls amassing fortunes
at the public’s expense became best sellers.233 It seemed that eco-
nomic shocks and traumas had to result from so many eggs being in
so few baskets. When the nation was gripped by an economic de-
pression in 1873, the public blamed big business.234 Ironically, the
moguls used the depression to their advantage, snapping up dis-
tressed businesses at bargain prices and adding them to their
commercial empires.235
228. Id.
229. Id. at 129–33.
230. BRANDS, supra note 27, at 351. It is worth noting that until 2012, when the Stop
Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act was passed, members of Congress were arguably
exempt from federal law banning insider trading. See Robert Pear, Insider Trading Ban for
Lawmakers Clears Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012),http://nyti.ms/1JF7hL0. That legisla-
tion was quietly weakened by an amendment a year later. See Craig Holman, Congressional
Insider Trading Revisited (But Don’t Tell Anyone): Commentary, ROLL CALL, May 9, 2013, http://
www.rollcall.com/news/congressional_insider_trading_revisited_but_dont_tell_anyone_com
mentary-224674-1.html.
231. BRANDS, supra note 27, at 7.
232. See PIKETTY, CAPITALISM, supra note 186, at 348 (showing that inequality of wealth
became increasingly more extreme from at least 1810 until 1910, with the steepest rise in the
portion of national wealth held by the top one percent beginning in 1870).
233. E.g., EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARDS 2000–1887 (1888); HENRY GEORGE, PRO-
GRESS AND POVERTY (1877) . See BRANDS, supra note 27, at 377–83 (describing Bellamy’s books
at length). In THE GILDED AGE: A TALE OF TODAY, published in 1873, Mark Twain and
Charles Dudley Warner addressed the problems through satire and coined the famous term
for the era. Id. at 411–13.
234. Kintner, Vol. 1, supra note 217, at 11–12.
235. See BRANDS, supra note 27, at 84–94.
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The American people demanded a check on corporate power.
One approach was to regulate business. In 1877, Congress created
the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate railroad rates and
practices. That legislation was principally about protecting small
business from big business—specifically to stop railroads from
forming cartels and conspiring to fix prices, and to stop giant ship-
pers from extracting low rates from railroads companies through
rebates and other practices, thereby giving them lower rates than
those charged to their smaller competitors.236 Benjamin Harrison,
then a United States Senator, said he favored establishing the I.C.C.
because the large railroads were exercising “a most dangerous and
unwarranted control over the commerce of this country.”237
The other way to check corporate power was to do something to
control corporate size and consolidation. In 1888, both the Demo-
cratic and Republican Parties included antitrust planks in their
platforms. The Democratic plank said that “the interests of the peo-
ple are betrayed” by trusts and combinations, which were “unduly
enriching the few” at the expense of the body of the citizenry.238
The Republican plank declared the party’s “opposition to all com-
binations of capital, organized in trusts or otherwise, to control
arbitrarily the condition of trade among our citizens.”239 Of course,
the two ways of checking corporate power—regulating business,
and limiting corporate power by limiting corporate size and consol-
idation—are not mutually exclusive.
In the presidential election that year, the Republican nominee,
Benjamin Harrison, defeated the incumbent Democrat, Grover
Cleveland. A month after the election, President Cleveland devoted
his last state of the union message to Congress to the need for anti-
trust legislation. He said in part:
Our cities are abiding places of wealth and luxury; our
manufactories yield fortunes never dreamed of by the fathers
of the Republic; our business men are madly striving in the
race for riches, and immense aggregations of capital outrun
the imagination in the magnitude of their undertakings. . . .
Upon more careful inspection we find the wealth and lux-
ury of our cities mingled with poverty and wretchedness and
unremunerative toil . . . .
236. Kintner, Vol. 1, supra note 217, at 13; GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 445.
237. CHARLES W. CALHOUN, BENJAMIN HARRISON 42 (2005).
238. See Kintner, Vol. 1, supra note 217, at 54 (reproducing Antitrust Plank of the Demo-
cratic Party Platform, June 5, 1888).
239. See id. (reproducing Antitrust Plank of the Republican Party Platform, June 19,
1888).
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We discover that the fortunes realized by our manufacturers
are no longer solely the reward of sturdy industry and enlight-
ened foresight, but that they result from the discriminating
favor of Government and are largely built upon undue exac-
tions from the masses of the people. The gulf between
employers and the employed is constantly widening, and clas-
ses are rapidly forming, one comprising the very rich and
powerful, while in another are found the toiling people.
As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we dis-
cover the existence of trusts, combinations, and monopolies,
while the citizen is struggling far in the rear or is trampled to
death beneath an iron heel. Corporations, which should be
carefully restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the
people, are fast becoming the people’s masters.240
Congress was, in fact, already busy at work drafting legislation to
control the trusts. The principal leader of the effort was Senator
John Sherman, a Republican from Ohio, and one of the most
widely respected figures in Congress.241 The Sherman Antitrust Act
was enacted the following year. During floor debates on the legisla-
tion, Sherman and other members of Congress made many
arguments in favor of the legislation. Many of those arguments had
to do with the evils of monopoly pricing. During one point in de-
bate, Sherman even alluded to what we today would call allocative
efficiency and deadweight losses.242 But Sherman also argued that
the legislation was necessary for social and political reasons. He
said:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb
social order, and among them none is more threatening than
the inequality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that
has grown within a single generation out of the concentration
of capital into vast combinations to control production and
trade and to break down competition.243
240. See id. at 57–58 (reproducing, in abbreviated form, the Fourth Annual Message of
President Grover Cleveland, Dec. 3, 1888).
241. See, e.g., CALHOUN, supra note 237, at 37 (referring to Sherman as being in “the front
rank of senators”). Sherman had been a leading candidate for the Republican presidential
nomination and received the highest number of votes on the first ballot at the party’s con-
vention. Id. at 50.
242. He said: “It is sometimes said of these combinations that they reduce prices to the
consumer by better methods of production, but all experience shows that this saving of cost
goes to the pockets of the producer. The price to the consumer depends upon the supply,
which can be reduced at the pleasure of the combination.” 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890).
243. Id.
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He also declared:
If the concentrated powers of [a] combination are intrusted to
a single man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our
form of government, and should be subject to the strong resis-
tance of the State and national authorities. If anything is
wrong this is wrong. If we will not endure a king of political
power we should not endure a king over the production, trans-
portation, and sale of the necessities of life.244
Sherman was also concerned about how trusts affected the free-
dom of workers. He reported there were “complaints from the
workingmen all over the land” about the problems caused by corpo-
rate combinations.245
Other members of Congress also made it clear that their con-
cerns extended beyond consumer welfare. Senator Henry M. Teller
(R., Colo.) said during the debate: “I have not learned the doctrine
that cheapness is the only thing in the world that we are to go for. I
do not believe the great object in life is to make everything
cheap.”246 Senator George F. Edmunds (R., Vt.) opposed the trusts
even though he believed that the oil trust had considerably reduced
the price of oil and the sugar trust may have reduced the price of
sugar.247 Senator James K. Jones (D., Ark.) thought that liberty was
at stake. “If the proceeds of the labor of our men and women are
not to be their own we have no liberty and our Government is a
farce and a fraud.”248 He also thought that the trusts created a cul-
ture of rapacious and immoral greed. He said that the trusts had
been “allowed to grow and fatten upon the public,” and that,
their success is an example of evil that has excited the greed
and conscienceless rapacity of commercial sharks until in
schools they are to be found now in every branch of trade,
preying upon every industry, and by their unholy combina-
tions robbing the victims, their general public, in defiance of
every principle of law or morals.249
244. Id. at 2457.
245. Id. at 2569.
246. Id. at 2561 (said during a discussion with Senator George about whether the bill
would apply to labor unions and, if so, to what effect. Teller was replying to George’s observa-
tion that labor unions were dedicated to raising wages, and that higher wages meant higher
prices.)
247. Id. at 2726.
248. 20 Cong. Rec. 1457 (1889).
249. Id.
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Senator George F. Hoar (R., Mass.) observed that the great mo-
nopolies “are a menace to republican institutions themselves.”250
Senator James Z. George (D., Miss.) was concerned about what
others much later would refer to as the problem of central plan-
ning, that is, economic decisions of sweeping national effect being
made by a single person or organization. He said that “the great
evil” of combinations and monopolies is that,
they have gathered together the money and the means of large
numbers of persons, and under these combinations, or con-
spiracies, or trusts, this aggregated capital is wielded by a
single hand and guided by a single brain, or at least by hands
and brains acting in complete harmony and co-operation, and
that in this way, by this association, by this direction of this
immense amount of capital, by one organized will, to a very
large extent, these wrongs have been perpetrated on the
American people.251
The legislation passed the Senate on a nearly unanimous vote. Only
a single senator voted nay.252
There was more skepticism about the legislation in the House.
Representative Richard Parks Bland, a prominent Democratic from
Missouri, was worried that the trusts were so powerful and resilient
that they would inevitably get their way notwithstanding Congress’
efforts.253 Bland was not sanguine about how the Supreme Court
would interpret the legislation, and he wanted the House to take
more time to strengthen the bill by making it more specific. He
succeeded in having the bill amended so that it explicitly covered
the railroads and sellers of cattle and hogs, which were then con-
trolled by four large companies.254 The conference committee
rejected these amendments because it considered them unneces-
sary and feared they might provide ammunition for members who
250. 21 Cong. Rec. 3146 (1889).
251. Id. at 3147.
252. The vote was 52 to 1, with 29 senators absent. Id. at 3153.
253. Bland argued that history demonstrated that big corporations had powerful advan-
tages in litigation, whether before agencies or courts He said that the railroads overwhelmed
smaller parties in the I.C.C. and the courts by “procuring the testimony of experts who claim
to know all about transportation and the ‘reasonableness’ of freight charges.” Id. at 5953.
Representative Elijah Morse, a Republican from Massachusetts, agreed. “[T]he interstate-
commerce commission was supposed to be in the interest of the consumer and people,” said
Morse. Yet “it has proved to be the opposite. In its practical workings it has strengthened the
chains that it was intended to loosen.” Id.
254. Id. at 5952–53. See also Kintner, Vol. 1, supra note 217, at 26–27.
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wanted to delay and defeat the legislation.255 The conference com-
mittee reported out the bill in the Senate form, which the House
then passed without a single dissenting vote.256
Congress enacted Magna-Carta-type legislation. That is, the Sher-
man Act announced broad principles and left it to the courts to
interpret and develop those principles through common law adju-
dication.257 The Act prohibited contacts, combinations, or
conspiracies “in restraint of trade or commerce.”258 It also prohib-
ited monopolizing or attempting to monopolize “any part of trade
or commerce.”259 Violating the act was a crime. Moreover, anyone
who was injured by violations could sue the perpetrators in federal
court and recover three times his damages plus his attorney’s fees
and other costs of suit.260
Because this was landmark legislation, and remains—nearly a
century and a quarter later—the nation’s most important antitrust
law, scholars have long debated exactly what Congress intended
when it enacted the Sherman Act. Robert Bork, of course, believed
that the Sherman Act was all about consumer welfare. Some have
argued that members of Congress—and especially the generally
pro-business Republicans—passed the legislation for cynical politi-
cal reasons.
Economist Thomas Hazlett, for example, argues that Congress’
true objective was pro-business.261 He believes that Congress slyly
placated a demanding public by passing a law that trumpeted
grand-sounding principles but that was designed to be ineffectual.
This ploy not only allowed Congress to avoid having to take mean-
ingful action against the trusts; it also provided cover for giving big
business what it really wanted: the protectionist McKinley Tariff Act.
Hazlett’s evidence for that proposition is a high correlation be-
tween how members of Congress voted on both pieces of
legislation. Even putting aside a serious error in his underlying
data,262 Hazlett’s conclusion is difficult to swallow. If Congress truly
255. There was a heated exchange between Bland and Representative William E. Mason,
a Republican from Chicago. After Mason argued that the amendment was unnecessary and
would only help opponents, Bland accused Mason of protecting the “Big Four” meat compa-
nies. 21 Cong. Rec. 5960–61(1890). See also Kintner, Vol. 1, supra note 217, at 28–30.
256. The vote was 242 to 85, with 85 representatives not voting. 21 Cong. Rec. 6313
(1889).
257. HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 61–65.
258. Sherman Act §1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §1).
259. Sherman Act §2 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §2.)
260. Sherman Act §7 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §15).
261. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-Examined, 30 ECON.
INQUIRY 263 (1992).
262. Hazlett counts 62 House Democrats as voting “no” on the Sherman Act, and he says
he excluded members who abstained. Id. at 271. He does not explain where he got that
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intended the Sherman Act to be a weak instrument, would it have
given private parties the right to sue for injuries in any judicial dis-
trict where the defendant could be found—and to recover treble
damages and attorney’s fees?263
The more likely explanation is that members of Congress sin-
cerely strived for what may seem irreconcilable goals. They wanted
to break up or at least restrain the trusts. At the same time, they—
especially Republicans, who represented the industrial states—
wanted to protect American business from foreign competition.264
They enacted legislation to do both. Economists may believe high
tariffs supported the trusts by protecting them from foreign compe-
tition (and in fact members of Congress expressed exactly that
view).265 But while economists may see the two legislative acts as
irreconcilable, the messy business of governing can produce seem-
ingly irrational compromises.
Horace H. Robbins expressed the far more widely shared view
when, more than half a century ago, he wrote: “At the time the
Sherman Act was passed, there was certainly some intention to legis-
late against size and concentration. There was widespread agitation
and deep feeling prevailing against the great business units and the
great concentration of capital.”266
Writing more recently, Herbert Hovenkamp agrees. He says that
the Sherman Act was enacted either “at the behest of small busi-
nessmen who had been injured by the formation of larger, more
number, but other sources suggest he is mistaken. The House voted twice on the Sherman
Act. On the first occasion, April 25, 1890, the bill passed without a recorded vote count. The
official record merely states: “The bill as amended was ordered to a third reading; and being
read the third time, was passed.” 21 Cong. Rec. 4105 (1890). See also Kintner, Vol. 1, supra
note 217, at 27 n.177 (“Congressional Record does not reflect that a record vote was taken.”).
The second occasion was June 20, 1890, when the bill was reported out of the conference
committee. On that time, there were 242 yeas, 0 nays, and 85 not voting. 21 Cong. Rec. 6314
(1890).
263. This was in the original Section 7 of the Act. In 1955, that section was repealed
because it had been reenacted with modifications in section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§15. See Kintner, Vol. 1, supra note 217, at 52.
264. Doris Kearns Goodwin tells us: “Protectionism had become a central tenet of Repub-
lican ideology.” GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 583. It was a party commitment with staying
power. Theodore Roosevelt studiously avoided the issue throughout his presidency, notwith-
standing his sympathy for progressive claims that high tariffs strengthened monopolies and
inflated prices. Howard Taft made a major push for tariff reform during his presidency but
achieved only limited success. See id. at 726–45.
265. For example, Congressman William L. Wilson (D., W.Va.) spoke about tariffs at
length, and argued that at then-existing levels, which were lower than those later imposed by
the McKinley Tariff Act, the American tariff system “presents the most favorable and tempt-
ing field in the world for the successful formation and growth of trusts.” 21 Cong. Rec. 4093
(1890).
266. Horace H. Robbins, “Bigness,” The Sherman Act, and Antitrust Policy, 39 VA. L. REV.
907, 907 (1953).
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efficient firms,”267 or “out of a persuasive fear of private ‘bigness’
and the political power that it engendered.”268
Robert H. Lande also concurs. He believes that Congress’ main
concern was allocative efficiency, that is, with firms having the mar-
ket power to raise prices and restrict output.269 But, writes Lande,
“[t]he Act also involved efforts to decentralize economic, social,
and political decisionmaking to ensure that narrow private interests
would be unable to override the public good flowing from free
competition.”270
Noted historian Richard Hoftstadter was more emphatic. He said
Congress had three goals in mind when it enacted the Sherman
Act.271 The first was economic: the belief that competition would
produce the greatest efficiencies. The second goal was political: the
desire to block accumulations of power that threatened democratic
government. The third was social and moral: the belief that robust
competition improved national character, making Americans more
vital and disciplined. “Among the three,” writes Hofstadter, “the ec-
onomic goal was the most cluttered with uncertainties, so much so
that it seems to be no exaggeration to regard antitrust as being es-
sentially a political rather than an economic enterprise.”272
C. The Antitrust Movement and the Clayton Act
The Sherman Act had a troubled early life. The first major Sher-
man Act case that the Court considered involved American Sugar
Refining Co., then popularly known as the sugar trust. Previously
the company had acquired all of the sugar refineries in the United
States except five. In March 1892, it entered into agreements to
acquire four of its remaining five competitors.273 The fifth and puta-
tively only remaining independent firm had a market share of two
percent. The federal government brought an action under the
Sherman Act to enjoin the acquisitions. The Sherman Act had been
enacted pursuant to Congress’ constitutional power to regulate in-
terstate and foreign trade.274 The Court held that Congress had no
267. HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 60.
268. Id. at 61.
269. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 910 (1999).
270. Id. at 911.
271. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 199–200 (1965).
272. Id. at 200.
273. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
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power to prevent American Sugar from monopolizing sugar refin-
ing in the United States because refining sugar was a purely
intrastate activity, even though the refined sugar was to be shipped
throughout the country.275 Some believed the Court was simply at-
tempting to protect the traditional role of the states in regulating
corporations. Some believed the decision was evidence that the
Court was a pawn of the plutocrats.276 Business read the sugar trust
case and other early decisions of the Court277as a green light for
mergers and acquisitions.278
The Court seemed more willing to apply the Sherman Act
against restraints of trade than to mergers, however. In a famous
case, U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, the government
brought an action against eighteen competing railroads and an as-
sociation they formed for fixing rates.279 The Court rejected the
railroads’ argument that they should be deemed exempt from the
Sherman Act because they were regulated by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. 280 It also rejected their argument that they had
not violated the Sherman Act because the rates they adopted were
reasonable.281
In its opinion, the Court addressed what it saw as one of the great
purposes of the Sherman Act—protecting small firms that needed
to ship goods via railroad from being put out of business by big
corporations that demanded preferential rates from the railroads.
The Court observed that sometimes small companies were de-
stroyed by dislocations due to changes in technology and methods
of doing business. That was unfortunate but inevitable. The Court
continued:
It is wholly different, however, when such changes are effected
by combinations of capital, whose purpose in combining is to
control the production or manufacture of any particular arti-
cle in the market, and by such control dictate the price at
275. 156 U.S. 37–38.
276. See, e.g., BRANDS, supra note 4, at 435 (stating that William Jennings Bryan’s support-
ers believed the decision confirmed “that the captains of industry had captured the courts
and suborned them to the plutocrats’ profit-mongering purposes”).
277. E.g., Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) (holding that an association of
livestock traders was not engaged in interstate commerce even though its activities were part
of the process of shipping livestock throughout the country).
278. See, e.g., NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSI-
NESS, 1895–1904, at 109 (1985) (stating “there is undoubtedly some validity to [the]
argument” that the Court’s decisions signaled that mergers would be tolerated).
279. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). The number of rail-
roads is set forth in the district court’s opinion at 53 F. 440, 441 (1892).
280. 166 U.S. 290.
281. Id.
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which the article shall be sold, the effect being to drive out of
business all the small dealers in the commodity. . . . Whether
they be able to find other avenues to earn their livelihood is
not so material, because it is not for the real prosperity of any
country that such changes should occur which result in trans-
ferring an independent business man, the head of his
establishment, small though it might be, into a mere servant or
agent of a corporation for selling the commodities which he
once manufactured or dealt in, having no voice in shaping the
business policy of the company and bound to obey orders is-
sued by others. Nor is it for the substantial interests of the
country that any one commodity should be within the sole
power and subject to the sole will of one powerful combina-
tion of capital.282
Meanwhile, big businesses had powerful incentives to swallow
competitors. Three years after the enactment of the Sherman Act,
the country experienced a severe economic depression, and the de-
pression stimulated price wars in many industries—wars too
aggressive to end through collusion.283 The best way to end the
price wars was to buy one’s rivals.
In just a nine-year period beginning in 1895, more than 1,800
companies were eliminated through mergers and acquisitions.284
That merger wave created scores of firms with more than forty per-
cent of their respective markets, and forty-two firms with more than
seventy percent of their markets. Many of the giants created then
remain with us today, including DuPont, Kodak, International Har-
vester, International Paper, International Salt, Nabisco, Otis
Elevator, Pittsburgh Plate Glass, and United States Steel.285 By 1903,
there were three hundred U.S. companies with $10 million in assets
and seventeen companies with more than $100 million—even
though, four years earlier, only a dozen non-railroad firms had as-
sets valued at $10 million.286
This disturbing growth in company size and industry consolida-
tion helped fuel the Progressive Era. Progressives were concerned
282. Id. at 323–24 (1897). Half a century later, the Supreme Court continued to favorably
cite the language from Trans-Missouri Freight Association set forth in the main body. See, e.g.,
Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
283. LAMOREAUX, supra note 278, at 12, 100, 107, 166. The depression lasted from 1893 to
1897. STEVEN J. DINER, A VERY DIFFERENT AGE: AMERICANS OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 19–22
(1998).
284. LAMOREAUX, supra note 278, at 2.
285. Id. at 3–4.
286. DINER, supra note 283, at 28.
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about consumers being gouged by monopoly prices, but they were
more concerned about how congealed economic power was de-
stroying freedom.
Big corporations treated workers like cogs in a machine. They
engaged efficiency experts to tell employees exactly how to do their
work—how much to lift at one time, what sequence of tasks to fol-
low, even when to rest.287 Moreover, when efficiency increased,
employers appropriated all the benefits. Factories, for example,
started paying workers on a piece-rate basis to encourage them to
work faster; but when employees worked hard to increase their pro-
ductivity, employers cut the rates to control wages.288 Work hours
were brutally long, and workplace conditions were difficult and
often dangerous. When workers sought to improve their lot
through collective bargaining, corporations used political muscle to
bust unions. Police and National Guard troops were used to break
strikes, and union leaders were jailed.289 Ironically, big business
used the Sherman Act against unions. Between 1890 and 1914, fed-
eral courts issued more than one hundred injunctions against
unions under the Sherman Act,290 and twelve of the first thirteen
criminal convictions that the federal government obtained under
the Act were against unions.291
Farmers faced similar problems. “[F]armers found their auton-
omy and economic security challenged by remote institutions: the
railroads on which they shipped their products to market, the cur-
rency and credit system, the corporations which manufactured and
sold agricultural machinery, and most important, the invisible hand
that determined the price of farm commodities,” writes historian
Steven J. Diner.292 Much effort was put into educating farmers
about scientific methods and teaching them how to increase their
productivity. Manufacturers sold them modern equipment, states
sponsored institutes for farmers, land grant universities tried to per-
suade farmers to send their sons to their agricultural colleges or to
extension courses, and the federal government funded research de-
voted to increasing agricultural productivity.293 And productivity
did increase. But the problem from the farmers’ point of view was
287. Id. at 36–39.
288. Id. at 55–59, 64.
289. Id. at 25–26.
290. 2 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES
993 (Earl W. Kintner ed. 1978) [hereinafter Kintner, Vol. 2].
291. HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 65.
292. DINER, supra note 283, at 102.
293. Id. at 121.
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that increased production resulted in lower prices.294 With lower
prices and increased costs for machinery (and bank loans financing
the machinery), farmers reaped few rewards from their increased
productivity. Even the most successful farmers found that their cash
earnings were generally lower than those of city workers.295 The
principal beneficiaries were city dwellers, which was precisely the
point. “What the city man wanted was cheap food,” an official in
Theodore Roosevelt’s administration remarked in 1918. 296 “There-
fore, what was done for the farmer was directed almost without
exception toward helping or inducing him to grow cheap food.”297
But, of course, factory workers had not been demanding that their
government subsidize agriculture programs.
Who, really, had government officials been trying to please by
working to increase farmers’ productivity? Steven Diner suggests
that it was the corporate capitalists. “Low food prices lessened pres-
sure to increase the wages of industrial workers,” he explains.298
The progressives understood all of this. Their principal concern
was freedom, not low prices. “The great common people are slaves
and monopoly is the master,” declared Mary Elizabeth Lease, a fa-
mous progressive orator.299 There were increased public outcries
over the growth of the trusts, the consolidation of industries, and
the passivity of presidents and, especially, the courts.
On September 14, 1901, President William McKinley was killed
by an assassin in Buffalo, New York. McKinley, who had been owned
lock-stock-and-barrel by big business,300 was succeeded by his vice
president, Theodore Roosevelt, a Republican progressive who
wanted to do something about the trusts.301
294. Id. at 122.
295. Id. at 103.
296. Id. at 123 (quoting Gifford Pinchot).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 122.
299. Id. at 14.
300. Terrified of populist William Jennings Bryan, James J. Hill, John D. Rockefeller, and
others corporate moguls contributed as much as $12 million to McKinley’s campaign (the
equivalent of more than $330 million today). Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company contrib-
uted a quarter of a million dollars. BRANDS, supra note 27, at 550. Neither Grover Cleveland
nor McKinley had been much interested in antitrust enforcement. The justice department
instituted only eleven antitrust actions during the combined eight and half years of their
administrations, compared to seven antitrust actions instituted in the roughly thirty-two
months remaining in Benjamin Harrison’s administration after passage of the Sherman Act.
CALHOUN, supra note 237, at 94.
301. Republican boss Mark Hanna, who was closely tied to the moguls, had warned Mc-
Kinley not to make Roosevelt his vice president. “I asked him if he realized what would
happen if he should die,” Hanna said. GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 292.
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Although Roosevelt was genuinely repulsed by what he consid-
ered rapacious, unpatriotic greed by the moguls, part of his
motivation was to dampen populist sentiment for an all-out war on
business.302 Two months after he became president, a group of the
great business barons—James Hill, J.P. Morgan, Cornelius Vander-
bilt, E.H. Harriman, John D. Rockefeller, and Jay Gould—created
the Northern Securities Company by uniting large railroads
throughout the northwest and southwest sections of the country. It
instantly became the nation’s second-largest company. Because this
new trust was formed on his watch, Roosevelt felt he had to do
something about it.303 In great secrecy, Roosevelt asked his attorney
general, Philander C. Knox, to examine whether the new trust vio-
lated the Sherman Act; and on November 13, 1901, the Roosevelt
administration surprised the nation by announcing it was filing an
action to break up Northern Securities.304 Three days later, Morgan
was at the White House to explain to the president how things
should work.305
It was not clear when these two men met which one was the most
powerful person in the country. Morgan did not attempt to per-
suade the president that Northern Securities did not violate the
Sherman Act. He scolded the president for suing his firm without
talking to him first and resolving matters the way they ought to be
resolved. “If we have done something wrong, send your man to my
man and they can fix it up,” said Morgan.306
“That can’t be done,” Roosevelt responded. Attorney General
Knox added: “We don’t want to fix it up; we want to stop it.”307
“Are you going to attack my other interests?” asked Morgan. “The
steel trust and others?”308 The “steel trust” was the United States
Steel Corporation, the largest corporation in the nation—the first,
in fact, with more than one billion dollars of capital—which Mor-
gan formed the previous year with John D. Rockefeller, Andrew
Carnegie, and others.309 The whole country had been wondering
whether the government would take action against that colossus.
“Certainly not, unless we find out that in any case they have done
something that we regard as wrong,” replied Roosevelt.310 It was, in
302. BRANDS, supra note 4, at 435.
303. Id. at 436.
304. Id.
305. GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 299.
306. BRANDS, supra note 4, at 435.
307. Id. at 435–36.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 434.
310. Id. at 437.
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fact, an extremely revealing statement because it summed up his
philosophy about the great trusts: they would be permitted unless
their actions offended Roosevelt’s sense of right and wrong. It was,
to say the least, not a very legalistic approach.311
A great deal hinged on the Northern Securities case. Doris
Kearns Goodwin writes: “For Roosevelt, the outcome loomed with
enormous implications for his party, as well as the nation. If the
Court sustained the administration’s argument that the colossal
merger represented a monopoly that restricted trade, the victory
would demonstrate a fundamental shift in the Republican Party’s
relationship to the trusts.”312
It was, therefore, a time of high drama, when on March 14, 1904,
Justice John Marshall Harlan read the Court’s opinion from the
bench. By a vote of 5-4, the Court held that the railroad trust vio-
lated the Sherman Act. “The mere existence of such a combination,
and the power acquired by the holding company as its trustee, con-
stitute a menace to, and a restraint upon, that freedom of
commerce which Congress intended to recognize and protect,” said
the Court.313 Roosevelt was delighted—though he was irked that
one of the two justices he had appointed to the Court, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, joined the dissent. Roosevelt had nominated Holmes
for the Court because he was considered a friend of common peo-
ple. “I could carve out of a banana a judge with more backbone that
he,” Roosevelt privately remarked.314
Roosevelt’s administration also took on other trusts, including
the beef and tobacco trusts.315 Following a massive expose´ of John
D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company by the investigative re-
porter Ida M. Tarbell—published as a twenty-four-part series in
McClure’s Magazine and then as two-volume book316—newspaper ed-
itorials began calling for the government to take action. The
problem was “as much a moral issue as a financial one,” one edito-
rial declared.317 Soon after, the government filed suit against the
311. Steven Diner says that Roosevelt “preferred to prosecute trusts selectively, not for
bigness itself but for bad behavior, judging goodness and badness [for] himself.” DINER,
supra note 283, at 221.
312. GOODWIN, BULLY PULPIT, supra note 21, at 398.
313. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 327 (1904).
314. GOODWIN, BULLY PULPIT, supra note 21, at 399.
315. Id. at 378.
316. IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904).
317. GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 549 (quoting William White’s editorial in the Emporia
Gazette). Press attention stimulated an investigation by James Garfield, director of Roosevelt’s
Bureau of Corporations. Garfield found that Standard Oil had achieved a monopoly position
in the oil industry by using predatory practices such as rebates and fully abhorrent practices
such as bribes and kickbacks. Id. at 546, 550–51. This met Roosevelt’s criterion of being not
only a trust, but a bad trust.
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Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, also naming as defendants
Rockefeller himself, six other individuals, and thirty-three affiliated
companies.318
Although Teddy Roosevelt took great pride in being called “the
trust buster,” Roosevelt’s successor, Howard Taft, was a more vigor-
ous enforcer of the Sherman Act.319 Taft’s administration instituted
more antitrust actions in its first three years than Roosevelt’s filed in
more than seven years.320 Most dramatically, Taft filed an action to
break up the biggest trust of all, United States Steel Company, and
indicted the company’s top officials, including J.P. Morgan, John D.
Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie, personally.321 When it filed its
complaint in that action, Taft’s Department of Justice insinuated
that years earlier J.P. Morgan bamboozled Roosevelt into permit-
ting U.S. Steel to engage in a controversial acquisition of the
Tennessee Coal and Iron Company.322 During his presidency,
Roosevelt personally blessed that merger, but he did so as part of
deal in which Morgan saved a leading brokerage house from bank-
ruptcy during the financial panic of 1907.323 Roosevelt was enraged
by the suggestion that Morgan had pulled the wool over his eyes.
Indeed, this perceived insult triggered Roosevelt’s decision to oust
his successor by running again for presidency in 1912.324
Meanwhile, on May 15, 1911, the Supreme Court decided the
Standard Oil case.325 The Court unanimously held that the defend-
ants violated both the restraint of trade and monopolization
provisions of the Sherman Act, and had to be broken up. The deci-
sion is famous for adopting the rule of reason,326 but for our
318. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 221 U.S. at 45.
319. See, e.g., DINER, supra note 283, at 221 (stating that “Roosevelt’s reputation as a ‘trust
buster’ had never been deserved.”).
320. GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 668.
321. Id. at 667.
322. At the time, a respected financial analyst claimed Roosevelt had allowed J.P. Morgan
to pay $45 million for stock worth at least $1 billion, acquire an energetic competitor, and
look public spirited in the process. Other Taft loyalists happily picked up the theme. Id. at
529-30, 667–68. See also BRANDS, supra note 4, at 602–05.
323. The brokerage house Moore & Schley had been teetering on bankruptcy. The ad-
ministration feared that if Moore & Schley failed, it would bring down other financial
institutions. J.P. Morgan proposed saving Moore & Schley by buying its large position in
TC&I, but he insisted that Roosevelt promise not to challenge the acquisition. BRANDS,
supra note 4, at 602–05.
324. GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 667.
325. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 1 (1911).
326. The Court held that in determining whether the Sherman Act was violated courts
must apply “the rule of reason” guided by the established law and “judgment must in every
case be called into play in order to determine whether a particular act is embraced within the
statutory classes.” Id. at 63. The adoption of the rule of reason is considered a watershed
event in the development of antitrust law. One commentator writes:
FALL 2015] The New Road to Serfdom 59
purposes what is most significant is what the Court said about the
history and purpose of the Sherman Act. The Court wrote:
[T]he main cause which led to the legislation was the thought
that it was required by the economic condition of the times,
that is, the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of corpo-
rations, and individuals, the enormous development of
corporate organization, the facility for combination which
such organizations afforded, the fact that the facility was being
used, and that combinations known as trusts were being multi-
plied, and the widespread impression that their power had
been and would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure
the public generally.327
It is worth noting that this was quite a different Court than the
one that decided Trans-Missouri Freight Association fifteen years ear-
lier. Only one justice who had been in the majority in Trans-
Missouri was still on the Court.328 That was John Marshall Harlan,
who agreed with the majority that defendants had violated the Sher-
man Act and should be broken up, but disagreed with using a rule
of reason analysis. Nonetheless, Harlan agreed with his colleagues
about the history and purpose of the Sherman Act, adding the fol-
lowing in a separate opinion:
All who recall the condition of the country in 1890 will remem-
ber that there was everywhere, among the people generally, a
deep feeling of unrest. The Nation had been rid of human
slavery—fortunately, as all now feel—but the conviction was
universal that the country was in real danger from another
kind of slavery sought to be fastened on the American people,
namely, the slavery that would result from aggregations of cap-
ital in the hands of a few individuals, and corporations
controlling, for their own profit and advantage exclusively, the
entire business of the country, including the production and
sale of the necessaries of life. Such a danger was thought to be
The Standard Oil decision summed up, as much as anything, the implicit compromise
on big business that emerged from the Progressive Era. The country would accept
large companies as long as they were efficient and stopped short of monopoly. Ac-
cordingly, many industries developed into oligopolies, dominated by a handful of very
big enterprises that competed, albeit cautiously.
WELLS, supra note 120, at 31.
327. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 221 U.S. at 50.
328. THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORI-
GINS 96 (4th ed. 2009).
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then imminent, and all felt that it must be met firmly and by
such statutory regulations as would adequately protect the peo-
ple against oppression and wrong.329
I described the antitrust trust debate in the presidential cam-
paign of 1912 in the Introduction to this Article, and will not repeat
that here, other than to briefly note that both the Democratic and
Republican party platforms of 1912 called for new antitrust legisla-
tion to supplement and strengthen the Sherman Act.330 Wilson’s
election was considered something of a referendum on the issue. In
1914, Congress—following committee testimony and floor debate
that fill thousands of pages in the Congressional Record331—en-
acted both the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Among other things, the Clayton Act strengthened the anti-monop-
oly provision of the Sherman Act,332 made it unlawful to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodi-
ties333 or to sell goods to a buyer on the condition the buyer not do
business with a competitor,334 exempted labor organizations from
the antitrust laws,335 and provided that any person injured by anti-
trust violations could bring a private action and recover three times
the amount of their damages plus their attorney’s fees.336 The Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act provided that “unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce” are unlawful,337 and it estab-
lished a new antitrust enforcement agency to determine when
methods are unfair, thus empowering the FTC to find conduct un-
lawful even if it does not technically violate provisions of the
Sherman or Clayton Acts.338
329. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 221 U.S. at 83–84 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
330. See Republican Party Platform of 1912, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 18,
1912), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29633; Democratic Party Platform
of 1912, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 25, 1912), http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29590.
331. See THE LEGISTLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STAT-
UTES, supra note 290, at 1000 (reporting that more than 100 witnesses testified before the
committees, and the record of testimony and debates takes up nearly 2,800 pages).
332. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914).
333. Id. § 13.
334. Id. §14. This section was designed to expressly make exclusive dealing and tying
arrangements unlawful, even though they could also be considered a violation of Sherman
Act §1. See generally HOVEMKAMP, supra note 89, at 66.
335. Id. §17. This exemption turned out to be largely ineffective. HOVENKAMP, supra note
89, at 66.
336. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
337. Id. § 18.
338. HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 66.
FALL 2015] The New Road to Serfdom 61
Antitrust concerns were quickly whisked off the stage by the First
World War.339 The prevailing view was that producing the arsenals
of war required big companies unhampered by concerns about con-
solidations, collaboration, or cartelization.340 In many ways, of
course, free enterprise is often suspended during the emergency of
war and the government is allowed to allocate materials, ration
goods, and fix prices.341
Nor would real interest in antitrust return soon after the war en-
ded. The next three presidents—Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge,
and Herbert Hoover—were pro-business Republicans who disfa-
vored government regulation of business. Their collective attitude
toward antitrust was typified by the man whom Coolidge nominated
to be a commissioner of the FTC calling that agency “an instrument
of oppression and disturbance and injury,”342 and by Herbert Hoo-
ver denouncing as a “perversion of justice” antitrust enforcement
actions brought against trade associations by his own Department
of Justice.343
D. The New Deal
In his first term, Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought to fight the
Depression by essentially suspending the antitrust laws and encour-
aging business to collaborate—including agreeing on prices and
industry production quotas—through the auspices of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).344 The idea was to save businesses
from ruinous competition and thereby restore their profitability.
The fruits of prosperity would be shared by working people
through wage codes and collective bargaining, which the Act
339. See, e.g., WELLS, supra note 120, at 54 (stating that “Washington suspended the anti-
trust laws” during World War I).
340. See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND
WAR 35 (1995)(describing the view that the war effort required harmony among business,
government and labor).
341. See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM 1940–1945
at 90–97, 116–120, 255–62, 332–43 (1970)(regarding resource allocation and wage and price
controls during World War II).
342. The FTC commissioner who made the remark was William Humphrey. DAVID GREEN-
BERG, CALVIN COOLIDGE 73 (2006). Greenberg notes that while the Coolidge administration
filed a record seventy antitrust actions, it settled almost a third of them on terms favorable to
industry. National Cash Register, for example, was convicted of price fixing and ultimately
paid a fifty-dollar fine. Id.
343. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, HERBERT HOOVER 65 (2009).
344. BRINKLEY, supra note 340, at 38–39; WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE
DREAM: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICA 1932–1972 at 104–05 (1973).
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authorized.345 But industry was more enthusiastic about establishing
codes to raise prices rather than wages. Prices rose; wages did not
keep pace; small businesses complained that large corporations
controlled the process and were using it to magnify their own mar-
ket positions; unions complained that employers were not
bargaining in good faith.346 The experiment collapsed even before
1935 when the Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional.
This ignited an explosion of thinking by liberal intellectuals both
inside and outside the administration. One source of their inspira-
tion was work done by lawyer Adolf A. Berle and economist
Gardiner C. Means. In one of his early public statements about
their work, in the spring of 1929, Berle said:
The economist working with me has produced statistics indi-
cating that presently something over one-third of the national
wealth of the country will be administered by some two hun-
dred corporations who in turn are dominated by less than
eighteen hundred men. This small group in connection with
their bankers thus has a power over a very large proportion of
the savings of the country; likewise over the lives of men who
work in the industries; and in a less direct sense, over the pub-
lic served by them. This is a problem of government rather than
finance.347
In a subsequent article, Berle argued that the concentration of
power in giant corporations constituted a “major shift in civiliza-
tion.”348 “A Machiavelli writing today would have very little interest
in princes, and every interest in the Standard Oil Company of Indi-
ana,” he observed.349 In 1932, Berle and Means expanded their
thinking in their book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
Before the year was out, Louis D. Brandeis, who was now on the
Supreme Court, cited the book in one of his opinions.350 The next
spring, Time magazine reported the book had become “the eco-
nomic Bible of the Roosevelt administration.”351
345. MANCHESTER, supra note 344, at 105.
346. BRINKLEY, supra note 340, at 39.
347. See JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN
ERA 56 (1987) (quoting Berle).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558 n.37 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in
part).
351. SCHWARZ, supra note 347, at 61.
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Another influential thinker of the time, at least within liberal in-
tellectual circles, was the economist Saul Nelson.352 Nelson argued
that a crusade against economic concentration was necessary to
provide individuals with the freedom of economic opportunity and
to preserve the integrity of communities. The ability of people to
start their own businesses or have some control over the conditions
in which they worked was at stake. Nelson was quite clear: the prob-
lem was not that large companies were abusing power, but that they
had that power. “The monster is a menace not because of the way
he acts,” he wrote, “but simply because he is too large.”353
In 1936, while still in the midst of the Depression, Congress en-
acted the Robinson-Patman Act, which attempted to strengthen the
Clayton Act’s section dealing with quantity discounts.354 The pur-
pose of the Act was to protect small businesses by restricting
manufacturer discounts to large retailers.355 The legislation was pro-
posed, drafted, and lobbied for by the United States Wholesale
Grocers’ Association, whose members were not able to purchase
goods at the same low prices granted to chain supermarkets.356
The Act is extremely weak. It permits discounts based on the
seller’s cost savings, and a patchwork of legislative compromises
produced a final product described by three leading commentators
as “a deplorable model of statutory obfuscation.”357 Nevertheless,
the Act was passed because, in this context at least, Congress
wanted to protect small businesses even though consumers would
wind up paying higher prices.358
By 1937, when the country starting slipping back into recession,
FDR and his brain trust had become convinced that giant corpora-
tions, consolidated industries, and gross inequalities in income
were draining energy from the economy, and that the medicine the
nation needed was a vigorous new approach to antitrust.359 In De-
cember 1937, Harold Ickes, who was Secretary of the Interior, and
352. BRINKLEY, supra note 340, at 60–61.
353. Id.
354. See 15 U.S.C §§13(a)–(f).
355. Congressman Wright Patman argued that when independent merchants were forced
out of business, “the reservoir of credit” for local communities was drained. He believed that
draining credit from communities was one of the causes of the Great Depression. See MOR-
GAN, supra note 328, at 388 (quoting Patman).
356. See KINTNER, VOL. 2, supra note 290, at 2895 n.6.21(quoting Frederick M. Rowe as
stating that, “Throughout the hearings [the association’s counsel] functioned as Mr. Pat-
man’s factorum—drafting, analyzing, and explaining for the legislators.”).
357. GELLHORN, KOVACIC & CAUKINS, supra note 105, at 36.
358. HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 629.
359. Indeed, some within the administration thought they were facing a “capital strike,”
that is, large corporations and titans of industry were conspiring to deliberately sabotage the
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Robert Jackson, who headed the antitrust division in the Depart-
ment of Justice, gave a series of coordinated speeches in which they
argued that the national economy was hostage to the nation’s rich-
est families.360 Young men and women finishing their educations
had no realistic choice “except to start of the bottom of an impossi-
bly long ladder of a few great corporations dominated by America’s
sixty families,” Jackson declared in two speeches that month, one
carried over radio and the other before the American Political Sci-
ence Association.361
The following month, the president told Congress that economic
concentration threatened the body politic.362 He said the antitrust
laws needed “reconstruction,” and promised to send recommenda-
tions along those lines to Congress.363 Three months later,
Roosevelt asked Congress for increased funding for antitrust en-
forcement and half a million dollars to study the concentration of
economic power in America, explaining this was necessary because
“the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the
growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than
their democratic state itself.”364
Roosevelt made the theme an important part of his 1939 reelec-
tion campaign. In his speech accepting the Democratic Party’s
nomination for president, Roosevelt echoed the title and thinking
of Brandeis’ classic old book, Other People’s Money.365 He declared:
A small group has concentrated into their own hands an al-
most complete control over other people’s property, other
people’s money, other people’s labor—other people’s lives.
For too many of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer
real; men could no longer follow the pursuit of happiness. . . .
Here in America we are waging a great and successful war. It is
not alone a war against want and destitution and economic
recovery—and with it, the Roosevelt administration—by not spending for business expan-
sion. There is evidence that the president, himself, thought there might be something to this
view. BRINKLEY, supra note 340, at 56; WELLS, supra note 120, at 37; HOFSTADTER, supra note
271, at 229–30.
360. The theme was taken from Ferdinand Lundberg’s popular book America’s 60 Fami-
lies, published in 1937.
361. BRINKLEY, supra note 340, at 57.
362. Roosevelt also deployed his Brandeisian phrase “other people’s money, other peo-
ple’s labor, and other people’s lives” in this message. Id. at 58.
363. Id.
364. SANDEL, supra note 2, at 239.
365. BRANDEIS, supra note 12.
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demoralization. It is more than that; it is a war for the survival
of democracy.366
But the socio-political viewpoint was challenged within
Roosevelt’s inner circle. Others believed the desire to break up big
business was antediluvian and naı¨ve. “We need big business,” one
New Dealer said.367 “To talk about returning to arts and crafts is not
only romantic, it is impossible.”368
Many liberals argued that the modern economy depended on a
consumer culture.369 People had to want things and earn enough to
satisfy some of their desires. Consumption was the engine that
would drive the economy. If consumers wanted things, business
would produce them. Business revenues, in turn, would be suffi-
cient to pay workers enough so that, in their roles as consumers,
they could afford to purchase things. The spark plug of consump-
tion was desire. The great danger for the modern economy was
“underconsumption.”370 Modern industrial society had the capacity
to produce sufficient food, shelter, goods, and entertainment, to
eliminate poverty, and to give everyone the good life. But industry
would deliver the cornucopia of goods only if people hungered for
them.371
Some labor leaders agreed. For example, Sidney Hillman, the
president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America who
was influentialwithin New Deal circles, maintained that it “is essen-
tial to our system of mass production to create a consumer’s
demand for almost unlimited output.”372An economist at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania argued that consumer desire was the true
meaning of modern life.373 It is a view that gives advertising an im-
portant social purpose; but this economist went even further,
arguing that the primary purpose of education should be to arouse
within people desires and make them aware of pleasures awaiting
them in department stores and amusement parks. New Dealers
366. WELLS, supra note 120, at 34.
367. See BRINKLEY, supra note 340, at 62 (quoting Maury Maverick).
368. Id.
369. See generally id. at 65–85 (Chapter 4, “Spending and Consumption.”).
370. See id. at 70 (describing the thinking of journalist Stuart Chase).
371. In this line of thinking, people’s desire for consumer products had to be ardent
enough to cause them to buy rather than save. Two liberal thinkers, William Trufant Foster
and Waddill Catchings, argued that consumers were saving too much—something they char-
acterized as “wasteful thrift.” Id. at 76.
372. See id. at 217–18 (identifying Hillman) and 218 (setting forth the quotation).
373. See id.at 67–68 (describing the writings of economist Simon Patten).
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holding to this view wanted a new cabinet-level Department of the
Consumer.374
This debate occurred not merely within the confines of FDR’s
inner circle. It was carried on in newspapers and magazines.375 Dor-
othy Thompson, a widely-read syndicated columnist, explained the
root of the debate to her readers:
Two souls dwell . . . in the bosom of the American people. The
one loves the abundant life, as expressed in the cheap and
plentiful products of large-scale mass production and distribu-
tion. . . . The other yearns for the former simplicities, for
decentralization, for the interests of the ‘little man . . . de-
nounces ‘monopoly’ and ‘economic empires,’ and seeks
means of breaking them up.376
This debate, of course, has profound implications for antitrust
policy. If the consumer is king, the economy exists to provide as
many goods as inexpensively as possible. What makes that possible
is efficiency—both allocative and productive efficiency—and the
best industrial structure is whatever makes that possible. Such a sys-
tem would help fashion an economy system that is good for the
efficient wheels of industry but often is not good for social organiza-
tions—professional, cultural, educational, civic.
Although neither side prevailed absolutely, the consumer welfare
model started to gain the upper hand. This occurred for two rea-
sons. One reason was the Second World War. War, as previously
noted, requires the industrial production of arsenals, and govern-
ment regulation of all kinds, including antitrust, are suspended to
the extent it is considered an interference. The other reason that
the consumer welfare model gained strength was that in 1938, Rob-
ert Jackson became solicitor general, and Thurman Arnold
replaced him as chief of the antitrust division.377
There is little in his background that suggested that Thurman
Arnold would become one of the most influential figures in anti-
trust history. Arnold had been mayor of Laramie, Wyoming; dean
of the West Virginia University College of Law; a professor at Yale
Law School, where he published a best-selling book titled The Folk-
lore of Capitalism, which caught the attention of the inner circle of
374. Id. at 71.
375. Id. 299 n.35 and 313 n.48.
376. See WELLS, supra note 120, at 29 (quoting Dorothy Thompson).
377. Id. at 38.
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the New Deal; and a tax lawyer in Department of Justice.378 Al-
though he made some comments about antitrust in The Folklore of
Capitalism, that field had never been his particular focus.
Some feared Arnold was a radical who might be overzealous;
others worried that he had a jaundiced view of antitrust and was not
opposed to monopolies.379 Arnold turned out to be a dynamo. In
just his first two years, the budget of the antitrust division quin-
tupled, the number of lawyers in the division grew from fifty-eight
to more than three hundred, and the number of antitrust com-
plaints filed annually more than tripled to 3,412.380 Even more
remarkably, Arnold won a stunning ninety-four percent of cases
brought to trial, and he settled the rest on terms so favorable to the
government that he successfully argued for appropriations by show-
ing that antitrust enforcement was producing three times its cost
for the U.S. Treasury.381 For the first time, Arnold brought antitrust
enforcement to a prominent place within the Department of
Justice.
However, while Arnold believed in energetic enforcement of the
antitrust law, he also believed the law should support efficiency and
competition and not seek to deter bigness. “What ought to be em-
phasized is not the evils of size but the evils of industries which are
not efficient or do not pass efficiency on to consumers,” Arnold
later explained.382 He dismissed concerns about bigness as outmo-
ded “religion” and “an anachronism in a machine age.”383 “The
test,” he said, “is efficiency and service—not size.”384
And yet Arnold’s tenure as antitrust chief was something of a
mixed bag. Historian Wyatt Wells writes that, notwithstanding the
main trust of his views, Arnold harbored suspicions of big enter-
prises, and most of the lawyers in the antitrust division shared
378. BRINKLEY, supra note 340, at 106–11.
379. Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
569, 574–76 (2004).
380. The passages about antitrust in Arnold’s book were sufficiently oblique that readers
wondered whether Arnold did not like antitrust law itself or merely how the law was being
applied. At Arnold’s confirmation hearing, Senator William Borah of Idaho asked Arnold
whether he believed in breaking up monopolies. “Certainly,” Arnold replied. Alan Brinkley
observes: “Borah seemed satisfied, but his original concerns were well grounded.” BRINKLEY,
supra note 340, at 111.
381. Id.
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Brandeis’ concern that an economy dominated by large companies
was inimical to democracy.385
The tug of war between the consumer welfare and socio-political
models continued.386 The struggle is reflected by a famous case. In
1937, when Robert Jackson still headed the antitrust division, the
government sued the Aluminum Company of America—the com-
pany popularly known as Alcoa—seeking to dissolve its monopoly
in the production of aluminum ingot.387
There was no doubt that decades earlier Alcoa had, in part,
maintained its monopoly through unlawful practices. It had formed
a cartel with foreign producers, who agreed either not to import
aluminum ingot to the United States at all or to do so under quota
and price restrictions.388 It had also purchased electricity from
power companies on the condition that they not supply electricity
to Alcoa’s rivals.389 These practices allegedly ended decades earlier;
but still, Alcoa possessed more than ninety percent of the relevant
market.390
The case was controversial when instituted, and it became even
more controversial as America started to mobilize for war. Thur-
man Arnold, now head of the antitrust division, blamed Alcoa for
production shortages endangering the nation’s defense efforts. In-
deed, he came close to accusing Alcoa of war profiteering.391 Before
the war, the international cartel had previously divvied up the world
market. The German producers’ share had been twenty percent;
but in 1934—when Adolf Hitler assumed dictatorial powers and was
furiously building up the Luftwaffe392—they demanded the right to
produce unlimited amounts of aluminum for domestic needs. The
other members of the cartel reluctantly agreed, but only on the
condition that exports from Germany be severely restricted.393 Al-
coa, however, neither increased production nor its production
385. See id. at 216 (describing Arnold as “deeply suspicious of big business”), 211 (describ-
ing the sentiments of lawyers in the antitrust division).
386. Historian Ellis Hawley tells us that not only did New Dealers fail to reach a consensus
by 1939, but if anything they were even more divided than they had been in 1933. See SANDEL,
supra note 2, at 263 (quoting Hawley).
387. For the background of the case, see WELLS, supra note 120, at 59–64.
388. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1945).
389. Id.
390. Id. at 425. The definition of the relevant market was hotly contested. The Second
Circuit found that the relevant market was virgin aluminum ingot, including all of that prod-
uct that Alcoa fabricated whether sold to others or used itself to produce other aluminum
products. Id. at 424–25.
391. WELLS, supra note 120, at 61–62.
392. See generally WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THE GATHERING
STORM 110–29 (1948).
393. WELLS, supra note 120, at 61–62.
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capacity. As Arnold put it: “Hitler tripled aluminum product for air-
craft and war materials while the democracies stood still.”394 Arnold
was implying that Alcoa had put the nation in peril to enjoy monop-
oly profits.
The trial in district court lasted more than two years, and the
district judge took almost another two years to write his decision.395
As a result, the case reached the Supreme Court as the war was
ending. The Court could not then muster a quorum to hear it, and
referred the case to the Second Circuit, which ultimately produced
a decision written by the great jurist Judge Learned Hand.396
It was clear that Alcoa had a monopoly, though less clear
whether it had maintained its monopoly through illegal practices,
at least within the past couple of decades. Moreover, the district
trial had found that Alcoa never took extortionate profits. Its profit
had been about ten percent; its consumers had never been gouged.
The Second Circuit found that irrelevant. “[I]t is no excuse for
‘monopolizing’ a market that the monopoly has not been used to
extract from the consumer more than a ‘fair’ profit. The Act has
wider purposes,” Learned Hand wrote.397 Even if only economic
consequences mattered, many believed that “unchallenged eco-
nomic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift, and depresses
energy,” he continued.398 It did not matter whether Alcoa had been
a good trust. Congress “did not condone ‘good trusts’ and con-
demn ‘bad’ ones; it forbade all.”399
Moreover, Congress had not necessarily been motivated “by eco-
nomic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or
moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent
for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the
great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few.”400
The court wrote:
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which
forbid monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are
others, based on the belief that great industrial consolidations
are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic re-
sults. In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself . . .
showed that among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a
394. Id. at 62.
395. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at421.
396. MORGAN, supra note 328, at 256 n.1.
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desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital because of
the helplessness of the individual before them. . . . Through-
out the history [of the Sherman Act and other laws] it has
been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to per-
petuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible
cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effec-
tively compete with each other.401
The court then wrestled with the question of whether there is
such a thing as a lawful monopoly, that is, whether the law required
dissolving a monopoly even if its position was achieved without en-
gaging in unlawful acts. Judge Hand noted that on at least five
occasions, the Supreme Court had ordered the dissolution of such
monopolies. Nonetheless, he observed, courts “had at least kept in
reserve the possibility that the origin of a monopoly may be critical
in determining its legality.”402
In the end, it was not a problem the court had to definitively
resolve because it found that that Alcoa was not merely a “passive
beneficiary of a monopoly” but had intentionally taken action to
shut out competition.403 That was a bit of hedge however. The court
accepted Alcoa’s argument that there had been “no moral derelic-
tions after 1912.”404 Thus, there had been no showing that Alcoa
had engaged in unfair practices for the last quarter-century. But the
court famously concluded that it was nonsense to read the Sherman
Act as requiring a showing of specific intent “for no monopolist
monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.”405 The Supreme
Court later indirectly endorsed this decision by citing it favorably in
another antitrust case.406
Although antitrust enforcement often took a backseat during the
war, FDR still considered antitrust important to individual freedom.
On January 11, 1944, he proposed a Second Bill of Rights in his
annual message to Congress and in a radio address to the nation.
401. Id. at 428–29.
402. Id. at 429.
403. Id, at 430.
404. Id. at 431.
405. Id. at 432. The court cited with approval Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo’s famous lan-
guage that, “Mere size . . . is not an offense against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the
point at which it amounts to a monopoly . . . but size carries with it an opportunity for abuse
that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the past.” Id.
at 420 (quoting United States v.Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932)).
406. The Supreme Court also remarked that “the material consideration in determining
whether a monopoly exists is not that prices are raised and that competition actually is ex-
cluded but that power exists to raise prices or exclude competition when it is desired to do
so.” American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
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One of the eight rights he included was the following: “The right of
every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of
freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies
at home or abroad.”407
Following the war, importing antitrust law to Germany and Japan
was considered necessary to the reorganization of both nations.
Cartels dominated industries in both countries. Based on both re-
cent and earlier experience in which cartels had been a driving
force for European colonial empires, some thinkers associated car-
tels with imperialism.408 In a long memorandum, a U.S. inter-
agency Committee on Private Monopolies and Cartels concluded
that the “growth of monopoly unparalleled in western industrial na-
tions” was one of the factors that led to the development of the
authoritarianism in Germany, and drove the Third Reich to seek
foreign expansion.409 Arms manufacturers especially nurtured Ger-
man aggression. “Almost from the end of the World War I
Germany’s arms manufacturers, for the most part the great com-
bines which constituted the very heart of heavy industry, set about
preparing Germany for another effort at conquest,” read the
memo.410 A U.S. Senate report also concluded that German imperi-
alism would be permanently extinguished only if the structure of
the nation’s industry were dramatically changed. Democracy, it was
feared, could not flourish where economic power was highly
concentrated.411
Therefore, giant firms had to be broken up, and cartels had to be
eliminated. In April 1945, the joint chiefs of staffs sent General
Dwight D. Eisenhower orders concerning the occupation of Ger-
many, which instructed: “It is the policy of your government to
effect a dispersion of the ownership and control of German indus-
try.”412 The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States
discussed how to accomplish these goals. In 1947, the United States
and Great Britain issued identical laws for the occupation zones
they controlled, outlawing cartels and stating that there was a prima
407. Harvey J. Kaye, FDR’s Second Bill of Rights: “Necessitous Men are Not Free Men,” NEXT
NEW DEAL (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/fdrs-second-bill-rights-necessitous-
men-are-not-free-men.
408. WELLS, supra note 120, at 119.
409. See id. at 110 (describing the committee), 138 (describing the memo).
410. Id. at 138.
411. Edward Welch, who headed the antitrust and cartels division of U.S. occupation
forces in Japan said, “People can talk and write about democracy, but they cannot really live
democracy without deconcentration of economic power.” Id. at 176. See also id. at 142.
412. Id. at 140.
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facie case for dissolving any firm that had more than 10,000
employees.413
American policy was very much the same regarding Japan. At
war’s end, ten giant Zaibatsu (family-dominated firms) controlled
about half of Japan’s industrial and financial resources.414 President
Harry S. Truman instructed General Douglas MacArthur “to favor a
program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking
combinations which have exercised control of a large part of Ja-
pan’s trade and industry.”415
In April 1947, at the strong urging of the U.S. occupation author-
ity, the Japanese Diet adopted antitrust legislation.416 These policies
were not unchallenged. Some American officials believed that effi-
ciency should trump concerns about size.417 Some industries were
successfully deconcentrated while others were not.418 Nevertheless,
for political and social rather than economic reasons, the official
policy of the United States favored eliminating cartels and breaking
up giant firms in Germany and Japan. 419
But, at home, some of the practical difficulties in reconciling at-
tempts to promote robust competition and at the same time to
support small businesses were evident in a 1949 Supreme Court
case.420 The Court decided that it was unlawful for an oil company
to enter into exclusive supply contracts with independent service
stations, thereby precluding these small businesses from purchasing
gasoline from other suppliers. The oil company’s distribution sys-
tem included both company-owned and independent stations.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented because he believed the
Court’s decision would discourage the oil companies from dealing
with independent dealers. If they could not ensure that that dealers
would not buy from others, the big oil companies would distribute
their product exclusively through company-owned stations. Thus,
believed Douglas, even though the Court sought to promote com-
petition and the freedom of small businesses, the unintended
consequence of its decision would be to snuff out small businesses
and make giant oil companies even larger. He wrote:
413. See id. at 154.
414. Id. at 150 (regarding discussions with the Soviet Union) and 154 (regarding the U.S.
and British laws).
415. See id. at 142 (quoting Truman’s instructions).
416. Id. at 179.
417. Id. at 154.
418. In Germany, the banking sector escaped deconcentration, for example. Id. at
166–67.
419. See generally id., at 13786 (Chapter 5, “Among Unbelievers: Antitrust in Germany and
Japan”).
420. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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The economic theories which the Court has read into the
Anti-Trust Laws have favored rather than discouraged monop-
oly. As a result of the big business philosophy underlying [the
Court’s decisions], big business has become bigger and bigger.
Cartels have increased their hold on the nation. The trusts wax
strong. There is less and less place for the independent.
The full force of the Anti-Trust Laws have not been felt in
our economy. It has been deflected. . . . [W]hen it comes to
monopolies built in gentlemanly ways—by mergers, purchases
of assets or control and the like—the teeth have largely been
drawn from the Act. . . The increased concentration of indus-
trial power in the hands of a few have changed habits of
thought. A new age has been announced. It is more and more
an age of ‘monopoly competition.’ Monopoly competition
is a regime of friendly alliances, of quick and easy accommoda-
tion on prices even without the benefit of trade associations, of
what Brandeis said was euphemistically called ‘coopera-
tion.’. . .
The lessons Brandeis taught on the curse of bigness have
largely been forgotten in high places. Size is allowed to be-
come a menace to existing and putative competitors. . . .
[T]here is an effect on the community when independents are
swallowed up by the trusts and entrepreneurs become employ-
ees of absentee owners. There is a serious loss of citizenship.
Local leadership is diluted. He who was a leader in the village
becomes dependent on outsiders for his action and policy.
Clerks responsible to a superior in a distant place take the
place of resident proprietors beholden to no one. These are
the prices the nation pays for the almost ceaseless growth in
bigness on the part of industry.421
The consumer welfare model may have gained the upper hand, but
Douglas’ own dissent demonstrates that Brandeis’ warnings had not
been entirely forgotten. The debate between the consumer welfare
model and what may be called the citizen welfare model422—one
that insisted upon taking account not only people’s roles as con-
sumers, but also their roles as workers and members of
communities—was not over.
421. Id. at 315–19 (1949)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
422. Other possible terms for this view are “civic model” or “civic welfare model.” I prefer
the term “citizen welfare model” because of its more direct contraposition with the term
“consumer welfare model.” The heart of the debate is whether antitrust should consider what
is best of people solely as consumers and as citizens with many other roles.
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E. Mid-Twentieth Century
If war is a friend to corporate bigness, then the period immedi-
ately following a war may be an even better friend. That, at least,
was the case for American companies following both the First and
Second World Wars. In 1947, the FTC reported to Congress that
large American companies were then making large profits, and us-
ing some of those profits to go on acquisition sprees, repeating
what had occurred in the aftermath of World War I.423 From
“1940–47, more than 2,450 formerly independent manufacturing
and mining companies have disappeared as a result of mergers and
acquisitions,” reported the FTC.424 The asset value of the swallowed
firms represented about 5.5% of the total value of all manufactur-
ing companies in the nation.425 The FTC was particularly
concerned about seventy-eight giant manufacturers. The combined
asset value of those giants equaled the combined asset value of the
50,000 manufacturing companies in the country with individual as-
set values of less than $1 million. Moreover, the giants were holding
enormous amounts of cash and government securities. Although it
was not predicting things would go that far, the FTC noted that
seventy-eight giants had the financial capacity to purchase ninety
percent of all of the manufacturing companies in the nation.426
Congress reacted by passing the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.
That legislation amended and strengthened the anti-merger provi-
sion of the Clayton Act by making it clear that it applied not only to
acquiring other companies by purchasing their stock but also to ef-
fectively acquiring them by purchasing their assets—thereby closing
a large loophole that many businesses exploited. The act revised
the anti-merger provision so that it would apply to vertical as well as
to horizontal mergers.427 It provided that the FTC could seek to
dissolve mergers that had been consummated before it filed an in-
junction action.
423. See KINTNER, VOL. 2, supra note 290, at 3418, 3448–49 (FTC Report to Congress, The
Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, March 10, 1945). (FTC Report to Congress,
The Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, March 10, 1945).
424. Id. at 3448.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 3450–51. Congress’ view about the nature of the then-ongoing merger wave
was challenged by a study that reported that, in contrast to the merger waves of 1895–1904
and 1926–30, most mergers in this third wave, beginning in 1940, were between relatively
small companies and produced harmless economic effects, at least in terms of industry con-
centration. Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARV. L. REV. 226, 231–33 (1960).
427. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
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In 1976, Congress strengthened the anti-merger provision still
further by requiring companies to notify the Department of Justice
and the FTC before completing mergers or acquisitions of a certain
sizes, thereby affording regulators time to investigate and object
before the transactions occurred.428
Perhaps most importantly, the revision expanded the anti-
merger provision by prohibiting any acquisition if its effect “may be
substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monop-
oly.”429 As the Supreme Court later put it, Congress intended the
amended anti-merger provision to “arrest incipient threats to com-
petition which the Sherman Act did not ordinarily reach.”430 Thus,
the Celler-Kefauver Act was not merely about closing loopholes; it
was designed to create a new and more robust anti-merger policy.431
The sponsors of the Act were not concerned with efficiency and
consumer prices but with corporate bigness and the civic fabric of
the nation. Representative Emanuel Celler worried that the inde-
pendent and decentralized businesses that “made our country
great,” were disappearing, and that American business was tending
toward “monster concentration.”432 Senator Estes Kefauver of Ten-
nessee said the central issue was this: “Shall we permit the economy
of the country to gravitate into the hands of a few corporations?”433
Congress intended to give regulators and the courts an instrument
to preserve small and medium-sized businesses, even when consoli-
dation would produce lower consumer prices.434 There was a clear
congressional consensus that the socio-political benefits of decon-
centration were not to be sacrificed for efficiency and lower
consumer prices.435
428. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Clayton Act §7A, 15 U.S.C.
§18A (1976).
429. Clayton Act §7, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, 15 U.S.C. §18 (em-
phasis added). The House committee report explained that the revision was intended to
allow the government to stop mergers that would significantly reduce “the vigor of competi-
tion, even though this effect may not be so far-reaching as to amount to a combination in
restraint of trade, create a monopoly, or constitute an attempt to monopolize.” See Bok, supra
note 426, at 237 (quoting House report).
430. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Corp., 378 U.S. 158, 171 (1964).
431. Bok, supra note 426, at 306.
432. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 n.10 (1966).
433. Id.
434. Herbert Hovenkamp writes that when Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver amend-
ments to the Clayton Act, its chief concern was protecting small businesses “even though the
result of such protection would be lower total output and higher consumer prices.”
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 89, at 59.
435. See Bok, supra note 426, at 306 (regarding congressional consensus), 247–48, 318
(regarding noneconomic factors having the higher priority).
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The Warren Court sought to honor Congress’ intent. Two nota-
ble cases are worth briefly describing, especially since the Chicago
School had turned them into poster-children for its thesis that the
antitrust laws should be all about efficiency and consumer welfare,
and socio-political considerations should be ignored.
The first, Brown Shoe Company v. United States,436 involved the gov-
ernment’s challenge to a merger between the Brown Shoe
Company and the G.R. Kinney Company. Brown and Kinney were
both manufacturers and retailers of men’s, women’s, and children’s
shoes. In terms of sales volume, they were respectively the third and
eighth largest shoe companies in the country. Brown owned or
franchised 1,230 shoe stores; Kinney had 350 shoe stores.437 The
defendants argued that the merger would do no economic harm
because the industry was highly fragmented. Even after the merger,
the top four shoe manufacturers would produce only twenty-three
percent of the nation’s shoes, and the top twenty-four manufactur-
ers about thirty-five percent of the nation’s shoes.438 At the time the
government filed suit in 1955, Brown manufactured only four per-
cent and Kinney 0.5% of the nation’s shoes.439
There was, however, a trend toward consolidation in the indus-
try. In 1947, there had been 1,077 independent shoe manufacturers
in the United States; that number had decreased by ten percent
over the subsequent seven years. Brown, specifically, had grown
through mergers. Within the last four years, it had acquired seven
shoe manufacturers, a company that operated 250 shoe depart-
ments in department stores, and other smaller retailers as well.440
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the
merger would violate the amended anti-merger provision of the
Clayton Act. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren ad-
dressed the policy of the Celler-Kefauver amendments:
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration
of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to
be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy. . . . Other considerations cited in support of the bill
were the desirability of retaining ‘local control’ over industry
and the protection of small businesses. Throughout the re-
corded discussion may be found examples of Congress’ fear
not only of accelerated concentration of economic power on
436. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
437. Id. at 297.
438. Id. at 298–301.
439. Id. at 298 (Kinney), 303 (Brown).
440. Id. at 302–03.
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economic grounds, but also of the threat to other values a
trend toward concentration was thought to pose.441
The Court added:
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But
we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote com-
petition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned
businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs
and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considera-
tions in favor of decentralization.442
The Court found the sizes of the two companies important.
Brown sold twenty-five million pairs of shoes annually and had as-
sets of more than $72 million (the equivalent of $260 million in
2014), while Kinney sold about eight million pairs of shoes and had
assets of about $18 million (the equivalent $160 million in 2014).443
Although the Court did not say so, these figures alone may have
been sufficient grounds to deny the merger. Even though many
competitors remained, and the merger was far from creating an oli-
gopoly, the Court realized that if it approved this merger, “we
might be required to approve future merger efforts by Brown’s
competitors seeking similar market shares.”444 This process would
move the industry further toward oligopoly, and that was exactly
what Congress sought to prevent. Indeed, noted the Court, “Where
an industry was composed of numerous independent units, Con-
gress appeared anxious to preserve this structure.”445
The Court also said that one of the most important factors to
consider was the nature and motive of the merger.446 Companies
often pursue vertical integration to foreclose sources of supply or
means of distribution to rivals.447 There was evidence suggesting
that Brown would use its control of Kinney’s retail stores to force
them to carry Brown’s shoes, with a concomitant reduction in the
distribution of competitors’ shoes.448 The government was not re-
quired to prove this would certainly be the case, for the language of
441. Id. at 315–16.
442. Id. at 344.
443. Id. at 331–32.
444. Id. at 343–44.
445. Id. at 333, 344.
446. Id. at 329.
447. See Bok, supra note 426, at 335 n.321, and sources cited therein.
448. The trial court found that, in the industry as a whole, manufacturer-dominated
stores were “drying up” available outlets for distributions for competitors. Id. at 301 (quoting
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the Celler-Kefauver Act clearly indicated that courts were to be con-
cerned with probabilities rather than certainties.449
The second case worth briefly describing is United States v. Von’s
Grocery.450 In that case, the government alleged that Von’s Grocery
Company, a chain of twenty-seven stores in the Los Angeles area,
violated the anti-merger provision of the Clayton Act by acquiring
Shopping Bag, another grocery chain in the same area with thirty-
four stores. Even though Von’s Grocery and Shopping Bag were the
third and sixth largest chains in greater Los Angeles, they together
controlled only 8.9% of the market. In fact, there were more than
3,800 grocery markets in the L.A. metropolitan area at the time of
the merger, and the top dozen chains controlled slightly less than
half the market.451 Moreover, these two companies were medium-
sized regional firms, not large national firms such as the Brown and
Kinney shoe companies. Yet, the Court noted, “the basic purpose of
the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentra-
tion in the American economy by keeping a large number of small
competitors in business.”452 Congress sought to accomplish this goal
by “arresting a trend toward concentration in its incipiency before
that trend developed to a point that a market was left in the grip of
a few big companies.”453
There was, in fact, a trend toward consolidation in the relevant
market—during the preceding ten years nine of the largest chains
had acquired 126 stores—and thus the merger should be disal-
lowed. In dissent, Justice Byron White wrote: “[T]he Court’s
opinion is hardly more than a requiem for the so-called ‘Mom and
Pop’ grocery stores—the bakery and butcher shops, the vegetable
and fish markets—that are now economically and technologically
obsolete in many parts of the country.”454 Nonetheless, Von’s Grocery
was a 7-2 decision, and as the Court noted in a footnote, it was a
decision consistent with a long line of cases applying the amended
anti-merger provision of the Clayton Act.455
district court). In addition, both Brown’s history and testimony by its own president sug-
gested that Brown intended to follow that course with Kinney’s stores. Id. at 331.
449. The indication was made by using the term “may be to substantially to lessen compe-
tition” (emphasis added). See id. at 734, and infra note 432.
450. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
451. Id. at 280.
452. Id. at 275.
453. Id. at 277.
454. Id. at 288.
455. See id. at 278 n.14 (listing six previous cases, including Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States).
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Robert Bork attacked both decisions in The Antitrust Paradox.
They were, to him, examples of a “parade of horrors”456 unleashed
by the Supreme Court’s “disorientation.”457 His argument can be
boiled down to two points. The first was his unexamined assump-
tion that companies want to merge to become more efficient, and
that antitrust law—as applied in Brown Shoe and Von’s Grocery—was
frustrating those attempts. But one might ask: If growth provides
valuable benefits in efficiency, won’t companies denied the ability
to grow via mergers grow internally instead? Why wouldn’t they in-
vest the same funds they would have spent to purchase other firms
on internal expansion?
The answer is that if a firm such as Von’s Grocery were to grow
internally, it would have to compete with its rival Shopping Bag,
while purchasing Shopping Bag eliminates that rival. Even if the
cost of buying or building more stores were the same, Von’s Gro-
cery probably would have calculated that it was more profitable to
purchase a rival. The same holds true for manufacturers: internal
growth increases total industry output, causing prices to fall.
Purchasing a rival avoids the problem.458 While vertical growth is
different, it may eliminate an independent supplier who was a po-
tential, if not an actual, supplier of goods or services to rivals. Bork
never acknowledged that mergers almost always have implications
beyond creating a larger, more efficient firm. He suggested that
when companies want to grow through merger, they have simply
calculated that is the less costly means of doing so. Forcing them to
grow internally, therefore, is simply wasteful.459
Bork’s second point was that Congress never made a policy
choice preferring an economy with small and medium-sized firms
and non-concentrated industries to an economy dominated by
larger firms. He wrote: “The courts need not take into account the
facts of overall concentration as they are because Congress did not
make any policy choice on the topic and did not write a law that
speaks to the subject.”460 However, even if economists were to claim
that after a merger there would still be sufficient competition so
456. BORK, supra note 75, at 218. See also id. at 56, stating the two cases are examples of
hundreds of such cases.
457. Id. at 217.
458. It also reduces competition in the labor market. Von’s Grocery and Shopping Bag
did not just compete for customers; they competed for employees. The larger, merged, more
efficient enterprise may have resulted in lower consumer prices and lower wages.
459. Id. at 207. “Growth is preferable to merger only in one type of case: where merger
would create a market share so large that the result would be restriction of output,” Bork
declared. Id. at 206.
460. Id. at 203.
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that consumer prices would not be projected to rise, there are so-
cial costs of an economy with fewer independent firms and greater
industry concentration. History shows that neither Congress nor
the American people have been indifferent to those costs.
The Warren Court era was the zenith of the socio-political model
of antitrust. Indeed, in his 1960 book, The Antitrust Laws of the United
States of America, British scholar A. D. Neale—who produced what
may have been the best one-volume description of American anti-
trust law of the time—said that rationale of the American antitrust
laws “is essentially a desire to provide legal checks to restrain eco-
nomic power and is not a pursuit of efficiency as such.”461
But the Supreme Court’s enthusiasm for that model wound
down as Earl Warren, Hugo Black, and William O. Douglas retired
between 1969 and 1975. All three were strong supporters of the
socio-political model, and had written opinions interpreting the
amended anti-merger provisions of the Clayton Act as mandating
that approach. Warren Burger and Lewis Powell, who respectively
replaced Earl Warren and William O. Douglas, were supporters of
big business. In fact, shortly before being named to the bench, Pow-
ell wrote a memorandum for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
arguing that business was imperiled by the political and social
forces of the day.462 Powell wanted major corporations and their
CEOs to engage in aggressive political and propaganda efforts to
defend business and the free enterprise system. As the Warren
Court wound down, the Chicago School, and the broader but
closely related law-and-economics movement, gathered strength,
until they achieved not only dominance but hegemony within the
field of antitrust.463 In 1977, Justice Lewis Powell would write an
antitrust opinion for the Supreme Court based on Chicago School
theory that cited an article by Richard Posner no less than five
times.464
461. A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 489 (2d ed. 1970). Neale observed
that “it is tempting (and common) to regard antitrust policy simply as a kind of economic
engineering project.” Id. at 429. However, Neal concluded, “[i]t seems likely that American
distrust of all sources of unchecked power is a more deeply-rooted and persistent motive
behind the antitrust policy than any economic belief or any radical political trend.” Id. at 430.
462. TELES, supra note 72, at 61–62.
463. Steven Teles writes: “Simply measured in terms of the penetration of its adherents in
the legal academy, law and economics is the most successful intellectual movement in the law
of the past thirty years, having rapidly moved from insurgency to hegemony.” Id. at 216.
464. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In a separate opin-
ion, Justice Byron White argued that the Court was relying on Posner instead of its own
precedent. Id. at 70. This was not a merger case. The issue was whether a particular restric-
tion was a per se violation or should be analyzed under the rule of reason.
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Six years later, Judge Patricia Wald of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard an antitrust case
with two of her colleagues, Judges Robert Bork and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.465 It was a unanimous decision, and Judge Bork wrote the
opinion. Judge Wald wrote separately to note that the majority’s
reasoning assumed that “the only legitimate purpose of the anti-
trust laws is this concern with the potential for decrease in output
and rise in prices,” adding: “But I do not believe that the debate
over the purposes of the antitrust laws has been settled.”466 But even
if Judge Wald was right that the debate was not fully settled, the
writing was on the wall. The agreement between liberal champion
and future Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Chi-
cago School guru Robert J. Bork reflected the emerging consensus.
F. Merger Policy Today
Today antitrust policy is exclusively about consumer welfare. The
FTC and Department of Justice jointly employ a mathematical
formula to guide their merger decisions. The formula, known as
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), is designed to measure
the degree of industry concentration.467
The HHI is based on the theory that up to a certain point, in-
creased industry concentration will not affect prices and output.
The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual
market shares of all participants.468 For example, if an industry in-
cluded a total of five firms with equal market shares of twenty
percent each, the HHI would be 2000.469 If it included six firms
with equal market shares, the HHI would be 1653.470 If it included
ten firms with equal market shares, the HHI would be 1000.471 If an
industry included two firms with fifteen percent of the market each
plus ten additional firms with seven percent of the market apiece,
the HHI would be 940.472
465. Rotherty Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (1986). This was
not a merger case. The issue was whether a practice that could be characterized as a boycott
or concerted refusal to deal was a per se violation or should be analyzed under the rule of
reason, and if so, if it offended the rule of reason.
466. Id.
467. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
18–19 (Aug. 19, 2010).
468. Id. at 18.
469. Calculated as follows: 202 + 202 + 202 + 202 + 202 = 2000.
470. Calculated as follows: 16.62 + 16.62 + 16.62 + 16.62 + 16.62 + 16.62 = 1653.36.
471. Calculated as follows: 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 +102 +102 + 102 + 102 +102 + 102 = 1000.
472. Calculated as follows: 152 + 152 + 72 + 72 + 72 + 72 + 72 + 72+ 72 + 72+ 72 + 72 = 940.
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The regulators divide the HHI results into three regions:
HHI below 1,000 – Unconcentrated Markets
HHI 1,000 to 1,800 – Moderately Concentrated Markets
HHI above 1,800 – Highly Concentrated Markets
If following a merger, the HHI will remain below 1,000, or the
merger will increase the HHI by less than one hundred points, reg-
ulators assume that the merger will not have adverse competitive
effects and will generally approve the merger without further exam-
ination. If a proposed merger will produce an HHI in the 1,000 to
1,800 range, and the proposed merger would increase the HHI by
more than one hundred points, the merger is deemed to “poten-
tially raise significant competitive concerns” and regulators will
analyze specific features of the industry and the merging firms.473
The same situation applies if the HHI is above 1,800 and the
merger would raise the HHI between one hundred and two hun-
dred points. If the merger will increase the HHI by more than two
hundred points, regulators presume that the merger is “likely to
enhance market power,” and is therefore likely problematic.474
However, the merger partners can rebut this presumption. For
example, regulators will allow a merger if they are persuaded that
the market is easy to enter so that the merging firms cannot raise
prices without potentially drawing new rivals into the market.475
Regulators also recognize the longstanding “failing firm” exception;
that is, they will allow a merger if they are persuaded that one of the
firms would otherwise go out of business.476 Additionally, regulators
will allow a merger if the participants persuade them that the
merger will generate sufficient efficiencies to lower prices, improve
quality, enhance service, or produce new products, with the bene-
fits outweighing the anticompetitive effects.477 Moreover, regulators
must also decide where to deploy their limited resources. The num-
ber of mergers they confront is daunting. During the past decade,
473. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 467, at 19.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 27–28. Regulators appear heavily influenced by this factor. During its
1999–2011 fiscal years, the FTC closed all forty-five of the merger examinations it conducted
in which it concluded that market entry was “easy” without bringing a single enforcement
action. John E. Kwoka Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement Actions
and Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 619, 625 (2013).
476. The Merger Guidelines make this a stringent test. Participants must demonstrate
failure is imminent, that the failing firm could not successfully reorganize in bankruptcy, and
that it has unsuccessfully explored other alternatives that would keep its assets in the market.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 467, at 32.
477. Id. at 29–31.
FALL 2015] The New Road to Serfdom 83
more than 15,000 mergers were large enough to require that they
be reported in advance to the Department of Justice and the
FTC.478
This system has three important features. First, it focuses entirely
on consumer welfare and ignores socio-political effects. Second, it
permits the vast majority of mergers. Regulators ignore mergers
that fall within HHI safe zones. Even when mergers have high HHI
numbers, the merging parties are often able persuade regulators—
or failing that, courts—that a particular merger will not result in
higher prices or will yield benefits that justify higher prices. And
regulators may choose not to deploy their resources to challenge a
particular merger. In fact, the Department of Justice and the FTC
rarely challenge mergers if the post-merger HHI would be less than
2,000 or the merger will increase the HHI by less than three hun-
dred points.479 Those numbers are well above the levels that
supposedly raise significant concerns under the merger guidelines.
Third, the system may fail to meet even its own limited objective
of protecting consumer welfare. According to an evaluation of ret-
rospective merger studies undertaken by economist John Kwoka of
Northeastern University, 82.6% of mergers that were large enough
to be reported to regulators but that were ultimately permitted re-
sulted in price increases while only 17.4% yielded price
reductions.480 Netting out the increases and decreases yielded an
average price increase of 7.29% of all of those mergers.481 It is par-
ticularly striking that the average price increase for mergers that
were cleared without any conditions by the Department of Justice
and the FTC was roughly the same as that for mergers that were
permitted if the merging firms divested themselves of portions of
their operations.482 This suggests that economists may not be able
to reliably predict under what conditions firms will have sufficient
market power to raise prices.
What became of Von’s Grocery and Shopping Bag—the two me-
dium-sized, Los Angeles-based chains that the Supreme Court
stopped from merging in 1966—after the legal environment
478. Kwoka, supra note 475, at 619.
479. Id. at 622.
480. Id. at 632. This was based on a small sample of forty-six mergers, two of which oc-
curred in the 1970s, eight in the 1980s, thirty-two in the 1990s, and eleven after 2000.
Nevertheless, this may be the most complete information available. Kwoka’s figures result
from a meta-analysis of all available retrospective studies of individual mergers.
481. Id.
482. Mergers cleared outright resulted in an average price increase of 7.40% while those
subject to divestiture averaged 7.68%. Divestiture is generally considered the most rigorous
precondition regulators impose. When regulators required other conditions, mergers re-
sulted in an average price increase of 16.01%. Id. at 640.
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changed? Von’s Grocery is today part of Safeway Inc., a national
chain with more than 2,000 stores, 250,000 employees, and $36.6
billion in annual sales—which, incidentally, makes it only the sec-
ond largest food retailer in the nation.483 In 1972, Shopping Bag
was acquired by Fazio’s, a larger grocery chain, and rebranded as
Fazio’s Shopping Bag.484 In 1978, Fazio’s was in turn acquired by
Albertsons, which in 1999 briefly became the largest grocery chain
in the country with 2,500 stores, until it was surpassed by the even
larger giant, Kroger’s.485 Today food retailing—like so many of in-
dustries—is dominated by behemoth chains with hundreds or even
thousands of stores.
The story is similar for the Brown Shoe Company. When merger
policy eased, Brown went on a buying spree—purchasing five com-
panies in the period 1970 to 1974 alone, and following that up with
a half dozen other major acquisitions in subsequent years.486 Today
Brown Shoe has annual sales of $2.5 billion, operates more than
1,200 retail stores and fourteen branded e-commerce sites, and has
more than 11,000 employees.487 By today’s standards, that makes it
big, but not very big. Its annual revenue is only about half as much
as the lowest-ranking firm in the Fortune 500.488 Meanwhile, denied
483. See Our Story, VON’S, http://www.vons.com/ShopStores/Our-Story.page (last visited
Oct. 3, 2015) (regarding Safeway acquiring Von’s Grocery in 1996–97); George Avalos, Albert-
sons to buy Vons owner Safeway for $9.2 billion, could mean closure of Southern California stores, LOS
ANGELES DAILY NEWS (July 26, 2014), http://www.dailynews.com/business/20140726/albert-
sons-to-buy-vons-owner-safeway-for-92-billion-could-mean-closure-of-southern-california-stores
(stating number of Safeway stores and employees following merger with Albertsons in 2014);
See 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, June 16, 2015, at F-31 (providing Safeway’s revenue
and industry rank).
484. The Vons Companies Incorporated History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fund-
inguniverse.com/company-histories/the-vons-companies-incorporated-history.
485. See Fazio’s California Adventure, PLEASANT FAMILY SHOPPING (Apr. 12, 2008, 12:40 AM),
http://pleasantfamilyshopping.blogspot.com/2008/04/fazios-california-adventure.html
(stating Fazio’s was acquired by Albertsons in 1978); 75th Anniversary Timeline, ALBERT-
SON’S, http://www.albertsons.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Albertsons-75-Anniversa
ry-Timeline.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2015)(stating Albertsons became one of nation’s largest
grocery chains in 1999); Dana Canedy, Kroger to Buy Fred Meyer, Creating Nation’s Largest Grocer,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/20/business/kroger-to-buy-
fred-meyer-creating-country-s-biggest-grocer.html (stating Kroger replaced Albertsons as larg-
est grocer).
486. FN Staff, A Timeline of Brown Shoe’s Building Blocks, FOOTWEAR NEWS (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://footwearnews.com/2014/business/news/a-timeline-of-brown-shoes-building-blocks-
143678/.
487. Press Release, Brown Shoe Company Celebrates 100 Years of Listing on the New York Stock
Exchange (April 23, 2014), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201404230
05074/en/Brown-Shoe-Company-Celebrates-100-Years-Listing#.VfLsPvnBzRY.
488. See 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, June 16, 2014, at F-21 (reporting that the
company ranked number 500, United Rentals, had $4.955 billion in revenues). In recent
years, Brown Shoe has been struggling, and attempting to cut losses by downsizing and sell-
ing off brands. See Brown Shoe Company. Announces Sale of Avia and Navados, DAILY FINANCE
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the opportunity to merge with Brown Shoe in 1962, Kinney Shoe
Company sold itself to the F.W. Woolworth the following year.489
Woolworth, then a large five-and-dime department store chain, had
not previously been in the shoe business, and therefore the transac-
tion was not deemed to offend antitrust policy. Woolworth and its
shoe division have since gone through a number of corporate reor-
ganizations and name changes.490 The surviving company, Foot
Locker Inc., operates 3,460 retail stores under different brand
names in twenty-three countries.491 Its $6.5 billion in annual sales
places it at number four hundred on the Fortune 500.492
We will now turn to why having fewer companies and bigger
companies matter.
III. BIG PROBLEMS
In 1954, the combined revenues of the sixty largest public com-
panies in the United States accounted for less than twenty percent
of the gross domestic product (GDP). Today, the combined reve-
nues of the twenty largest public companies account for more than
twenty percent of the GDP.493 The five hundred largest companies
account for about seventy-three percent of the GDP.494 Corporate
bigness is undeniable. But is it, as Louis D. Brandeis suggested, re-
ally a curse?
(May 14, 2013), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/05/14/brown-shoe-company-an-
nounces-sale-of-avia-and-neva/; AP, S&P Downgrades Brown Shoe Co., BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9RCNFP
80.htm.
489. See The History of Kinney Shoes, KINNEY SHOE CO., http://r-rwebdesign.com/kinney/
memories.html.
490. Id.; Venator Group Inc., REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, http://www.referenceforbusiness
.com/history2/94/Venator-Group-Inc.html.
491. Press Release, Foot Locker Inc, to Report Second Quarter Financial Results on Fri-
day, August 22, 2013 (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.footlocker-inc.com/pdf/2013/pr_2013_fl_
2Q13_to_report_financial_results.pdf.
492. 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 487, at F-17.
493. See CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT 242 (rev’d ed. 2011) (providing data
for 1954 and 2004). According to my calculations, the combined revenues of the twenty
largest public companies currently account for 20.12% of the U.S. GDP. See 500 Largest U.S.
Corporations, supra note 487, at F-1 (setting forth revenues of twenty largest public companies,
totaling $3,379,944 million); GDP (current US$), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank
.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (listing 2013 U.S. GDP at $16.8 trillion).
494. In 2013, the total combined revenue of the Fortune 500 companies was $12.2 tril-
lion. 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 487, at F-21.
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A. What We Learned from the Banking Crisis of 2008
In recent years, we have learned some important things about
mergers and why corporate managers pursue them. Consider this
story. Beginning in the 1980s, legal restrictions on the ability of
banks to expand geographically—such as caps on the number of
branches an intrastate bank may have, or the ability of a bank to
have branches in more than one state—were relaxed. This ignited
aggressive mergers among banks and financial institutions.
During the period 1980–1994, there were more than six thou-
sand bank mergers.495 Mergers occurred among banks of all sizes.
Nearly half of the mergers occurred between large banks with more
than $1 billion in assets, and mergers also occurred among giants
with assets of more than $100 billion. In fact, during the period
from 1988 to 1997, the share of nationwide assets held by the eight
largest U.S. financial institutions increased from 22.3% to 35.5%.496
Then in the following year—that is, in 1998 alone—eight of the
nation’s largest financial institutions merged into four firms.497
Researchers studied these mergers.498 They wanted to know
whether mergers made the banks more efficient and more profita-
ble. And they wanted to know whether mergers benefited
customers: Did the mergers result in higher interest rates for depos-
itors and lower interest rates for borrowers? Did the combined
assets of the merged banks allow the enterprises to be less lever-
aged? Were the larger, merged banks less likely to fail? The
researchers found that some mergers did increase their efficiency—
but that was the case for small banks only.499
Researchers divided on whether mergers between larger banks
had no effect on efficiency whatsoever or whether mergers actually
made the banks less efficient, increasing their operating costs with-
out improvements in service.500 One might assume that a merger
would improve efficiency by allowing the combined entity to serve
495. John H. Boyd & Stanley L. Graham, Consolidation in U.S. Banking: Implications for
Efficiency and Risk, tbl. 3 FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, Working Paper No. 572 (rev’d
Dec. 1996).
496. Allen N. Berger et al., The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Conse-
quences, and the Implications for the Future, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 135, 138 (1999) (page 3 of
unpublished draft).
497. Citicorp merged with Travelers; BankAmerica merged with Nations Bank; Banc One
merged with First Chicago; Norwest merged with Wells Fargo. Id.
498. The researchers, John H. Boyd and Stanley L. Graham, were affiliated with the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and the Carlson School of Management at the University
of Minnesota.
499. Boyd & Graham, supra note 495, at 12–15.
500. Id. at 8.
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the same customer base with fewer branches. Surely when two
banks serving common geographic areas merge, the new firm is
able to close branches. Yet researchers discovered that banks that
acquired other banks opened more branches than they closed.501
Researchers also found that as size increased, average profitability
declined and leverage increased.502 Indeed, the data show that at
least for the last forty years banks with assets of less than $1 billion
have consistently been more profitable than larger banks—and the
least profitable banks have been those with $10 billion or more in
assets.503 Banks with less than $1 billion in assets were also less likely
to fail than larger banks.504
Moreover, bank mergers do not serve the interests of consumers.
When banking markets became highly concentrated, depositors re-
ceived lower interest and borrowers were charged higher interest
rates.505 The researchers wrote: “Except for [small banks], we see
little evidence that consolidation in the U.S. banking industry has
been particularly helpful over any performance dimension.”506
Bank executives were undoubtedly aware of this data, and yet
they continued to press for more and more mergers. “[I]t is vexing
to explain consolidation in banking in response to market forces,”
Federal Reserve researchers wrote.507 “But it may be that manage-
rial hubris, as opposed to ownership interests, is the driving
force.”508 Other researchers called the same thing empire build-
ing.509 No matter the term, researchers said that the interests of
management—executives’ status, ego, and income—drove mergers
in banking. Data confirms what seems intuitive: top executives are
able to successfully demand higher compensation for running
larger enterprises.510 That, in fact, has long been the case, not only
in banking but throughout the corporate world. Economists Mur-
ray Weidenbaum and Mark Jensen put it succinctly: “In plain
English, the bigger the company, the larger the rewards to top
management.”511
501. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nation-
wide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1014 (1992).
502. Boyd & Graham, supra note 495, at 9.
503. More profitable whether measured in terms of returns on assets or on equity. Wil-
marth, Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve?, supra note 501, at 986.
504. Id. See also Boyd & Graham, Consolidation in U.S. Banking, supra note 495, at 9.
505. Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve?, supra note 501, at 1020.
506. Boyd & Graham, Consolidation in U.S. Banking, supra note 499, at 17–18.
507. Id. at 18.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 8; Wilmarth, supra note 501, at 1005.
510. Berger, et al., supra note 496, at 146.
511. Weidenbaum and Jensen added:
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Why were large banks either no more efficient or less efficient
than medium-sized banks? Enterprises can become too big to man-
age effectively.512 They become so complex and so far flung that top
executives are not able to effectively understand their operations.
Knowledge about customers and communities decreases. There has
long been evidence that large banks lose ability to maintain quality
control over lending.513
A dramatic example of the too-big-to-manage dynamic emerged
in early 2012 when it was revealed that—notwithstanding every-
thing that bankers should have learned from the 2008 crisis—JP
Morgan had resumed trading in high-risk derivatives, and as a re-
sult of trades placed by its London office, had lost $6.25 billion. JP
Morgan had been considered America’s best-run bank, and Jamie
Dimon, its CEO, was reputed to be the most capable and virtuous of
bank executives. In an article titled “Why JP Morgan’s Jamie Dimon
Is Wall Street’s Indispensable Man,” Bloomsberg Businessweek asked:
“If Jamie Dimon can’t run a bank without stuff blowing up, can
anyone?”514 It appeared that JP Morgan had become too big for
Dimon to run, and if that were indeed the case, it was too big for
anyone to run. Moreover, if a bank has become too large and com-
plicated for its own top executives to understand and manage, it is
likely also too complicated for regulators to understand.515
Bank executives have often argued that mergers are necessary to
enable regional banks to compete with national banks or to permit
U.S. banks to compete with foreign banks, but it is by no means
clear that either gigantism or consolidation has been an advantage.
At least one scholar observed that the relative diversification of
banking had been a U.S. advantage. At the end of 1990, for exam-
ple, none of the twenty largest banks in the world was a U.S. bank,
The same factors that encourage managers to be generous to themselves in allocating
corporate resources can also be the driving force behind corporate acquisitions. After
all acquisitions do increase the amount of corporate resources in the winning manage-
ment’s span of control. Studies by the Conference Board confirm with telling statistics
what most people instinctively know: top executives in larger companies are paid more
than their counterparts in smaller firms. Size of firm is the most compelling factor.
Murray L. Weidenbaum & Mark Jensen, Introduction to the Transaction Edition of ADOLF A.
BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xvii (Trans-
action 1991)(rev’d ed. 1968).
512. STIGLITZ, supra note 50 at 114–15, 165.
513. Wilmarth, supra note 501, at 1009.
514. Nick Summers & Max Abelson, Why JP Morgan’s Jamie Dimon is Wall Street’s Indispensa-
ble Man, BLOOMSBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 16, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
articles/2013-05-16/why-jpmorgans-jamie-dimon-is-wall-streets-indispensable-man.
515. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, The Perils When Megabanks Lose Focus, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2013,
at B1 (observing that “the more complicated an institution is, the less likely regulators are to
really understand it.”).
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and yet the largest U.S. banks were more profitable and more inno-
vative than their larger European and Japanese counterparts.516
Economists Walter Adams and James W. Brock have persuasively
argued that industry consolidation also made America less competi-
tive against foreign firms in the steel517 and automobile518
industries.
Notwithstanding the evidence that showed it ill-advised, U.S.
banks and financial institutions continued to merge. Placing more
and more eggs in fewer and fewer baskets presented obvious risks.
The chickens came home to roost in 1984 when the Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Company, then the nation’s seventh
largest bank, sank into insolvency as the result of devastatingly bad
loans.519 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) de-
cided that protecting depositors’ accounts up to the limit allowed
by law was not sufficient.520 Allowing the bank to go out of business
would destabilize the nation’s financial system. And so the federal
government took control of Continental Illinois and propped it up
with billions of taxpayer dollars.521 Those who followed congres-
sional hearings about the bank’s failure were introduced to a new
term: too big to fail.522 This was in 1984. At that time, the ten largest
banks in the nation held less than thirty percent of all bank deposi-
tary assets; by 2012, that had grown to fifty-four percent.523
In a rational world, the government would have devised a strat-
egy to avoid having to rescue banks with taxpayer money again. It is
a cardinal principle of capitalism that failed enterprises should be
allowed to go out of business, thereby making room for more
needed, more innovative, more efficient, or otherwise superior en-
terprises. The economist Joseph Schumpeter called this natural and
516. Wilmarth, supra note 501, at 1062–63.
517. WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 237–52, 274–81, and 322–23 (2d ed. 2004).
518. Id. at 48–52, 64–71, 282.
519. Wilmarth, supra note 501, at 994. See also FDIC, Continental Illinois and “Too Big to
Fail,” in An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s, https://www
.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.; Richard J. Herring & JacobSafra, WHARTON
FIN. INSTS. CTR., THE COLLAPSE OF CHICAGO ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/case%20studies/continental%20full.pdf (last accessed
Oct. 3, 2015).
520. Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1376–77 (2011).
521. Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated
Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1329 (1995).
522. Wilmarth, supra note 501, at 994.
523. Steven M. Davidoff, Weighing the Dodd-Frank Restrictions Against the Power of Big Banks,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2012, at B11.
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continuing process the “perennial gale of creative destruction.”524
Moreover, when firms recognize that the government perceives
them as too big to fail, moral hazard takes hold and firms are em-
boldened to take great risks, secure in the knowledge that the
government will save them should their choices prove disastrous.
But rather than taking action so that financial institutions were
not too big to fail, the government did just the opposite. It contin-
ued to permit giants to grow ever larger through mergers. The
largest bank in the nation today, JP Morgan Chase, is the product of
mergers among Chemical Bank, Manufacturers Hanover, JP Mor-
gan, Bank One, First Chicago, and the National Bank of Detroit—
all of which have transpired since 1991.525 Other banking giants—
including Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, Goldman
Sachs, and Morgan Stanley—were also allowed to grow dramatically
through post-1984 mergers.526 Government itself sometimes actively
made matters worse. The FDIC, for example, ultimately sold Conti-
nental Illinois to BankAmerica, thereby placing even more eggs in a
single basket.
At the same time, the large financial institutions—aided by Chi-
cago School theorists who argued that modern financial markets
provide enough information so that traders take care of them-
selves—persuaded the Clinton administration and Congress to
repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, which had separated commercial and
investment banking since 1933.527 This now allowed commercial
banks to invest in high-risk ventures, including subprime mortgages
and derivatives, and also sparked a new wave of bank mergers.528
Meanwhile, no compensating regulatory measures were put in ef-
fect.529 Quite the contrary: by the end of the 1990s, regulatory
restrictions on banks had been reduced below pre-New Deal
levels.530 All of this led to the crisis of 2008.531
We had long known better, so why was this the case? The answer
is not complicated. “The basic principle behind any oligarchy is
524. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES AND IDEAS OF
THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 302 (7th rev’d ed. 1999).
525. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS 59 (2010).
526. Id. at 35.
527. See id.at 32–38 (regarding enactment of Glass-Steagall), 133–44 (regarding repeal of
Glass-Steagall and ensuing activity by the banks). See also STIGLITZ, supra note 50, at 81–85.
528. HENRY  M. PAULSON JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 95 (2010).
529. Id.
530. See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON
MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 69 (referring to work
by economists Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef). See also PAULSON, supra note 528 (noting
that regulation had not kept pace with changes brought about by repeal of Glass-Steagall and
the resulting wave of bank mergers).
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that economic power yields political power,” write Simon Johnson
and James Kwak.532 Large enterprises have more political power.
They can make large contributions to political campaigns, political
parties, and advocacy groups, and they often can unite with their
employees and their unions to lobby for what is in their interests.533
They have the ears of the president and members of Congress, who
wish to keep them happy. They have a greater capacity to capture
regulatory agencies.534 Power is further accentuated when a small
number of firms dominate an industry, making it easier for them to
reach consensus and lobby for what they perceive to be in their
mutual interest.
Banking has become a true oligopoly in the United States. To-
day, eighteen commercial banks rank among the five hundred
largest companies in the nation.535 Although all eighteen of these
banks are giants, the top four—JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America,
Citigroup, and Wells Fargo—dwarf the industry. Their combined
annual revenue is nearly $390 billion while the combined revenue
of the next fourteen largest banks is about $239 billion.536
Political contributions by the financial sector laid the ground-
work for the repeal of Glass-Steagall and lax regulation of the
industry. In fact, political contributions from that sector quadru-
pled from 1990 to 2006, making it, by far, the highest-contributing
group in the country (with the health care industry a distant sec-
ond).537 Key beneficiaries of this largesse were chairs of the Senate
Banking Committee, including Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY), who
chaired the committee from 1995 to 1998, and Phil Gramm (R-
TX), who became chair in 1999, and was the prime sponsor of the
legislation repealing Glass-Steagall.538 Large contributions from the
financial sector flowed to congressional members of both parties. In
addition, during 1999 the financial sector spent over $214 million
lobbying.539 In November 1999 the bill repealing Glass-Steagall Act
531. See, e.g., James Rickards, Repeal of Glass-Steagall Caused the Financial Crisis, U.S. NEWS
(Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/08/
27/repeal-of-glass-steagall-caused-the-financial-crisis.
532. Id. at 74.
533. ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 517, at ch. 21, “The Labor-Industrial Complex.”
534. STIGLITZ, supra note 50, 312–16, 337, 342 (2010).
535. 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 488, at F-30.
536. Id.
537. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 525, at 90–91. The financial sector includes both the
banking and securities industries.
538. Id. at 91–92. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6810 et seq., repealed most of
the Glass-Steagall Act.
539. Ranked Sectors, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?
showYear=1999&indexType=c. This figure comes from the Center for Responsive Politics,
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was passed 90-8 in the Senate540 and 362-57 in the House of
Representatives.541
While the government injected billions of dollars into giant fi-
nancial institutions through the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), it provided no help to small banks holding the same kind
of toxic assets, and more than three hundred small banks and
credit unions failed.542 The government was only rescuing financial
institutions that were so large that their collapse would bring down
the national economy.
As understandable as that rationale may be, a few things bear
mentioning. First, small businesses depended on credit from those
small banks. No one stepped in to fill this need, and as a result
170,000 small businesses went out of business during the crisis.543
Second, the government hoped that the large banks would use
TARP funds to extend loans to businesses, thereby stimulating the
economy. That did not happen, at least not to the extent the gov-
ernment hoped.544 Instead, the large financial institutions used
much of the money to pay off their creditors, who were often other
large financial institutions. Moreover, unlike most corporate reor-
ganizations when creditors must accept less than the full amount of
what they are due, the large banks were paid off at the rate of one
hundred cents on the dollar.545 Nearly $13 billion in TARP funds
provided to the American International Group (AIG) were, in turn,
paid over to Goldman Sachs, which was AIG’s largest creditor.546
Even after being rescued from its mismanagement by American tax-
payers, AIG infamously paid $168 million in bonuses to its top
executives.547 Some of the TARP money was simply held by the
large financial institutions. Precious little of the TARP funds were
used to provide credit to American businesses and assist national
recovery. Most relevant for our purposes, the large financial institu-
tions used some of their TARP funds to acquire other financial
institutions, thereby exacerbating the too-big-to-fail problem.548
and represents lobbying expenses by firms in what it classifies the financial/insurance/real
estate sector.
540. S. 900 (106th): Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/con-
gress/votes/106-1999/s354 (Vote on Nov. 4, 1999 to approve the conference committee
report).
541. Id.
542. ELIZABETH WARREN, A FIGHTING CHANCE 124 (2014).
543. Id.
544. Id. at 111–12. See also STIGLITZ, supra note 50, at 125 (stating that “U.S. banks carried
on paying out dividends and bonuses and didn’t even pretend to resume lending.”).
545. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 525, at 169–70. See also WARREN, supra note 542, at 111.
546. WARREN, supra note 542, at 111.
547. Id. at 104.
548. Id. at 112.
FALL 2015] The New Road to Serfdom 93
I am not arguing that in the exigency of the 2008 crisis govern-
ment regulators should not have combined failing banks. The
nation faced imminent economic collapse, and emergencies some-
times require making a bad choice when the only alternatives are
worse. Nevertheless, the history that led up to the crisis, choices
made during the crisis, and what we have done since the crisis
demonstrate that companies can be too big to regulate. Prior to the
crisis, regulators permitted banks to merge themselves into entities
that were too big to fail even while recognizing both the risks and
the fact that mergers were not yielding the benefits that the banks
claimed. During the crises, the government should have insisted on
tougher terms.549
Government regulators claimed they had limited authority to de-
mand more stringent terms. “But that is not a complete
explanation,” write Simon Johnson and James Kwak, “because there
is little evidence that the government attempted to force the issue.”
It was not only that the government had a weak hand; it was that the
government negotiators came to the table largely in agreement with
the bankers’ view of the world.550 In other words, regulators were
psychologically captured by the big banks.551
549. For example, the government might have received greater assets in return for the
TARP funds; required that bank creditors be paid off at discounted rates, as would have
occurred that the banks gone through reorganization; and prohibited bank executives from
receiving bonuses. See, e.g., id. at 104 (arguing that the government overpaid for the assets it
received).
550. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 525, at 185.
551. For example, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and five of his top aides, including
the man placed in charge of the TARP program, had previously worked at Goldman Sachs.
Id. at 94 and 185.
I say the regulators were psychologically captured, but the term scholars generally employ
is “cognitive capture.” STIGLITZ, supra note 50, at 384 n.57. Regulatory capture, cognitive and
otherwise, has been a subject of wide interest for more than half a century. The literature on
the topic is vast. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis,
Causality, and Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221 (2012), Gerald Caprio Jr., Regu-
latory Capture: How it Occurs, How to Minimize It, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 39 (2013), and sources
cited therein. See also BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA, supra note 111, at
138–72 (describing how regulatory agencies are weakened through a confluence of factors
including capture, cycling, and ossification).
George Stiglitz argues that the banking crisis weakened faith in democracy. He writes:
In the developing world people look at Washington and see a system of government
that allowed Wall Street to write self-serving rules, which put at risk the entire global
economy, and then when the day of reckoning came, Washington turned to those
from Wall Street and their cronies to manage the recovery—in ways that gave Wall
Street amounts of money that would be beyond the wildest dreams of the most cor-
rupt in the developing world. They see corruption American-style as perhaps more
sophisticated—bags of money don’t change hands in dark corners—but just as
nefarious.
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After the financial crisis was over, we should have found a way to
disaggregate these institutions so that today no bank is too big to
fail. We had too many eggs in too few baskets in 2008; we have more
eggs in even fewer baskets now. The official government position is
that we solved the too-big-to-fail problem through regulation by en-
acting the Dodd-Frank Act.552 That legislation is designed to
identify “systemically important”—i.e., too-big-too-fail—financial in-
stitutions, and provide government regulators with authority to
ensure that they will not fail or, if they do, that the government can
seize the institutions and liquidate the interests of their stockhold-
ers and bondholders.553 The merits of this immensely complex
legislation are beyond the scope of this Article. However, astute ob-
servers argue that bank lobbyists succeeded in weakening Dodd-
Frank to the point where it is unlikely to prove an adequate safe-
guard in future crises, and are continuing to weaken it still
further.554
STIGLITZ, supra note 50, at 225–26. It bears mentioning that TARP ultimately produced a net
profit for taxpayers. Cokie Roberts & Steven V. Roberts, Why Obama’s Economic Policies Are
Working, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 2015, at A8. This does not detract from Stiglitz
point about public perceptions.
552. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2011, P.L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For the official White House position, see Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-
Frank Act, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-
frank-wall-street-reform.
553. Id. See also Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawyed and Inadequate Re-
sponse to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (noting that the Act’s preamble
states that one of its main purposes is “to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”);
and STIGLITZ, supra note 50, at 335–38.
554. See, e.g., Larissa Roxanna Smith & Victor M. Mun˜iz-Fratocelli, Strategic Shortcomings of
the Dodd-Frank Act, 58 ANTITRUST BULL. 617, 632 (2013) (arguing that fines authorized by the
Act have limited deterrent value, and the threat of liquidating failing firms lacks credibility);
John C. Coffee Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Seems to be Frus-
trated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1081 (2012) (arguing that
government regulators are “far better at prosecuting outliers and crooks than in controlling
reckless ambition by those at the top of the corporate hierarchy,” and that while Dodd-Frank
is not likely to provide adequate protection); Wilmarth., supra note 553. See also Elizabeth
Warren, John McCain, Maria Cantwell, & Angus King, We Need to Rein In Too Big To Fail Banks,
CNN OPINION (July 17, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/17/opinion/warren-mccain-
big-banks; Gretchen Morgenson, Bailout Risk, Far Beyond the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2014, at BU-1 (stating that “[e]veryone knows that the largest of our nation’s banks would be
destined for a taxpayer bailout if they ran into trouble anytime soon”); Anat R. Admati, We’re
All Still Hostage to the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2013, at A21; Gary Rivlin, How Wall Street
Defanged Dodd-Frank, NATION (May 20, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/174113/
how-wall-street-defanged-dodd-frank; Steven M. Davidoff, supra note 523 (stating “[t]he bot-
tom line is that there are real problems with Dodd-Frank”); George F. Will, Break Up the
Banks, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2012, at A21; Sherrod Brown, Break Up the Big Banks, WASH. POST,
June 7, 2012, at A23. Cf. Paul Krugman, Obama’s Other Success: Dodd-Frank Financial Reform is
Working, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/opinion/paul-
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Immediately after Republicans won control of the Senate in the
2014 elections—giving them majorities in both houses of Con-
gress—their first order of business was repealing the Dodd-Frank
provision that forbade banks from investing FDIC-insured funds in
high-risk instruments such as default swaps and trading derivatives
and commodities.555 As a matter of public policy, the repeal was, as
one former Treasury official said, “outrageous.”556 Investments of
these kind were a key cause of the 2008 financial crisis.557
Nevertheless, the president backed the initiative.558 The White
House argued that it had cut a deal with Republicans in which, in
return for the president’s support, Republicans would not seek to
repeal other provisions of Dodd-Frank as well.559 All of this was very
telling. The repeal was patently antithetical to capitalist principles,
which hold that those who take market risks should reap the fruits
or suffer the losses of their decisions. But by being able to bet tax-
payer-insured money on high-risk investments, the big banks will
own any profits generated by the investments while taxpayers will
cover losses. Why then did the Republicans want to do this—in-
deed, make it the very first thing they sought to do after winning an
election—and why did the Democratic president capitulate?560
The reason was simple: Citigroup, JP Morgan, and Bank of
America lobbied heavily for it.561 Indeed, New York Times reported
that Citigroup drafted the legislation.562 Those banks—gigantic and
immensely powerful—have the clout to get what they want, even if
it is patently counter to the public interest.
krugman-dodd-frank-financial-reform-is-working.html?_r=0 (concluding that although re-
form did not go far enough, the fact that banks are continuing to lobby hard to gut the law
still further must mean that “it’s an important step in the right direction”).
555. Steven Mufson & Tom Hamburger, Large U.S. Banks Said to Press Officials on Easing
Dodd-Frank, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2014, at A22.
556. Id.
557. The official went on to say: “This was the epicenter of the crisis. This is what brought
AIG down, what brought Lehman Brothers down.” Id.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. The effort to weaken regulation corporate trading regulation extended beyond
Dodd-Frank. The first bill enacted by the 114th Congress was the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Program Reauthorization Act of 2015. Large corporations—including Koch Industries,
which has one of the largest derivative trading businesses in the world—successfully lobbied
Congress to include into that legislation an unrelated provision that prohibits commodity
regulators from mandating collateral and margin requirements for large corporate derivative
trades. Lee Fang, Congress Incorporated: A Surge of Corporate Officials and Lobbyists Have Seized
Control of Legislative Power, NATION, March 2/9, 2015, at 12, 14.
561. Id.
562. Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Bank Lobbyists Help in Drafting Financial Bills, N.Y. TIMES
(May 23, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/banks-lobbyists-help-in-drafting-
financial-bills.
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B. The New Serfdom
When Brandeis and Woodrow Wilson talked about big businesses
turning Americans into serfs, they focused on what it was like to
work for huge bureaucracies, particularly the lack of autonomy for
mid-level managers. But a second route to serfdom has more re-
cently become apparent—a route not for the people directly
employed by big businesses but for the owners and operators of
small firms who do business with the giant corporations. In this
case, the men and women who find themselves at first ensnared and
ultimately imprisoned in a modern serfdom are often the very peo-
ple who valued their independence.
The industrial meat producing industry offers a prime example.
Let’s start with chicken production—a story superbly told by investi-
gative journalist, Christopher Leonard, in his recent book.563
Today chickens are grown from baby chicks to slaughter-ready
size in chicken houses that may be as long as three football fields,
and equipped with computer-controlled feeders, water troughs,
and ventilation systems. A chicken farmer who owns a facility con-
sisting of a number of such houses raises tens of thousands of
chickens simultaneously. That farmer appears to be an indepen-
dent, self-reliant businessperson. He has borrowed funds from a
bank to build and equip his chicken houses, which cost hundreds
of thousands apiece, or about two million dollars for a complete
facility, and is responsible for meeting his payments on the loan.564
He raises the chicken himself, through his own labors and those of
his own family and employees. The profits or losses from the opera-
tion are his. Nevertheless, his independence is an illusion.
The typical chicken farmer is a cog in a mammoth machine oper-
ated by one of two companies, Tyson Foods or Pilgrim’s Pride. Both
of these corporations are giants. Tyson, the ninety-third largest
company in the country, has annual revenues of about $34.5 bil-
lion.565 Pilgrim’s Pride, which had $8.1 billion in sales in 2012, is
part of an even larger entity, JBS S.A., a Brazilian multinational and
the world’s largest beef producer, selling its product under a num-
ber of brand names including Swift.566
If the chicken grower were, in fact, an independent businessper-
son, he would be able to sell his chickens on the open market to
563. CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, THE MEAT RACKET: THE SECRET TAKEOVER OF AMERICA’S
FOOD BUSINESS (2014).
564. Id. at 23.
565. 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 488, at F-31.
566. JBS owns 75.5% of Pilgrim’s stock. See About Us, PILGRIM’S, http://www.pilgrims
.com/our-company/about-us.aspx.
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Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, or someone else. But the typical chicken
grower cannot sell his chickens on the open market. In fact, they
aren’t even his chickens. The typical chicken farmer—or as he may
more accurately be called today, chicken grower567—raises chickens
under multi-year contracts for either Tyson or Pilgrim’s Pride.568 If
the grower has a standing arrangement with Tyson, every eight
weeks or so Tyson delivers to him tens of thousands of baby
chicks.569 He never takes ownership of those chickens; they remain
Tyson’s property and are at the grower’s facility on consignment. 570
The grower raises those chicks under strict supervision from Tyson.
He feeds the chickens Tyson chicken feed, and Tyson field techni-
cians periodically visit the chickens on his farm. About eight weeks
after delivery, Tyson returns and picks up the now ready-for-slaugh-
ter chickens.
Back at its own facility, Tyson weighs the chickens, and then pays
the grower a sum that is based on a formula that takes into account
how much weight the chickens gained and how much feed they
consumed, and then compares those figures to chickens raised by
other chicken growers in the same geographic area.571 If the
grower’s chickens are below average in terms of weight gained rela-
tive to feed consumed (what Tyson calls “feed conversion”), he will
receive a reduced payment.572 It is a tournament system, pitting
growers against each other. Yet the grower has limited control over
the result.573 He must accept whatever chicks are delivered to him.
They have been bred by Tyson. Some batches are genetically
stronger or simply healthier than others. He must feed them the
food that Tyson supplies, and raise them in environmental condi-
tions that Tyson dictates.
Today Tyson Foods Company is a vertically-integrated firm that,
with one exception, spans the entire spectrum of chicken produc-
tion. Tyson owns the hatcheries, feed mills, slaughterhouses,
567. Farmer is still the term used, mainly for reasons of tradition. LEONARD, supra note
563, at 17.
568. Regarding the combined market share of Tyson and Pilgrim, see id. at 266 (noting
that by 2008 Tyson’s and Pilgrim Pride controlled more than forty percent of the national
chicken market) and at 266 (describing evidence that suggests that has been sufficient to give
the two companies the power to reduce total industry production and increase prices). Re-
garding the multi-year aspect of at least some contracts, see id. at 138 (describing a three-year
contract between Tyson and a grower). Nevertheless, Tyson may cancel a grower’s contract at
any time. Id. at 24.
569. See id. at 17–20 (describing the process).
570. For a brief description of the contracts and relationships between Tyson and its
chicken growers, see id. at 23–25. For a more extended description, see id. at 113–32.
571. Id. at 115–22, 131–32.
572. See id. at 114–22 (describing tournament system).
573. Id. at 23–38, 117, 131, 132–37.
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processing plants where the meat is packaged for the supermarket
shelves or processed for ready-to-eat products such as those for Mc-
Donald’s, distribution centers, and even the trucking enterprises
that transports the chickens between all of these facilities.574 This
vertical integration builds high barriers to entry for potential new
rivals. Anyone else entering the chicken business would be forced
to build their own hatcheries, slaughterhouses, and processing
plants because the existing ones are largely controlled by Tyson or
Pilgrim’s Pride.575 Shutting out potential new competition is, in
fact, one of the things that makes vertical integration so attractive to
large companies. The one link in the vertical chain that Tyson has
not internalized is growing the chicks until they are ready for
slaughter. Chicken growing is extremely labor-intensive and there-
fore potentially costly.576 The chickens have to be attended to
constantly. Although the automated systems make it possible to
raise vast numbers of chickens at one time, there are many matters
that require constant attention, such as removing clogs in the feed
troughs and the carcasses of dead birds. This makes chicken grow-
ing costly, especially if the workers are entitled to minimum wage,
overtime pay, and benefits.577 It is for this reason that both Tyson
and Pilgrim’s Pride contract out farming.578
Because it depends on chicken farms, one might expect that Ty-
son would want that business to be profitable. But that is not the
case. Power wants to suppress countervailing power. Tyson does not
want chicken growers to be capable of organizing, bargaining col-
lectively, or hiring lawyers or lobbyists.579 It is better for Tyson if
chicken growers lack the time, energy, and financial resources to
574. Id. at 5, 62, 106–07, 288.
575. See id. at 6, 108.
576. Tyson decided to externalize the chicken growing part of the business because it
“realized that chicken farming was a losing game.” Id. at 22. Moreover, it found chicken
growing unprofitable even though it successfully prevailed in litigation with the Department
of Labor, successfully arguing that it did not have to pay workers minimum wage because
farms are exempt. Id. at 83.
577. Should a feed or water line temporarily stop working, for example, chickens will
start pecking themselves to death. Id. 30. Growers need to also constantly remove dead birds
from the houses. Id. at 126. Consequently, a “seven-day workweek [is] required for chicken
farming.”  Id. at 32.
578. Id. at 22. Tyson experimented with owning its own farms but found it difficult to
incentivize employees to do the hard work of chicken farming. Id. at 71.
579. After forming the Northwest Poultry Growers Association, a group of farmers be-
lieved that Tyson was cancelling their contracts in retribution. Id. at 79, 84–85. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture sought to intervene on the farmers’ behalf, but Tyson successfully
argued that the Department lacked statutory authority to do so. See Arkansas Valley Indus.
Inc. v. Freeman, 415 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1969); and LEONARD, supra note 563, at 256 (report-
ing that farmers remain afraid that Tyson will cancel their contracts if they band together in a
union or association).
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seek to improve their relationships with Tyson. Tyson therefore cali-
brates the levels at which it pays chicken growers so that, at best,
chicken growers scrape by but are constantly fretting about paying
their bills. It doesn’t look this bleak to people who are considering
chicken farming. The potential new chicken grower is led to expect
that with hard work his enterprise will be profitable.580
But once they are in the system growers discover the harsh reali-
ties of the tournament. Other growers are also working hard, and it
is difficult to consistently keep winning the tournament. Even if all
of the growers perform superbly and have excellent feed conver-
sion rates half of them will nonetheless fall below the average.581
Tyson can manipulate the rankings in many ways, such as by simply
picking up chicks a few days earlier from one farm than from an-
other. Tyson does not disclose to the growers much of the key
information on which their payments are based. It does not identify
the other farms against which one is being ranked, and its contracts
have stringent confidentiality provisions that prohibit growers from
comparing their payment information with each other.582
Overall, chicken growers have long been receiving a constantly-
shrinking fraction of the money that consumers spend on chicken
while Tyson’s share keeps increasing.583 Christopher Leonard
writes: “Tyson exercises [its] power in a way that systematically de-
presses the prices it pays to many growers, creating a new breed of
high-tech sharecroppers who live on the ragged edge of bank-
ruptcy.”584 Some individuals whose families farmed for generations
have left farming entirely, either because they were driven into
bankruptcy or decided that scraping by at a bare subsistence level is
not worth backbreaking work and never-ending anxiety.585
Meanwhile, immigrant families have entered the business, believ-
ing that because they are used to hard work, seven-day workweeks,
and sacrifice, they could succeed.586 In parts of Arkansas, for exam-
ple, Laotian immigrants took up chicken farming while native
580. See id. at 45–46 (describing how the business looked good on paper to a prospective
new chicken farmer).
581. Id. at 122.
582. Id. at 117.
583. Id. at 7. See also id. at 34–35 (reporting that chicken farmers’ revenue has been gen-
erally flat for decades even though their expenses have risen dramatically).
584. Id. at 114–15. Many farmers wind up in bankruptcy. See id. at 38–40, 45, 137–38, and
188 (describing farmer bankruptcies).
585. See, e.g., id. at 25–32 and 38–45 (describing how Jerry Yandell took over chicken
farming in Arkansas from his father and hoped to pass on the farm his sons, who grew up
helping him in the business, only to be driven into bankruptcy and out of farming entirely),
and 125–27 (describing how Greg and Donna Owens were driven into bankruptcy by Tyson’s
tournament system).
586. Id. at 113–15.
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Arkansans left the business.587 However, they too soon discovered
the harsh realities of the tournament contract farming.588 Despite
operating large farms with tens of thousands of chickens, some of
the Laotian chicken growers have budgeted as little as six dollars
per day—or in some cases, even less—to feed each member of their
family.589
If a chicken grower does not like doing business with Tyson, why
doesn’t he give up contract farming, raise his own chickens, and sell
them on the open market? That is often impossible. The chicken
business is an oligopoly.590 Two companies, Tyson and Pilgrim’s
Pride, control nearly half of all chicken production in the United
States.591 In many areas of the country, there is no chicken market
apart from these two companies.592 As a practical matter, many
chicken farmers are forced to deal exclusively with either Tyson or
Pilgrim’s Pride. There is simply no one else close enough with
whom to do business.593
Tyson reached its present size and power through mergers. Be-
tween 1962 and 1997, Tyson acquired no less than thirty-three
separate companies.594 Some of these were vertical mergers and ac-
quisitions, the kind that the Chicago School argues should not
concern antitrust law. In 1994, for example, Tyson purchased Cobb-
Vantress, a venerable Massachusetts firm that specialized in poultry
breeding and had developed genetic lines of chickens that grow
faster and have bigger breasts.595 This allowed Tyson to effectively
own the DNA of more-profitable chickens.
Tyson also made large horizontal acquisitions. Like Amazon and
other powerful companies, it found ways to acquire firms that de-
cidedly did not want to be absorbed by Tyson. In the early 1980s,
for example, Tyson wanted to purchase Valmac Poultry, a major
587. See, e.g., id. at 45–46, 113–15, 119–20, 123–25, 127–39 (describing the experiences of
Laotian immigrants).
588. See, e.g., id. at 127–39 (describing how the Laotian farmers found themselves “beset
by bankruptcy and failures”).
589. Id. at 142–43.
590. Christopher Leonard argues each of the two companies has the ability to manipulate
market prices. Id. at 270–71, 313. Cf. In the Matter of Pilgrim’s Pride, 728 F.3d 457, 462 (5th
Cir. 2013) (per curium) (reversing a district court finding that in 2008 Pilgrim’s Pride cut
production to drive up prices, finding instead that the company cut production because it
had been producing more chicken than the market demanded, which had been suppressing
prices).
591. See LEONARD, supra note 563, at 266.
592. Leonard explains that “many farmers live close enough to only one chicken com-
pany with which they can do business.”  See id. at 136–37.
593. See id.
594. Id. at 110. See also id. at 93.
595. Id at 108–09.
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competitor that was then processing 153 million chickens annu-
ally.596 Valmac’s owners wanted to remain independent and refused
to sell. At a time when Valmac was short of cash and behind on its
payments, Tyson purchased from a third party a $10 million Valmac
note collateralized by Valmac stock, and called in the loan. Wishing
at all costs to avoid being taken over by Tyson, Valmac declared
bankruptcy, and persuaded the bankruptcy court to allow the in-
vestment firm Bass Brothers Enterprises to purchase it. That
maneuver was for naught. Tyson immediately offered Bass Brothers
a price that was significantly higher than it had paid for Valmac’s
stock, and within thirty days Tyson owned Valmac after all. Some
might argue that this is a desirable result because wealth is de-
stroyed if a firm cannot be sold to the highest bidder. However, a
firm such as Valmac is worth more to an oligopolist than to some
other purchaser who would not have an oligopolist’s share of the
market because it is more profitable to control a market than to do
business in a highly competitive market.
Chicken farming is not unique. Oligopolies control beef, pork,
grain, and seed production as well. Thirty years ago there were hun-
dreds of small meatpackers, and the four largest firms controlled
no more than about a third of the beef market.597 Today that mar-
ket is also controlled by four firms—Tyson, JBS, Cargill
Incorporated, and National Beef Packing Company, LLC—which
collectively purchase eighty-five percent of all of cattle sold in the
United States.598 Christopher Leonard reports that “[t]here is am-
ple evidence that the big four meatpackers have chosen to divvy up
the market, picking territories where they can buy all the cattle
from a feedlot without facing a competing bid.”599 Once again, in-
dustry consolidation resulted from many mergers, with big fish
swallowing small fish, and then in turn being swallowed by even
bigger fish.600
Smithfield Foods is the largest company in pork production.601 It
is a multinational corporation operating in the U.S., Mexico, and
throughout the world. According to one source, Smithfield has
more sows in the U.S. than the next three largest pork producers
596. For the Tyson-Valmac story, see LEONARD, supra note 563, at 100–01.
597. See id. at 212 (stating that in 1980 the four largest “controlled just 36 percent of the
cattle market”). But see id. at 171 (stating that by 1980 the four biggest beef companies “con-
trolled only about 25 percent of the total market”).
598. Id. at 208.
599. Id. at 209.
600. For example, Iowa Beef Packers (IBP) became a giant in its industry by acquiring
dozens of rivals. Id. at 171. Tyson purchased IBP in 2001. Id. at 176.
601. Smithfield Foods’s annual revenues total $13.2 billion, placing it at number 214 on
the Fortune 500. 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 488, at F-11.
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combined.602 Like Tyson, Smithfield achieved its present size and
dominance through multiple mergers.603 In 1999, for example,
Smithfield acquired Murphy Farms, which was itself so large that
contract farmers in Iowa were raising 900,000 pigs for Murphy
Farms.604 As is the case in the chicken industry, the large pork pro-
ducers are also vertically-integrated enterprises.605 Indeed,
Seaboard Corporation, one of the biggest pork producers with
$6.67 billion in annual revenues, boasts that it “controls every step”
of an “integrated food system.”606 The Tyson-style contract-farming
method has become so pervasive in pork production that only two
percent of all hogs in the United States are sold through negotiated
prices in the market.607 Here too the large producers continually
squeeze the growers economically. Thirty years ago, hog farmers
received about half of the money that consumers paid for pork.
Today they receive less than twenty-five cents of the consumer’s
dollar.608
The grain and seed markets are, if anything, even more highly
concentrated. Archer Daniels Midland and Cargill Incorporated
control the lion’s share of the grain market.609 These firms are both
super-giants. Archer Daniels Midland’s revenues are nearly triple,
and Cargill’s nearly quadruple, Tyson’s revenues.610 Meanwhile, the
biotechnology company Monsanto dominates the seed industry.611
602. Top 25 U.S. Pork Powerhouses 2013, SUCCESSFUL FARMING, http://www.agriculture
.com/uploads/assets/promo/external/pdf/PP2013_03.pdf.
603. LEONARD, supra note 563, at 168.
604. Id. at 240.
605. Tyson and Cargill and also large pork producers. Another giant, Hormel Foods, is
also involved in pork production but mostly produces consumer foods. It too continually
grows through mergers. Hormel’s most recent acquisitions include Skippy (2013) and Mus-
cle Milk (2014). See Milestones in Our History, HORMEL FOODS, http://www.hormelfoods.com/
About/History/Company-History./.
606. History, SEABOARD FOODS, http://www.seaboardfoods.com/About/Pages/History
.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). For revenue, see 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 488,
at F-17. Seaboard Foods is a division of Seaboard Corporation. Its consumer brands are
Daily’s and Prairie Fresh.
607. LEONARD, supra note 563, at 202. See also id. at 236 (reporting more than seventy
percent of hogs in Iowa are raised through contract farming).
608. Id. at 204.
609. See id. at 235.
610. See 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 488, at F-31 (reporting Archer Daniel
Midland’s revenues are $89.8 billion); At a Glance, CARGILL, http://www.cargill.com/com-
pany/glance/index.jsp (reporting Cargill’s revenues are $134.9). Because Cargill is a private
company it is not ranked by Fortune magazine, but it if were, it would place at number eleven
on the Fortune 500, just ahead of AT&T.
611. Monsanto’s revenues are $14.9 billion, placing it at number 197 in the Fortune 500.
500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 488, at F-9. Monsanto achieved its monopoly position
in many products—including transgenic corn, canola, soy, and cotton seeds—not merely
through patents but through a series of mergers with other companies. See, e.g., Monsanto
Signs Five Corn Seed Deals, CHEMICAL WK. (Sept. 7, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 25475530.
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It is monopsony power that has enabled the big meat producers
to turn farmers into serfs. Monopsony is the flip side of monopoly.
Monopoly refers to the ability of a single seller to control a market;
monopsony refers to market dominance by a single buyer.612 From
the consumer’s point of view, the large meat companies are oligo-
polists, but from the farmer’s point of view, they are oligopsonists.
In either case, there is not sufficient choice for a free market to
operate. Someone who must buy or purchase is essentially forced to
do so on terms dictated by the other, more powerful party. It is
worth making the distinction between monopoly and monopsony,
however, because modern antitrust law often ignores the coercive
power of the monopsonists. Its single-minded focus on consumer
welfare seeks to protect citizens in their roles as consumers while
often ignoring their at least equally important roles as workers and
entrepreneurs.
The largest monopsonist in America today is also the largest cor-
poration in the nation, namely, Walmart Stores.613 Walmart also
turns small and medium-sized businesses into modern-day serfs. As
is the case with the large meat companies, the Walmart road to serf-
dom can be seen as a commercial version of the classic morality
play about selling one’s soul to the devil. Businesses start down the
road voluntarily but wind up ensnared and unable to either exer-
cise independence or escape. They may have been lured by an
invitation to become Walmart’s main supplier of a particular prod-
uct.614 That can be extremely seductive. Walmart is so enormous
that being its main supplier will generally make Walmart a manu-
facturer’s largest customer—by far. So, the business accepts. To
meet Walmart’s volume requirements, the manufacturer may have
to significantly increase its production. It may have to open new
plants, and borrow funds to do so. It may also have to suspend deliv-
eries to existing customers because it cannot ramp up fast enough
to serve both Walmart and its other customers, and now it must give
Walmart priority.615 It seems well worth it at first.
Walmart, however, is all about low prices—and it seeks to contin-
uously lower its prices. In the second year, therefore, Walmart asks
612. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 14 (describing monopsony power).
613. See Fortune 500, supra note 488, at F-1 (reporting Walmart’s annual revenues at $473
billion and ranking it the largest corporation in the America by that measure).
614. See FISHMAN, supra note 493, at ch. 4 (describing the process).
615. Proctor & Gamble and Gillette were forced to merge, in part, to achieve the econo-
mies of scale necessary to meet Walmart’s demands. Id. at 12. Walmart is so critical to its
business, that Proctor & Gamble has an office with 250 employees near Walmart’s headquar-
ters in Bentonville, Alabama dedicated to servicing its most important customer. Indeed,
more than seven hundred companies have offices in or near Bentonville in order  to service
Walmart. Id. at 63.
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the supplier to reduce its wholesale price because Walmart wants to
cut its retail price. The supplier works at becoming more efficient,
and may be able to do so. In the third year, though, Walmart wants
another price cut. It is willing to provide advice about how its sup-
plier can increase efficiency further, and with Walmart’s assistance,
the supplier may succeed in reducing its costs enough to offset the
price cut that it must give Walmart.616
But Walmart’s pressure to lower prices is relentless. The com-
pany demands another price reduction in the fourth year, the fifth
year, and every year.617 At some point, the manufacturer hits the
wall and cannot increase efficiency further.618 It is now selling to
Walmart at a loss; but it is addicted to Walmart’s cash flow and can-
not terminate the relationship and survive. In some instances,
Walmart will tell its supplier that it can reduce production costs
further by moving its factories overseas, and many manufacturers
have done so.619 Others are driven into bankruptcy. Indeed, about
half of the Walmart’s ten largest suppliers in 1994 ultimately went
bankrupt.620 When that happens, Walmart simply begins again with
a new main supplier. One might think that based on the unhappy
experience of its rival, Walmart would have trouble luring a replace-
ment. But greed and hubris are powerful magnets; it can be
surprisingly easy to persuade oneself that he will succeed where
others have failed.
There is nothing inherently evil in Walmart’s approach. Walmart
is dedicated to making a profit, which is what we expect companies
to do. Moreover, much good flows from Walmart’s approach. It
provides low consumer prices, and consumers are grateful, which is
why Walmart is so successful. The problem lies not with Walmart’s
agenda or its business ethics but with its size.
It is, in fact, difficult to grasp how large and influential this com-
pany has become. Walmart is the largest retail seller of just about
every consumer product in the country. Dial Soap, to take just one
616. Walmart will work with new suppliers to help them lower costs. For example, it
might partner with a supplier to use Walmart trucks that are running empty on a return trip
to move goods destined for Walmart. Id. at 64-65. The general rule is that for price savings
achieved through through such partnerships, the supplier keeps one-third, Walmart gets
one-third, and one-third is passed onto to customers in retail price reductions. Id. at 65–66.
617. See id. at 88 (stating that Walmart often insists that manufacturers of basic consumer
products cut their wholesale price by five percent per year).
618. Id. at 106.
619. Id. at 102–06. Companies that sell more than twenty-five percent of their output to
Walmart have much thinner profit margins than those that sell no more than ten percent of
their output to Walmart. Id. at 163.
620. Id. at 160.
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example, sells thirty percent of all of total output to Walmart, ap-
proximately equal to the amount it sells to its next ten largest
customers.621 About forty-five percent of all Americans visit a
Walmart store each week.622 There has never been anything like
that in the world—one company with which nearly half of the na-
tion’s residents trade that frequently.
What about Walmart’s impact on employment? When it opens a
new store, does it add or subtract jobs from the local community? It
appears that Walmart adds jobs, but just a smidgeon. According to
one study, a new Walmart store will employ 150 to 350 workers, but
within five years of opening it will put four retail stores out of busi-
ness and cause other retailers to reduce the number of their
employees.623 And because Walmart handles its own distribution, it
will cause wholesalers to reduce the number of their employees as
well.624 On average, there is a net gain of thirty jobs.625 But there is
nonetheless a loss in the number and diversity of employers.
Just as consumers benefit from competition among sellers, work-
ers benefit from competition among employers. Just as competition
in production tends to reduce prices, competition among employ-
ers tends to increase wages. An absence of healthy competition for
workers not only tends to reduce wages as an absolute matter but
also increases the gap between average workers and top executives.
“Diminished competition . . . increases inequality by empowering
corporations to hold down the income of workers,” two commenta-
tors have written.626 Moreover, just as a diverse group of sellers
provide an assortment of products for different consumer tastes, a
diverse group of employers provide an assortment of work environ-
ments. Alternative places of employment are of immeasurable value
to a worker who, for example, has a personality clash with a supervi-
sor. When one’s present employer is, as a practical matter, the only
possible employer, that individual is a serf. Freedom expands with
the number of realistic alternatives.
As F.A. Hayek observed, a diversity of employers is also essential
to national productivity.627 Just as a healthy economy depends on a
621. Id. at 87.
622. See id. at xxxi (reporting that 145 million Americans visited a Walmart store each
week in 2010); U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
popclock (reporting that as of Dec. 31, 2010 the U.S. population was 310,537,757).
623. See Fishman, supra note 493, at 142–46 (citing Emek Basker, Job Creation or Destruc-
tion? Labor Market Effects of Wal-Mart Expansion, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 174 (2006)).
624. FISHMAN, supra note 493, at 142–46.
625. Id.
626. Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, The Great Unequalizer, WASH. POST, June 15, 2004, at
B1.
627. F.A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, 5 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 9, 21 (2002).
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diversity of producers so that prices may change in response to
changing circumstances, it also depends on a diversity of employers
so that relative wages may be sensitive to changes.628 Wages tend be
rigid when there is not a diversity of employers, and rigid wages
tend to produce decreases in real earnings. Hayek wrote: “A com-
pletely rigid wage structure is . . . liable to lead to a gradual
decrease in the level of real wages at which full employment can be
realized.”629
If these structural issues do not cause enough problems for citi-
zens in their roles as workers, a 2010 Department of Justice
investigation discovered that a small group of giant tech firms, in-
cluding Google, Apple, Intel, and others, secretly agreed not to
recruit software engineers from each other so as not to have to
compete in wages.630 This case is hardly unique.631 Companies in
concentrated markets have the same incentives to conspire on la-
bor issues as they do to conspire on matters of production and
prices. Antitrust regulators will take action if they discover that em-
ployers are actively colluding to fix wages, but they should also
consider how company size and industry concentration affect em-
ployment opportunities and national productivity.
C. Too Big To Regulate and Crony Capitalism
Both state and federal governments tried ameliorating the effects
of the tournament contract farming system through regulation. In
the fall of 2000, Iowa’s attorney general, Tom Miller, proposed the
Producer Protection Act to protect farmers from the oligopsonists
that purchase their livestock, crops, or milk.632 Among other things,
the legislation would require that the contracts written by the big
628. Although Hayek was thinking principally about the ratio of wage structures chang-
ing among different industries in response to changing circumstances, much of his point
applies also to the ability of wages to react to changed circumstances within a particular
industry. See id.
629. Id.
630. The Department of Justice said the conspiracy deprived the software engineers of
information that could have led them to better job opportunities and “disrupted the normal
price-setting mechanisms that apply in the labor setting.” In re High-Tech Employee Anti-
trust Litigation, 289 F.R.D. 555, 560 (N.D. Cal 2013).
631. See, e.g., Cason-Merenda v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 528 (E.D. Mich. 2013)
(alleging a conspiracy among Detroit-area hospitals to hold down wages of registered
nurses); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (alleging conspiracy to hold down
wages in energy industry).
632. See LEONARD, supra note 563, at 244–52 (describing history of proposed legislation).
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corporations be in plain English, and that all material risks be dis-
closed in a cover sheet.633 It would prohibit tournament payment
systems,634 void confidentiality provisions that preclude farmers
from discussing their contracts with each other (and arguably even
with their lawyers and financial advisers).635 The legislation would
also give farmers the right to join associations,636 and the right to
have a representative present when their livestock or crops were be-
ing weighed to determine their compensation.637 It allowed farmers
to sue for violations of these and other enumerated rights, and to
recover damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees if they prevailed.638
At first, Iowa legislators seemed favorably disposed to the bill.639
It would, after all, protect Iowa farmers from out-of-state corpora-
tions. The attorneys general of fifteen other states also urged their
state legislatures to enact the proposed legislation. However, the
large food companies quietly but powerfully began lobbying against
the legislation, and it ultimately failed to pass in any state.640 Sena-
tor Tom Harkin of Iowa introduced similar legislation in Congress,
but the proposed federal bill failed to even get a floor vote.641
Ten years later, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack sought
to address the livestock and poultry farmers’ plight through admin-
istrative regulation. At his urging, an agency within the Department
of Agriculture—the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Ad-
ministration (GIPSA), which, fittingly, was originally established in
1921 to regulate the “meat trust” of that time642—gave notice that it
was considering promulgating a regulation to ban tournament
compensation systems for chicken growers unless it provided for a
predictable base payment for growers.643 Vilsack, who had been a
popular, two-term governor of Iowa, understood the issues well. He
was urged to act by President Barack Obama, who learned about
the brutality of the tournament contract farming system while
633. MODEL PRODUCER PROTECTION ACT § 4, http://www.flaginc.org/wp-content/up
loads/2013/03/poultrypt5.pdf.
634. Id. § 9b(5).
635. Id. § 6.
636. Id. § 9a(2)(a).
637. Id. § 9b(4)
638. Id. § 13c(1).
639. See LEONARD, supra note 563, at 250.
640. Id. at 252.
641. Id.
642. In 1921, five companies dominated the meat market and were threatening to con-
trol the milk and egg industries as well. The original agency was the Packers and Stockyards
Administration. Id. at 246; see also Thomas J. Flavin, The Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 26
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1958).
643. See LEONARD, supra note 563, at 261–303 (chronicling the history of the proposed
rule).
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campaigning for the 2008 Iowa Democratic presidential caucuses.
In 2009, GIPSA promulgated regulations that required the poultry
companies to disclose some important, though still limited, infor-
mation to farmers before entering into tournament contracts with
them. Among other things, these regulations would have permitted
growers to disclose information to their legal and financial advisers,
and perhaps most significantly, to other growers for the same com-
pany, notwithstanding confidentiality provisions that poultry
companies included in their contracts.644
Vilsack and his team intended to go much further. In 2010,
GIPSA formally proposed rules to require that tournament con-
tracts ensure minimum base payments to poultry growers, and to
provide growers with other important protections.645 But the power
of the meat companies was too great. Tyson, Smithfield, JBS, Car-
gill, and other large meat companies, together with their trade
associations, spent millions lobbying in 2010.646 On July 20, 2010,
the House Subcommittee on Agriculture held a hearing on the pro-
posed rules, and both Republican and Democratic members
catered to the big meat companies by flaying a hapless GIPSA wit-
ness who had been selected to explain the proposed rules.647 The
rhetoric from industry and members of Congress who echoed its
talking points was that by interfering in the free market “big govern-
ment” would “hamstring” industry and drive up prices.648
In the end, under intense pressure from the meat industry, mem-
bers of Congress, and the Office of Management of Budget—which
evaluates whether proposed regulations pass a cost-benefit test and
is another focal point for industry lobbying—Vilsack relented and
eliminated the most important provision from the proposed rule,
644. GIPSA Poultry Contracts Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 63271 et seq. (Dec. 3, 2009),
amending 9 C.F.R. § 201.100(b)(regarding confidentiality provisions), § 201.100(c)(3) (re-
garding information disclosures), http://www.gipsa.usda.gov/federal%20register/fr09/12-3-
09.pdf.
645. See News Release, USDA, June 18, 2010, http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/
!ut/p/c4/04_sb8k8xllm9msszpy8xbz9cp0os_gac9-wmj8qy0mdpxbda09nxw9dfxcxq-caa_2cbe
dfaeuojoe!/?contentidonly=true&contentid=2010/06/0326.xml. (describing the proposed
rules); see also LEONARD, supra note 563, at 284.
646. Collectively the meat companies and their trade associations spent $7.8 million lob-
bying in 2010. Id. at 286.
647. Id. at 289–90.
648. See, e.g., Cindy Zimmerman, GIPSA Proposal an Example of Flawed Regulation, AGWIRED
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://agwired.com/2011/09/14/gipsa-proposal-an-example-of-flawed-reg-
ulation (quoting a small farmer who testified that “[w]e do not need big government setting
up shop on our farms and ranches”); Cindy Zimmerman, GIPSA Dominates Senate Committee
Hearing, AGWIRED (June 29, 2011), http://agwired.com/2011/06/29/gipsa-dominates-sen-
ate-committee-hearing (quoting Senator Pat Roberts, R-KS, as saying that the GIPSA rule
would “hamstring” the industry).
FALL 2015] The New Road to Serfdom 109
namely, the requirement for a base minimum payment to tourna-
ment payment systems. Although GIPSA went forward with the
other provisions, the battle did not end there. The big meat compa-
nies kept up lobbying, and in 2011 Congress included provisions in
a spending bill that prohibited GIPSA from spending money to en-
force the rules.649 In the end, all that survived was a provision that
gave farmers the right to sue the meat companies over contract dis-
putes notwithstanding contract arbitration provisions.650
Big businesses do not merely use their political muscle to fend
off regulation; they also use it for rent seeking, that is, to obtain a
wide variety of special favors, benefits, and subsidies from local,
state, and federal governments.651 Tyson, for example, benefits indi-
rectly—but enormously—from a federal program that provides
taxpayer-subsidized loans to farmers, including Tyson’s chicken
growers. These loans are dispensed by the Farm Service Agency
(FSA), within the Department of Agriculture.652 As it squeezes ex-
isting chicken growers into insolvency, Tyson is able to lure fresh
individuals into the business by helping them get loans to purchase
the land, buildings, and equipment for chicken farms. The loans
are dispensed by local banks; but if the borrower defaults, FSA pays
the bank more than ninety percent of the amount of default.653
As a result, the banks are lax in reviewing loan applications to
ensure that borrowers have the capacity to repay their loans. Chris-
topher Leonard reports that FSA-guaranteed loans became the
“pipeline for credit” for the Laotian chicken growers that Tyson
lured into chicken growing as native Arkansas farmers left the busi-
ness.654 The best information available is that the FSA guaranteed
$568.9 million to poultry farmers over a two-year period, and that it
paid out $468 million to banks to cover defaulted loans by all farm-
ers for the same two-year period.655 It may appear the FSA program
is benefitting small farmers, and of course, for those small farmers
who succeed, the FSA program may be a genuine benefit. But as
chicken farming illustrates, the FSA program can also be seen as a
form of crony capitalism benefitting big companies such as Tyson.
649. LEONARD, supra note 563, at 302.
650. Although the final rule also contained guidelines as to when meat companies could
terminate growers or require that they make capital improvements to their facilities, these
were, in effect, unenforceable suggestions. Id. at 302; see also Cindy Zimmerman, Congress
Restricts Implementation of GIPSA Rule, AGWIRED (Nov. 18, 2011), http://agwired.com/2011/
11/18/congress-votes-to-restrict-implementation-of-gipsa-rule.
651. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text.
652. See LEONARD, supra note 563, at 139–45.
653. Id. at 140–41.
654. Id. at 141.
655. Id. at 143–44.
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The FSA program is undoubtedly just one of countless obscure pro-
grams that are well understood by big companies and their lobbyists
but invisible to the public-at-large.
The meat industry is a run-of-the-mill example of how big compa-
nies can be too politically powerful to regulate or keep from
grazing at the public trough. The inability to disaggregate the giant
banks in the wake of the 2008 crisis, discussed earlier, is a more
visible example. It should be no surprise that in the wake of that
crisis politically connected banks were more successful at getting
the federal government to purchase their toxic assets than other
banks.656
Another example is a federal program to help small businesses
with economically or socially disadvantaged owners compete for
government contracts worth up to $6.5 million.657 The program has
long been plagued by schemes in which the small businesses that
apply are, in reality, fronts for large companies. One common
scheme was to have the small business that is the awarded the job
subcontract most of the work to a large company. New government
regulations were promulgated to end that practice by requiring that
firms awarded contracts perform at least half of the work them-
selves.658 Nevertheless, a Government Accounting Office
investigation revealed that the government departments that award
the most contracts under the program have ignored the regula-
tion.659 Even if this loophole is closed, another will be opened. Big
businesses will find ways to get what they want—perhaps not every-
where, and not all the time, but more often than not, especially
where the stakes are high and visibility is low. Small businesses may
complain to their elected representatives, but the meat industry il-
lustrates how that is likely to pan out.
As everyone knows, the amount of money contributed to political
candidates, parties, and political action committees is enormous.
During the 2012 election cycle, companies in the securities/invest-
ment sector contributed $286 million to political campaigns, and
656. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 525, at 168, 273 n.31 (describing a study by Jowei
Chen and Connor Raso titled “Do TARP Bank Bailouts Favor Politically Connected Firms?”).
657. This is known as the 8(a) Business Development Program. See About the 8(a) Business
Development Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/about-8a-busi-
ness-development-program.
658. Moreover, a 2013 statute subjects violators to a minimum penalty of $500,000. J.D.
Harris, Small-Businesses Contracting Rules Aren’t Being Enforced, Probe Finds, WASH. POST, Sept.
22, 2014, at A13.
659. The Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the De-
partment of Health and Human Services collectively award three-quarters of such contracts.
The GAO found that eight out of ten contract officers failed to monitor the amount of work
performed by subcontractors, despite red flags of possible abuse. Id.
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commercial banks contributed an additional $40 million.660 With
this level of political support, it is hardly surprising that Congress
has not broken up the too-big-to-fail banks. Compared to large fi-
nancial institutions, Tyson Foods is a relatively small political player;
yet is still quite potent.
During the 2012 election cycle, Tyson and its PAC contributed to
more than sixty members of Congress,661 and top Tyson executives
supplemented those contributions with their own individual, bun-
dled contributions. During the 2012 election cycle, Tyson Foods, its
PAC, and its executives contributed a combined $22,234 to Con-
gressman Steve Womack (R-AR).662 Tyson’s political contributions
were well targeted. During the 2012 election cycle, it contributed to
sixteen members of the House Agriculture Committee,663 nine
members of the Appropriations Committee,664 and five members of
the Ways and Means Committee,665 including the chairs of all those
committees. Tyson also contributed to nine members of the Senate
Agriculture Committee, including its chair,666 and to the chair of
the Agriculture Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee.667 Altogether, Tyson contributed $373,761 to candidates,
PACs, and political parties during the 2012 election cycle.668
In addition, and perhaps far more importantly, Tyson spent $1.9
million on lobbying during the same period. It took full advantage
of the power of the revolving door; seven of its eleven registered
lobbyists previously held government jobs, and two were powerful
660. See Commercial Banks: Long-Term Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.
opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2010&ind=F03.
661. Tyson’s smallest contribution, $500, was given to Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN).
That was an outlier. All of its other contributions were between $1,000 and $9,734. See Tyson
Foods, Profile for 2012 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/
summary.php?id=D000000460&cycle=2012.
662. Id.
663. Dennis Cardoza (R-AR), Rick Crawford (R-AR), Rodney Davis (R-IL), Scott
Dejariasis (R-TN), Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), Vicky Hartzler (R-MO), Timothy Johnson (R-IL),
Steven King (R-IA), Larry Kissell (D, NC), Frank Lucas (Chair, R-OK), Mike McIntyre (D-
NC), Kristi Noem (R-SD), Collin Peterson (Ranking Minority Member, D-MN), Reid Ribble
(R-WI), Mike Rogers (R-AL), and David Scott (D-GA).
664. Robert Aderbolt (R-AL), Sanford Bishop (D-GA), Henry Cuellar (D-TX), Tom
Graves (R-GA), Jack Kingston (R-GA), Tom Latham (R-IA), Alan Nunnelee (R-MS), Hal Rog-
ers (Chair, R-MS), and Steve Womack (R-AR).
665. Xavier Becerra (D-CA), Diane Black (R-TN), Charles Boustany (R-LA), Dave Camp
(Chair, R-MI), and Tim Griffin (R-AR).
666. John Boozman (R-AR), Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Kent Conrad (D-ND), Joe Don-
nelly (D-IN), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Ben Nelson (D-NE), Pat
Roberts (R-KS), and Debbie Stabenow (Chair D-MI).
667. Mark Pryor (D-AR).
668. Tyson Foods, supra note 661. The largest single recipient was Mitt Romney and his
PAC (Restore our Future), which together received $76,200 from Tyson. See id.
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former members of Congress.669 Tyson contributes at the state level
too.670 It is little wonder that chicken growers never stood a chance
battling Tyson politically.
In all of these things, Tyson is typical of giant corporations. Busi-
ness contributes about seventy percent of the hundreds of millions
of dollars contributed to political campaigns. Moreover, big busi-
ness contributes not merely to candidates for the political branches
of government—federal and state—but increasingly to state judicial
campaigns as well.671 In the post-Citizens United/McCutcheon world,
the power of big business will only grow stronger.672 Dark money—
i.e., contributions that do not need to be disclosed—pouring into
politics now exceeds disclosed contributions to PACs. Thus, we may
know less and less and about corporate political influence.673
Money, of course, is power, but so is information and expertise.
An underappreciated part of corporate power involves the in-
creased influence of corporate lobbying—which, in part, has been a
deliberate consequence of twenty-year-old strategy. When, in 1995,
Newt Gingrich became the first Republican Speaker of the House
since the Eisenhower administration, he laid off about eight hun-
dred lawyers, economists, policy and budget analysts, and
researchers working for House committees, reducing committee
professional staffs by more than one-third.674 The Republican Sen-
ate leadership made significant, though somewhat smaller, cuts to
the professional staffs of Senate committees that same year. Mean-
while, the professional staffs of both Congressional Research
669. The two former members were Senators John Breaux (D-LA) and Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott (R-MS).
670. For example, during the 2012 election cycle it contributed $10,000 to the Demo-
cratic Party of Arkansas. Tyson Foods, supra note 661.
671. See Adam Liptak, Judges on the Campaign Trail, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), http://
nyti.ms/1rASXNn (reporting that $152 million were spent on judicial elections over the past
three election cycles). Even when large corporations may choose not to contribute directly,
money may flow indirectly through bundled contributions by executives and through contri-
butions from trade associations such as the Chamber of Commerce. See Dan Eggen, The
Influence Industry: Judicial Elections, Corporate Policies Give Glimpse into 2012, WASH. POST, (Oct.
26, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-influence-industry-judicial-elec-
tions-corporate-policies-give-glimpse-into-2012/2011/10/26/gIQAeOWzJM_story.html
(reporting that while some corporations have policies against making these contributions,
the Chamber of Commerce and its affiliates are large contributors to judicial elections).
672. I refer to Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) and Mc-
Cutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1334 (2014).
673. Nicholas Confessore, Secret Money Fueling a Flood of Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2014, at A1.
674. Paul Glastris & Haley Sweetland Edwards, The Big Lobotomy: How Republicans Made
Congress Stupid, WASH. MONTHLY, (June/July/Aug. 2014), http://www.washingtonmonthly
.com/magazine/junejulyaugust_2014/features/the_big_lobotomy050642.php?page=all.
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Service and the Government Accountability Office, which serve
both houses of Congress, were also cut by one-third.675
In part, the cuts were designed to bleed power away from com-
mittee chairs and centralize it in the Speaker’s and Senate Majority
Leader’s offices. However, the cuts were also intended to perform a
partial “self-lobotomy,” as one former congressional staff member
described it.676 Reducing its own professional staff forced Congress
to rely more heavily on outside expertise, which corporate lobbyists
are only too happy to supply.677 Although Democrats made efforts
to redress the balance during periods of their control, congres-
sional professional staffs remain smaller today than they were in
1994.678 Meanwhile, over the past three decades, corporations have
vastly expanded their lobbyists in Washington, D.C. Indeed, since
1983, organizations have increased their total lobbying expenses
(controlled for inflation) by nearly sevenfold, with more than
seventy-five percent of that money being spent by corporations.679
“As a result,” writes political scientist Lee Drutman,
[congressional] staffers must rely more and more on the lob-
byists who specialize in particular policy areas. This puts those
who can afford to hire the most experienced and policy-liter-
ate lobbyists—generally large companies—at the center of the
policymaking process.680
Drutman goes on to observe that corporate political activity “in-
creasingly re-directs” the political system.681 Because corporations
so often work to stop government from doing things they don’t
like, democracy “is increasingly unable to tackle large-scale
problems,” he writes.682 And because corporations increasingly rely
675. Among other things, these cuts eliminated Legislative Service Organizations (LSOs),
in which members of Congress worked together, often on a bipartisan basis, to study and
discuss issues of interest outside of the committees. There was no longer enough staff sup-
port for LSOs. Id.
676. The former congressional staffer is Lorelei Kelly, who now works for the New
America Foundation. Id.
677. In addition to corporations and trade associations, Congress increasingly relies on
outside think tanks and advocacy organizations. Although think tanks span the ideological
spectrum, those most congenial to big business are often lavishly funded. See generally TELES,
supra note 72 (describing how corporations and related foundations—particularly the Olin,
Bradley, and Scaife Foundations—funded conservative and libertarian think tanks).
678. “[E]very single House standing committee had fewer staffers in 2009 than in 1994.”
Glastris & Edwards, supra note 674.
679. LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME
POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 8 (2015).
680. Id. at 220.
681. Id. at 218.
682. Id.
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on the political system to grant them favors that enrich their bot-
tom lines, we now have “a political economy that that too often
rewards lobbying over innovation.”683
Company size translates directly into political muscle. It is not
small or medium-sized enterprises that elected officials heed; it is
the giant companies. The larger a firm is in terms of revenue and
assets, the more politically influential it can become. Corporations
will use their political power to both resist regulation and to engage
in rent seeking. That is not evil or nefarious; it is the natural order
of things. Nevertheless, crony capitalism works to the disadvantage
of small businesses and the public at large. Regulation will never, by
itself, be sufficient to curtail crony capitalism. No matter what rules
Congress and the regulatory agencies are able to promulgate, big
corporations will also find (if not help create) loopholes. It is neces-
sary to curtail crony capitalism by curtailing corporate size.
CONCLUSION
Teddy Roosevelt had a reasonable position in 1912 when he ar-
gued that a strong government could effectively regulate big
corporations. But history has shown that Woodrow Wilson was
closer to the truth when he maintained that ultimately big corpora-
tions would be too powerful for the government to effectively
regulate. The fundamental problem is that in a modern democracy,
where money heavily influences the political process, giant compa-
nies have great political power. I am not suggesting that big
corporations are all-powerful. They are not. Sometimes they get
what they want; sometimes they don’t. But they are able to get what
they want far more often than not—even in instances where an om-
niscient observer would say that what they wanted was not in the
public interest.
The proof in the pudding is the financial crisis of 2008. Regard-
less of what may have been necessary to avoid a collapse of the
entire economic system in the heat of the crisis, once the financial
system stabilized it was necessary to cure the too-big-to-fail problem
by disaggregating the largest banks and financial institutions. Three
Federal Reserve Bank presidents publicly advocated that position.684
Even Alan Greenspan—who, during his tenure as chairman of the
683. Id.
684. They were James Bullard, Thomas M. Hoenig, and Richard W. Fisher, who were
respectively presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of Saint Louis, Kansas City, and Dallas.
BERNIE SANDERS, THE SPEECH: A HISTORIC FILIBUSTER ON CORPORATE GREED AND THE DECLINE
OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 189–90 (2011).
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Federal Reserve Board of Governors from 1987 to 2006, had fa-
vored deregulating the banks—concluded after the crisis that the
big banks should be broken up. “If they are too big to fail, they are
too big,” Greenspan said.685
Why has the nation not done so? The answer, quite simply, is that
the political power of the giant financial institutions makes propos-
ing to break up the big banks politically infeasible. Leaders of
neither of the two major political parties can afford to make their
party the political enemy of the big banks.686 The modern history of
banking resolves the debate between Roosevelt and Wilson. That
history involves decades of mergers despite empirical evidence
showing that large mergers benefitted only the executives. It also
includes the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the failure to disaggre-
gate the big financial institutions today, and current efforts to
weaken the Dodd-Frank Act. This long and deep history demon-
strates that corporations can, in fact, be too big to regulate.687
Antitrust law needs to be concerned with consolidated power,
and giant companies have a great deal of consolidated power. How-
ever, although I am arguing that antitrust policy should be
concerned with corporate size, I am not arguing that antitrust
should be used to break up companies based on size alone. (Large
financial institutions are a special case. They should be disaggre-
gated so that taxpayers do not have to again rescue too-big-to-fail
banks in order to avoid economic collapse.688
To take the prime example, I am not arguing that Walmart,
which is presently the largest corporation in the United States, be
broken up under the antitrust laws. That is not because Walmart’s
size does not present problems. It presents considerable problems,
as discussed above.689 I am not arguing that Walmart should be bro-
ken up simply—but importantly—because there is long and strong
American tradition of not penalizing firms that grow internally. An-
titrust law must reflect our national values and mores, and those
685. He added: “In 1911, we broke up Standard Oil. So what happened? The individual
parts became more valuable than the whole.” Id. at 192 (quoting Greenspan).
686. Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, who is not a leader nor even a member of a
political party, explains: “We have not been able to [break up the banks] because Wall Street
sends their lobbyists down here in droves and Wall Street provides zillions of dollars in cam-
paign contributions and Wall Street fights like the dickens to make sure that any strong
provisions that some of us might bring up are defeated.” Id. at 190.
687. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 50, at 40, 131, 335–39 (2010)(arguing that companies
can be too big to regulate; Gar Alperovitz, Wall Street is Too Big To Regulate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2012, at A19; see also Neil Irwin, Were CEOs ‘Too Big To Jail?’, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2013, at G1.
688. The banks should be broken up by new legislation by through existing authority
vested in the Federal Reserve or the Treasury Department, if such authority exists, but not
under the antitrust laws.
689. See supra notes 613–24 and accompanying text.
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hold that growing by outperforming rivals is not the same thing as
growing by buying rivals. So long as a company grows by building
the proverbial better mousetrap, our longstanding national values
say that the company should not be broken up based on size alone.
It would, of course, be another matter if a company became a mo-
nopoly or attempted to monopolize through predatory practices.
Walmart’s growth within the United States has been entirely inter-
nal, and thus despite the significant problems caused by its great
size, I do not advocate breaking it up.
Regulators and courts should, however, take a far more stringent
approach to corporations growing through mergers and acquisi-
tions. Antitrust law should not, as Robert Bork advocated, be
indifferent to whether growth occurs internally or externally. For
many reasons, growth through mergers and acquisitions is less so-
cially desirable than internal growth.
First and foremost, the nation is better served by having more
rather than fewer companies, and every merger and acquisition
causes at least one firm to disappear. Even if consumers might ben-
efit from a corporate merger, there are fewer employment options
for workers and fewer opportunities for suppliers. Antitrust laws are
about competition, but properly conceived antitrust policy should
also be about ensuring all forms of commercial competition—in-
cluding in labor and up-chain commercial markets—and not
merely about competition between rivals for customers. The reduc-
tion of opportunities for employees, suppliers, and contractors in
the industry diminishes individual freedom in real and meaningful
ways.690 The plight of the poultry growers is one example.
Second, the ready availability of mergers and acquisitions sup-
presses research and development. Steve Jobs is reported to have
said that every merger represents a failure of innovation.691 Rather
than investing heavily in research themselves, large companies
often find it more efficient to buy up smaller companies that create
valuable new products or processes. Conversely, the entrepreneur’s
dream increasingly is not to grow and sustain a vibrant, indepen-
dent business but—having developed something new and
valuable—to cash in by selling out to a corporate giant.692 This may
690. See supra notes 45, 197–200, 224, 246–48, 287–299, 355, 563–631 and accompanying
text.
691. Sarah Cohen, Apple’s Acquisition Aspirations: Think Again, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2013/04/25/apples-acquisition-aspirations-
think-again.
692. Laurie Segall, The Start Up Choice: Get Big or Get Bought, CNN MONEY (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/30/technology/startup_acquisitions.
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be profitable for the parties directly involved, but it is not good for
the nation.
Third, mergers and acquisitions often do considerable damage
to local communities. The community that loses a business that is
headquartered there loses not only jobs but civic leadership and
philanthropy. Corporate executives are often leaders in local civic
institutions. They sit on the boards of trustees of museums, thea-
ters, orchestras, ballets, schools, libraries, philanthropies, and the
like.693 One study found that the presence of corporate headquar-
ters is associated with the existence of elite nonprofit cultural
institutions in a community.694 When top corporate executives are
relocated elsewhere, their expertise, energy, and civic concerns are
relocated with them. Local communities lose philanthropic support
as well. Another study found that companies that are headquar-
tered in a community contribute more to local charities such as the
United Way than do comparable businesses headquartered else-
where.695 Corporate delocalization, therefore, has significant
ramifications for the civic fabric of the nation. Once again, antitrust
policy should concern itself not merely with competition between
sellers but with other areas of competition as well, including com-
petition among cities and states for jobs and economic activity.
Communities with large companies that grow by devouring smaller
firms enjoy powerful advantages in those struggles.696
Fourth, there are too many false positives in proposed merger
analyses. That is, the predicted net benefits for consumers often are
not realized.697 The real driving force behind many mergers is in-
creased compensation and prestige for top executives.698 Even
when a merger proposal is supported by elaborate analyses, claims
of future synergies and efficiencies may be camouflage designed to
persuade regulators, courts, and the stock market about the bene-
fits of the merger. Indeed, the supporting analyses can also be a
tool of self-delusion for the top executives themselves, who want to
believe that a merger will produce remarkable benefits. Regulators
are often persuaded that a merger will produce efficiencies that will
693. Brunell, supra note 14, at 162–66.
694. Id. at 170.
695. Id.
696. Requiring that the corporate headquarters of a previously-independent firm not be
relocated would probably have limited utility. Such a requirement would have an expiration
date, after which desires for efficiency would dictate that the subsidiary’s headquarters would
be combined with the parent company’s headquarters.
697. See supra notes 480–82- and accompanying text.
698. See supra notes 53–57, 60–61, 115, 510–14 and accompanying text.
118 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:1
benefit consumers when, in fact, those predictions will not material-
ize. It is easy to put too much faith in the ability of economic
models to predict the future. Markets are in constant flux. They are
driven by a complex multiplicity of forces—technological, social,
cultural, demographic, and economic—that cannot possibly be
foreseen. The assumptions upon which any economic model is
based will inevitably, and sometimes quickly, become outdated.
Fifth and perhaps most important, citizens are better off with
more, smaller companies than with fewer, larger firms. Citizens are
not merely consumers. They are also workers who benefit from a
diversity of employers. And small and medium-sized businesses are
better off with a diversity of potential suppliers and customers.
It is tempting to be lured by the Siren song of economists that
promises objectivity. It is comforting to believe that antitrust has
become a scientific (or at least semi-scientific) discipline based on
ideologically-neutral economic principles. But this lure has led us
into an age of oligopolies, giant corporations, and consolidated
power.
Take for example the telecommunications industry. We live in a
world that depends upon data and content being delivered to us
either through cables or without them. The stories of consolidation
in both the wired and wireless markets consists of a dizzying array of
mergers and acquisitions of all kinds—horizontal, vertical, and con-
glomerate—some successful and permanent, and some that later
resulted in spins offs.699 As of this writing, Charter Communications
is seeking to acquire Time Warner, along with Bright House Net-
works, a smaller cable company.700 Meanwhile, two of the largest
firms in the wireless television market, AT&T and DirecTV are seek-
ing permission to merge.701 Charter, Time Warner Cable, AT&T
and DirecTV are all corporate giants.702 Someone unfamiliar with
the process might be flabbergasted that such competitors would
even entertain the possibility that the FCC would allow them to
merge; but, in fact, the companies’ expectations of approval are
quite reasonable. In her book about mergers and monopoly power
in the telecommunications industry, Susan Crawford writes: “Just
699. See generally SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUS-
TRY AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GUILDED AGE (2013).
700. Michael J. de la Merced, Cable TV Merger Signals a Shift in the Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2015, at A1.
701. Roger Yu, AT&T Pays $48.5B for DirecTV, USA TODAY, May 19, 2014, at 1A; Roger
Yu, AT&T-DirecTV Deal Could Reshape Pay-TV Industry, USA TODAY, May 19, 2014, at 1B.
702. AT&T and DirecTV rank, respectively, eleventh and ninety-eighth in the Fortune
500. Times Warner Cable and Charter Communications rank forty-forth and 331st respec-
tively. Comcast ranks forty-third. 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 486, at F-35.
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two major media-telecommunications mergers have been rejected
by the FCC in the twenty-first century. . . . Both rejections were unu-
sual.”703 Crawford notes that the FCC even approved the merger of
Sirius and XM, even though the combined firm would monopolize
the satellite radio market.704
Merger mania is not limited to telecommunications. It is ram-
pant everywhere.705 Coca-Cola recently bought a share of Monster
Beverage;706 and the company that produces Chicken of the Sea
tuna is buying Bumble Bee.707 Antitrust regulators approved airline
mergers between Delta and Northwest in 2008, United and Conti-
nental in 2010, Southwest and AirTran in 2011, and American and
US Airways in 2013.708 Facebook recently acquired WhatsApp;709
Kraft Foods and H.J. Heinz have agreed to merge;710 Reynolds
American is seeking to purchase tobacco rival Lorillard;711 Hallibur-
ton is buying its rival oil Baker Hughes;712 Actavis, the world’s
largest generic drug manufacturer, has reached an agreement to
acquire Allergan;713 Dollar Tree is seeking to buy Family Dollar;714
Staples wants to purchase Home Depot, which itself acquired Of-
ficeMax in 2013;715 and health insurer Anthem wants to buy its rival
Cigna.716 These represent only a fraction of recent and proposed
703. Id. at 208. Strong public opposition to the Comcast-Time Warner Cable merger re-
portedly spooked regulators, who were said to be either leaning against the merger (DOJ) or
prepared to scuttle the deal by delaying it (FCC). Roger Yu & Mike Snider, How Comcast, Time
Warner Deal Unraveled, USA TODAY, (Apr. 25, 2015), available at http://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/2015/04/24/how-comcast-deal-to-buy-time-warner-cable-fell-apart/26313471/.
704. CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE, supra note 699, at 208–09.
705. See David Gelles, Mega-Mergers Popular Again on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2014,
at A1 (reporting on “one of the biggest booms in mergers and acquisitions”).
706. David Gelles, Coca-Cola Buys Stake In Monster Beverage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2014, at
B3.
707. Bumble Bee Seafoods was the last major American company in the canned-tuna
market. Chicken of the Sea is owned by a Thai company, and a South Korea company pur-
chased Starkist in 2008. Roberto A. Ferdman, Seafood Giant is Poised to Reel in Bumble Bee,
WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2014, at A12.
708. See Jad Mauawad, Merger of American and US Airways is Waived Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
27, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1ysDXAW; Jad Mauawad, Merger of American and US Airways is
Waived Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at B1 (reporting on the earlier mergers).
709. Id.




714. Michael J. de la Merced, Dollar Tree Bids for Family Dollar To Help Compete With Big
Retailers, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2014, at B3.
715. Liz Hoffman & Dana Mattioli, Staples, Office Depot in Advanced Talks to Merge, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 2, 1015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/staples-office-depot-in-advanced-talks-to-merge-
1422937999.
716. Jeffrey Cane & Reed Abelson, Anthem Makes $47 Billion Offer for Rival Cigna, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2015, at 4.
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mergers between very large companies.717 Some of the currently
proposed mergers may never be consummated, and others that are
unconsummated may prove temporary. But the point remains: As
was the case in the original Gilded Age, we are living in another era
of merger mania, and it is time for a wide-ranging debate about
what corporate size—and especially corporate growth through
merger—means for the nation.
At bottom, antitrust policy is about values. It is about what kind
of society we wish to live in. Antitrust policy both reflects and affects
national values. We, as a society, value efficiency and consumer wel-
fare. But those are not our only values. If we have one value that
transcends all others, it is freedom. Consolidated power—both gov-
ernmental and commercial—threatens freedom. Just as
constitutional law is a key tool for limiting consolidated governmen-
tal power, antitrust law is a key tool for limiting consolidated
commercial power. An antitrust policy that forgets that reneges on
one of its most critical historical roles.
717. See, e.g., Peter Eavis & David Gelles, Deemed Safe to Merge: A Stampede of Takeovers Could
Mean Growth Ahead, Or Just a Rise in Irrationality, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2014, at B1; James B.
Stewart, Big Mergers In Media Deserve Wary Eye, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2014, at B1.
